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ABSTRACT
GAMBLE-EDDINGTON, TAWREAK “Representative”
Department of Political Science, June 2021.

Democracy

Rethought.

ADVISOR: Robert Hislope
The rapidly changing dynamism of the 21st century has left democratic
institutions in shambles as populists rise to power and, arguably, threaten to undermine
the very fabric of the democratic way of life through increasingly exclusionary politics.
The popularity of populist leaders and reemergence of ethno-nationalism demonstrate a
shortcoming of many representative democracies, their elites’ ability to adequately
represent the masses. In this paper, I will argue that recent trends in the decline of
democracy can be partially attributed to a lack of democratic legitimacy that has been
caused by a failure to intentionally account for demographic diversity in the elites-masses
compromise that underpins representative democracies. Furthermore, I will argue that the
majoritarian notion of representation is not sufficient to represent the demographic
composition of multicultural democracies and suggest a mixed regime that provides for
greater descriptive representation of minorities in national politics.
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INTRODUCTION
These, then, will be some of the features of democracy... it will be, in all likelihood, an
agreeable, lawless, parti-colored commonwealth, dealing with all alike on a footing of
equality, whether they be really equal or not. — Plato, the Republic, Book 8, Section 558.

Can a democracy truly be representative if there is a need for “equal footing”
amongst citizens, that is as of yet unmet, in the political realm and elected officials are
not representative of the populace? The notion of democratic representation is founded on
the basis of equality amongst all citizens of a political community. Representative
democracy is conducted through the delegation of political decisions to elected officials
who are “responsive to the direct will of the people” in the moment, oftentimes referred
to as populist, and officials who are merely “rendering present [through the discretionary
expression of their preferences] the people they claim to represent” in their decisions
(Näsström 1-2). In either case, representative democracy is intended to complete the goal
of governance and serve as a compromise between elites and the masses; where elections
give the masses a right to choose representatives but prevents them from actually
intervening in ruling (Näsström 2). In this paper, I will argue that recent trends in the
decline of democracy can be partially attributed to a lack of democratic legitimacy that
has been caused by a failure to intentionally account for demographic diversity in elitesmasses compromise of many democracies; furthermore, I will argue that the majoritarian
notion of many representative democracies is not sufficient to represent the demographic
composition of multicultural democracies and suggest a mixed regime that provides for
greater descriptive representation of minorities in national politics.
Diversity, and thus descriptive representation, necessitates the inclusion of
different types of people within a given society or state to be intentionally included,
giving way for a large breath of lived experiences or backgrounds. From differences in
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culture, race, ethnicity and religion to variances in sex/gender identity, sexual orientation
and disability, diversity can be encapsulated by a large range of experiences. Diversity
can also, however, be seen through non-physical characteristics such as ideological
differences, political affiliation, geographic origins, education and socio-economic class.
The characteristics corresponding to each of the aforementioned forms of diversity are
important when discussing descriptive representation; for descriptively representative
politicians can encapsulate all, some, or none of the aforementioned characteristics in
relation to their constituents. However, the number of differing types of diversity makes
it difficult to coherently analyze diversity in representation or democracy without leaving
out some segments. As such, this essay will focus primarily on ethnic/racial diversity in
terms of descriptive representation or diversity since it has come center stage in Western
democracies as a result of social upheavals and mass mobilization around issues of racial
injustice in the state or security apparatuses; most notable of the upheavals has been the
Black Lives Matter Movement which began in the USA and has spread internationally.
Global migration has increased in the past few decades, with North America and
Europe receiving the vast majority of migrants and led to increasingly diverse
populations being present in Western democracies. In a 2019 Pew Research public
perception poll, the 27 nations surveyed—which collectively account for more than half
of the world’s international migrants and includes every Western democracy—the
majority of citizens said that their country had become more diverse in the past 20 years
(Poushter N.p). Among the countries surveyed, the Greeks were the most likely to say
that their country has become more diverse (92%) and more than 75% of those surveyed
in Sweden, Germany, Spain, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Italy and France said
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that their country has become more diverse (Poushter N.p). In the USA, however,
perception of diversity varied by race/ethnicity with white Americans (80%) being more
likely than black Americans (69%) to think their country has become more diverse in the
past 20 years. In the wake of the growing diversity in Western democracies, a median of
23% of those surveyed opposed increasing diversity in their country, viewing diversity as
a bad thing or perceiving less diversity as a good thing (Poushter N.p); of those who
viewed diversity as a bad or unwanted thing, especially in Europe, Pew found that the
majority of them supported right-wing populists. With growing racial/ethnic diversity and
the current rise of right-wing populism, race and ethnicity has come to center stage in the
current geo-political landscape (Roskin 62).
In the late 20th century, the Left gained tremendous ground, taking power
throughout Europe from
communist puppet regimes,
as citizens took to the
streets and initiated a
period of democratization
that has spread globally and
has lasted up until recently
(Roskin 62). Recently,
however, populist
movements expressing discontent with representative democracy have come from not
only the far right, but the Left and they have both begun to shake the established order or
regime (Crouch 125). According to political scientist Margaret Canovan, Populism is an
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anti-establishment and anti-elite ideology that heightens tensions between “the people”
and the distant or corrupt “elite” (Canovan 60). In Canovan’s conceptualization of
populism, “the people” can typically be classified as encompassing the nation or ethnos,
the (economic) underdog, or the ordinary people at any given time. Each classification of
“the people” plays to a differing fear or concern that is exacerbated by populist leaders:
the people as a “nation” is hostile to migrants or ethnic minorities, the people as the
“underdog’’ expresses concern about economic conditions, and the people as the
“ordinary people” differentiates between the “common” people and elites (Canovan 5055). No matter how a populism may define the people, Populism focuses on the agency
of individual leaders to form connections and to followers, exploiting the existing
institutional weaknesses seen in socio-economic conditions or the political establishment.
As such, like an earthquake of great magnitude, the pro-democracy dissidents of the 1989
revolts have become the voter base of the new radical-right and democracy is being
routed as anti-democratic sentiments have quickly shaken the core of modern democratic
institutions (Oberschall 90).
From the 2015 Refugee crisis and the 2010 Eurozone crisis to the current
COVID-19 pandemic, Europe’s fundamental structure has been rattled, and public trust
in government chipped away slowly, by the quickly shifting nature of the 21st century
and its various socio-economic crises. Similarly, in America, economic hardship in the
late 2000s, the War on Terror, anti-immigrant sentiment in general and the ongoing
COVID-19 pandemic have left the political field ripe for anti-democracy mobilization.
Far-right populism, in particular, has proven itself rather potent at mobilizing “the
people” against “the establishment” and capitalizing on discontent over socio-economic
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fluctuations. The strategy of the far-right populist is simple: ascend to power through
democratic institutions and claiming the right to speak for “the people”—often playing
off of the disdain held for ruling parties or established institutions and qualifying “the
people” as a subset of the general populace—and then diverging from the political order
to erode democratic institutions (Crouch 125-126). Coinciding with the rise of far-right
populism, in the political realm, has been a redefining of “the people,” often to the
exclusionary benefit of the majority group, in many countries away from the demos and
towards the ethnos; seen through the growing apprehension to liberal notions of
multiculturalism, a distrust of government institutions/legitimacy and the popularity of
anti-immigration political platforms (Wike N.p). The term democracy, it would seem, is
increasingly more exclusive.
From increased rates of diversity, repeated socio-economic crisis and growing
disdain for traditional parties to faltering democratic institutions and the heightened
levels of immigration, the liberal democratic order has become weakened and is under
siege by proponents of nationalism and populism (Wike N.p). In recent years,
democracies globally have seen radical populists and right-wing parties garner significant
levels of support that they have not witnessed since the mid-20th century; through
political fear mongering and sharp critiques of democratic institutions, populist and
nationalist that have sought to renegotiate the established democratic order or completely
upend it (Stone 2018). All across the globe, populists have risen to power, claiming to
“speak for the people”, and stressed the homogeneity of the people by excluding specific
population segments as others (Stone 2018). And as often is the case, fringe leaders have
called for the fundamental changing of the democratic process of integration, the
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destruction of democratic institutions and dramatic shifts in notions of “the people”
through fear mongering. What are the results? The global decline of democracy and the
erosion of the liberal order.
In the 2016 Democracy Index the average global score fell, on a scale of 0 to 10,
from 5.55 in 2015 to 5.52 with 72 countries experiencing declines in democracy and a
mere 38 countries showing improvements (Democracy Index 5). Apart from the instances
of democracy reversals or transitions into new “democratic categories,” there has been a
steady decline in many countries in some aspects of governance, political participation
and media freedoms, and a clear deterioration in attitudes associated with, or conducive
to, democracy; in the USA and some western European countries, in particular, a distrust
of government institutions has led to rapidly declining scores (Democracy Index 19).
Eastern Europe, Latin America, the Middle East and North Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa
and Western Europe all suffered from significant declines in their regional democratic
rankings and every other region stagnated; chief amongst the regions, however, was
Eastern Europe which recorded a decline from 5.55 to 5.43 (Democracy Index 3-5).
Additionally, the number of “full democracies” declined from 20 in 2015 to 19 in 2016,
with the USA falling into the category of “flawed democracy” (to 7.98 in 2015 from 8.05
in 2015) and popular confidence in the functioning of public institutions declining
globally. The “march” of democracy globally has come to a dramatic halt and, it would
seem, the democracies of the world are blindly marching backwards; the problems rooted
in the institutional inequalities of democracy or outright neglect have gone unchecked for
too long and democratic institutions are now crumbling.
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A number of events occurring globally capture the current state of democracy.
Throughout Eastern Europe, there has been a mood of deep popular disappointment with
democracy as a result of
ineffective government
policies or external
crisis and the countries
once herald as symbols
of democratization is
falling from grace. The
region of Eastern
Europe, in 2016,
recorded the most dramatic regression in democracy out of any region; not only are there
no “full democracies'' in Eastern Europe there has also been a consistent weakening of
the electoral processes (Democracy Index 7). In Poland, the Polish Law and Justice (PiS)
has systematically undermined the democratic institutions of Poland, rigging the judicial
branch of government, pushing through nationalistic regulations, curtailing women’s’
rights and undermining independent media (Tworzecki N.p). Similarly, in Hungary
Viktor Orban and his Fidesz party have sought to establish illiberal democratic
institutions, promote xenophobia —through discriminatory rhetoric and the literal
building of a border wall—nationally, attack LGBTQ+ rights, manipulate the media and
centralize government power (McVeigh N.p). Eastern Europe, despite the region's ability
to lead the pack in eroding democratic institutions, is not alone in their crisis of
democracy.
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Throughout other parts of Europe, democratic institutions have come into
question as populist or nationalistic rhetoric has washed over the continent. In the United
Kingdom, nationalist sentiment and notions of “controlling the border” from immigrants
or other “undesirables” has led the country to distance themselves from continental
attempts at European harmonization by leaving the European Union; all the while, the
fragile peace on the Emerald Island has come into question as the border between the
Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland over land—and the sea border between the UK
and the Republic of Ireland—could become a “hard” border (Democracy Index 5-10). In
the United States, similar in many regards to Hungary, Trump was elected on a
nationalistic platform of “America First,” anti-immigration notions of building a border
wall along the south of the USA and populist notions of destroying the establishment or
draining “the swamp” (NPR N.p.). In 2020 Trump lost reelection to the Democratic
nominee Joe Biden, but his platform still galvanized nationalist sentiments and led over
70,000,000 American voters to head to the poles to support his agenda; nevertheless, in
the 2020 Election, both Donald Trump and his adversary Joe Biden broke American
records for voter turnout (NPR N.p). Trump's rise to prominence can be seen as a direct
reflection of the ever-decreasing trust of Americans in government, appealing to notions
of elitism or corruption within the established institution to build a case for why voters
should choose him (Democracy Index 7). The lack of trust in government has had a
corrosive effect on American democracy, as reflected in the decline in the US score in the
Democracy Index.
Brexit and American support for Donald Trump, as well as political events in
places such as Poland, capture a set of contradictions that are besetting contemporary
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democracies. Populist leaders and nationalist sentiments are gaining popularity
throughout democracies and are eroding trust or functioning of democratic institutions;
the 2016 election of Trump, as well as his voter turnout in 2020, and Brexit are
vindications of the current state of democracy (Democracy Index 7). At the same time,
however, the record-breaking participation in some democracies shows the desire for
something “better” and the possibility for democracies to overcome illiberal practices
through popular political participation (Democracy Index 3-4). Oftentimes in the wake of
crises, the citizenry becomes disillusioned with their own society and their fear of the
“unknown future,” at that moment either great change or great catastrophe can befall a
democratic society. The major threat to democracy in the contemporary period, however,
is not only political parties challenging national institutions, but also the populace's
embracement of populist rhetoric and growing disdain for democracy.
With years passing since the large-scale re-insurgence of far-right and populist
leaders globally, where does democracy stand and has the situation improved? Well, put
simply, no. After improvements in 2018, with the Democracy Index global average rising
to 5.48, the 2019 Democracy Index global average sits at 5.44 (a 0.01 decline from
2016’s record low global average of 5.45) (Democracy Index 6). The decline in the 2019
global average in 2019 was driven by a sharp regression in Latin America and SubSaharan Africa, a small regression in Middle East and North Africa, and stagnation in the
remaining regions covered (Democracy Index 6). For western democracies there was
little improvement with the exception of France and Portugal who were able to emerge
from the “flawed democracy” category they found themselves in throughout 2018 and
join the ranks of “full democracy.” At the same time, however, Malta fell out of the “full
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democracy” category to become a “flawed democracy” (Democracy Index 6). The
majority of western democracies, however, remained stagnant in their 2019 ranking. The
defining feature in western democracies, according to the Economist Intelligence Unit,
were mass protests caused wide-spread dissatisfaction with the political status quo, most
notably anti-racists, anti-police brutality and Black Lives Matter Movements in the
United States and other
parts of the developed
world (Democracy
Index 6-8). Most
protests have been
centered on some
segment of the issue of
democratic
representation. The mobilization of the people in democracies, like that of the large voter
turnout in 2016 and now in 2020, show promise for democratic renewal and the peoples
effect meaningful change in the future. However, the fundamental inequalities of
representative democracy remain unchanged, and democracy has either stagnated or
regressed depending on the region (Democracy Index 6).
As the foundation of democracy is attacked from all fronts, this essay will not
only explore the current decline of democracy but to reflect on the origins of democracies
in general —looking at political theorists such as Aristotle, Plato, Rousseau—and the
development of representative democracies. To bring ancient political theorists, many of
which provide detailed critiques of democracy and whose works have lasting relevance
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even till today, this essay will aim to integrate and critique ancient political theorists
throughout the duration of the work.
Following the section on democratic regimes and democratic theory, this essay
will complete a comparative study of a handful of diverse democracies, as seen by the
Economist’s 2019 Democracy Index’s ratings, to explore variances in minority
representation in national legislators. To those ends, the comparative section will draw
substantially on expansive academic datasets currently in existence. As such, the
empirical section will use the Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) Data Sets from the Center
for Comparative and International Studies. The EPR Data Sets identifies all politically
relevant ethnic groups and their access to state power in every country of the world from
1946 to 2017. The EPR Data Sets include annual data on over 800 groups and codes the
degree to which their representatives held executive-level state power. The EPR Data
Sets will allow this essay to develop a comprehensive assessment of how democracies are
performing in terms of descriptively representing the populace, in particular marginalized
groups.
Additionally, this essay will also focus on the notion of representation in
democracies, the prominence of ethnic politics in democracies, the shortcomings of
consociationalism and the flaws of majoritarian representation by doing a comparative
case study of the three different types of democratic regimes (Anglo-American
majoritarian, Consociational, and Semi-autonomous). The comparative analysis of
democratic regime cases will make use of existing literature on the case studies and draw
on extensive data in order to gain a holistic idea about the level, or accuracy, of
descriptive representation in each case study. To those ends, this essay will choose three
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cases from the empirical section and study them more completely by using relevant data
on minority representation and democracy. The modes of empirical analysis that will be
used to accurately derive the political conditions within each case study will be: (1) the
EPR-Core Data Set from the Center for Comparative and International Studies, (2) VDEM reports, and (3) the Democracy Index from the Economist's Intelligence Unit.
The Democracy Index provides unique data driven insights into the health of
modern democracies and the ability of minority groups to participate or the level of said
participation in the country. The Democracy Index measures the health of contemporary
democracies and classifies countries as Full Democracies, Flawed Democracies, Hybrid
Regimes and Authoritarian Regimes. The Democracy Index uses four indicators to
classify regimes: the presence of a competitive and multiparty political system, universal
adult suffrage, regularly contested and secure elections conducted with secret ballots, and
public access of major parties to the electorate through the media or campaigning. The
cross referencing of the three data sets will allow me to develop a comparative analysis of
minority representation and the conditions of democracy of my case study countries.
Unfortunately, many have long dismissed the practicality or functionality of
promoting some form of demographically representative form of government,
discounting it as merely race or ethnic politics. This essay, however, will analyze which
democratic regime works best in the increasingly diverse 21st century and explore the
possibility of a mixed system that more fully incorporates minority groups in proportion
to their demographic size and makes use of modern technology for improved democratic
governance in politics. The global “march” of democracy stalled in the 2000s, confronted
difficulties in the late 2000s as a result of various economic crises, retreated with the rise
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of populism in 2016 and has continued to stagnant or decline globally; it seems that
democracy has taken a break from its march internationally, needing some time to gather
its energy or breath before continuing on its journey. Democracy’s decline does not,
however, mean that renewal of democracy’s march is impossible. Recent waves in voter
turnout and civil protest in the developing show the potential for democratic renewal and
change (Democracy Index 6-8). Nevertheless, with democracy declining globally, it the
current way in which we understand democratic representation and democratic
governance needs to change to usher in a new stage of democratic renewal.
As countries have expanded and encompassed new lands and peoples throughout
history, the various ethnic groups have endlessly competed with the dominant
demographic for power and have been delegated to less than demographically
proportional political power in many countries. This in turn has created a system of
continuous division and competition between a country’s dominant demographic group
and its minority groups, a trend that is prevalent in multicultural countries globally and
often coincides with secessionist movements. The culmination of various means of
conducting ethnic politics, historically, and promoting “state unity” have led to
drastically different representative democracies in Western society that have long been
dominated by the ethnic majority. This essay hopes to add to the corpus of existing
political thought and comparative politics by examining how we understand
representative democracies and how we can move said understanding forward to be more
inclusive in the wake of the decline of democracy globally and the expanding diversity of
democracies; the times of the completely homogenous society thought to be ideal for
democracy have passed and the future is increasingly ethnically diverse.
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CHAPTER 1- The Inequalities of Democracy and Representative
Democracy
“The People” as Ethnos or Dēmos:
When politicians in democracies say “we the people” to whom are they referring?
Are you included in “the people” so often talked about and, if so, why? It is commonly
held that in the “natural state,” the time before the creation of society or the state, all
people are equal to one another with the same rights and privileges in society; however,
in order to obtain some type of security of person or property and form a community
aspects of equality are ceded to the political community to form a political regime
(Dahrendorf 17).1 In this understanding of inequality, the regime or the state can be seen
as a manifestation, at its core, of the people’s will and inequality as a perpetuation of the
state. At the formation of every regime, ranging from monarchies and aristocracies to
democracies, the people or the dēmos has to be defined for institutions or societies to
function effectively (Taylor, N.p). The level of inequality inherent to a society at its
origins can be seen as parallels to the inequalities amongst individuals (such as individual
physical abilities, intellectual prowess...etc) who compose the new society before its
creation (Dahrendorf 17). The aforementioned criteria for inequality, however, outlines
inequalities of natural ability and not inequalities of social position that are created as a
result of the state (Dahrendorf 19). Many assume that the people or dēmos within a
democracy are inclusive and extend a voice to most individuals, if not all, within a
society. However, inclusion and exclusion are often symbiotic qualities of a democratic
1

Original discussions of the “natural state” can be drawn to the many interpretations of human nature and
the origins of inequality discussed by political theorists such as John Locke, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, and
Thomas Hobbes.
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state that are rooted in the defining of the people and the creation of inequalities of social
position.
The focus of this work will be on inequalities of social position and examine how
the said inequalities developed in societies, looking at how the unequal natural
capabilities of some were stratified in society through social differentiation of elites’
positions and social stratification of reputation or wealth in elites’ rank systems
(Dahrendorf 19). Elites—who are a small ‘ruling minority’ that has become increasingly
professionalized and influences or controls the socio-political landscape of a given
country—is, in theory, constrained by the same legal-constitutional rules and practices as
others within society (Higley 1). However, by way of their influential role in society
elites usually have enough autonomy to interpret societal laws, modify rules, and alter
public responsibilities in ways that protect or propagate their interests. Additionally, in
the modern context, elites employ mechanisms of society like the mass media to sway
non-elite groups and coercion when needed (Higley 1). When describing the qualities of
elites, Higley wrote:
They are the principal national-level decision makers in the largest or most
pivotal organizations and movements. Elites include top business,
government and military leaders, along with leaders of parties, professional
associations, trade unions, media combines, major interest groups,
important churches and other politically influential and hierarchically
structured organizations and movements. The outcomes they affect are the
basic stability or instability of political regimes, the forms and workings of
political institutions, and the main policies followed by national
governments. Typically, elite persons enjoy elevated social status
(sometimes ‘celebrity’ status) and large financial rewards, though these and
other perquisites are best seen as consequences and correlates of their
organizational positions, not separate bases of influence and power (Higley
3-5).
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Elites, in their essence, therefore, are differentiated by the people and stratified through
special privileges or influences not granted to the rest of the people (Higgins 3). With the
creation of regimes, elites helped develop the criteria for not only which individuals will
be included—and thus given the right to participate in the political community or,
sometimes, receive government protections—but which ones will be excluded is a central
tension. Inclusion and exclusion can often change over time as elites’ opinions change or
the masses determine new qualifications of worthiness (Taylor 81).2 In the process of
defining the people, nevertheless, socio-political criteria help choose those included in
deliberation and those excluded, making inequality seem natural to societies, including
democracies (Taylor, N.p).3
Since the time of ancient Athens, notions of governance by the dēmos through
assemblies has been a cornerstone of democratic theory and the formation of modern
representative democracies. In the constitutions of democratic regimes, as well as the
covenants of any other type of regime, the people are defined in clear terms along ideas
or guidelines laid out by the political community; however, the term itself contains a
porifera of understandings and, this ambiguity, leads many to believe that the people are
inclusive even when it is not within their society (Agamben 3-4). In most cases, the
people are defined through one's citizenship or more generally through one's ability to

2

Elites will be defined as those powerful people who hold a disproportionate amount of wealth, privilege,
political power or skill in a society; they can obtain said power through natural capabilities, however, this is
not the only means of creating or sustaining elite statues. Elites can find their origins as those who first
began claiming aspects of the natural states as their own and, subsequently, began a process of social
stratification with them at the center.
3
While societal elites can exclusion as a tool to prevent segments of the masses from governing or
participating in society and thus prevents the “tyranny of the masses,” inclusion, in general, has historically
led to the “inclusion of the masses” in abstract or elitist political institutions.
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participate in the larger political community (Aristotle Book I).4 Therefore, in a
democracy, bounds of inclusion are set through citizenship and those who are not
included in or are ineligible to fall within the said category are not included in the people.
Aristotle writes extensively on the topic of citizenship and says, “Consequently, our
inquiry must be into who is to be called a citizen and what a citizen is, for citizen too is
often a subject of dispute: not everyone agrees that the same person is a citizen, since
someone who is a citizen in a democracy is often not one in an oligarchy” (Aristotle
Book I). Aristotle promoted inequality within society, based on citizenship or exclusion,
because he believed that it was not only natural but essential in the formation of a
functioning political community.
For Aristotle, not all human beings are political in nature or able to meaningfully
participate because of their natural capabilities; namely Aristotle, in accordance with his
time, identifies those within the household (women, slaves and children) and foreigners
in those unfit for political rule (Aristotle Book I). Women, slaves and children were seen,
by Aristotle, as necessary to society in order to complete labor or produce products and
yet as unequal in their natural capabilities to participate in the community. While some
are unfit, the “free” within a society are able to not only partake in the political
community through active engagement as a “political animal” but to reach their full
human potential through said participation (Aristotle Book I). To prevent those unable to
fully participate in the political community from corrupting it and to maintain a separate
private sphere of production/ labor, Aristotle assumes an almost natural inequality of
social stratification based on natural capabilities.
4

For this essay, I will adopt Aristotle’s definition of citizenship and apply it accordingly throughout the
writing.
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While Aristotle conceptualized “the citizen” for his ideal society, it is also
important to note that during the insular times of Ancient Greece it was clear who was a
citizen and who wasn’t; Greek elites didn’t need to make arbitrary decisions who was a
member of the political community, unless imagining a new society, for citizenship was
determined by lineage and seemed “natural” (Aristotle Book I). Looked at in a modern
context, however, Aristotle’s conceptualization of citizenship as central to determining
the political community seems to have held true; from marriage and ancestry to
specialized tracks for skilled professionals or investors, every country has developed their
own criteria for citizenship and, thus defining the people.5 Whether in an ancient or
modern context, who participates in the political community as a citizen can be seen as a
decision based on a set of outlined criteria that seem “natural” or concerted defining of
the people to reflect political motives.
Aristotle was concerned, primarily, with the studying of inequality as a form of
social stratification, but he fails in comprehensively exploring the origins of social
stratification in political communities or societies (Dahrendorf 20). Why, you may ask,
did Aristotle fail in his endeavor to holistically comprehend social stratification? From
the onset, Aristotle assumed that there were inherent differences not only of ability or
skill, but of rank between individuals; he, thus, does not differentiate between the created
inequality of social stratification and the natural inequality of natural capability.
Aristotle falls into the trap of attempting to study social stratification, while failing to

5

Aristotle, like many political theorist of his time, accept exclusions based on sex or birth as natural to
society and notions of race or ethnicy did not need to be addressed because of the homogenous nature of
Greek city states. Later, in Rome, however, multi confessionalism and multiethnicity develops under the
empire and elites have to make decisions about who’s in and who’s out.
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recognize his presupposed assumption of inequality, applying unequal ranks to society as
a natural feature (Dahrendorf 20-21).
For ancient political theorist Plato, similar to Aristotle, a strict aristocratic society
with a strong meritocratic component centered around justice and not democratic
freedom created the ideal way to rule in the favor of the people (Plato Book IV). While
discussing a “just society” Plato wrote, “When the trader, the auxiliary [Zoe or bare
living], and the guardian [Bio or political living] each do their own business, that is
justice, and will make the city just (Plato Book IV).” In Plato’s ideal world everyone did
their specific tasks, and only their task, in a fragmented society and the people—meaning
those able to participate in the state’s political community and contribute to the
governance of said state—were defined as an exclusive group of individuals known as
the guardians. The guardians, by all of Plato’s accounts, were to be a group of individuals
of superior “nature” or ability that, as a result, were given special privileges and tasked
with ruling society as a part of the political community (Plato Book IV).
Plato, like Aristotle, embraced inequality in society and conceptualized it as a
natural or needed aspect of regime in order to progress effective governance. For Plato,
the natural capabilities were ingrained into each human at birth and should be the leading
factor in their development or role in life; for class was created in order to meet the needs
in society (Plato Book IV). Put simply, some were born to be farmers, some were born to
be weavers and others to be guardians. Therefore, Plato embraced the natural inequality
in ability to perform different occupations and sought to limit individuals to their
“natural” occupation so that they could foster a specialization in that role and not corrupt
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the jobs of others, in particular that of governance, through unspecialized input (Plato
Book IV).
Plato’s notion of a “just society,” like that of Aristotle, bases the notion of the
people on a quality that he believed to be ideal for society. For Plato, notions of
citizenship do not particularly matter, but the people are, nevertheless, defined narrowly
as those in the guardian class based on birth and individuals’ “nature.” For Plato,
exclusion—in direct opposition to the notions of inclusion inherent to the foundation of
the democratic regime he hated—sat at the center of creating a just society and, thus,
informed, how he defined the people of his society (Plato Book IV). When looking at
Plato and Aristotle from a historical perspective they are not unique in their creation of
qualifications for being part of the people nor are they special in their assertion that their
interpretation of the people is correct. Despite the differences of Plato’s notion of society,
he too falls into the same trap as Plato when analyzing the inequality of social
stratification. Plato’s understanding of society and conceptualization of a “just society”
assumes that men are by nature unequal in rank and, thus, fall in a natural hierarchy
within society; at the top of society, as a result, is the inequality of natural capabilities
codified in the inequality of social stratification through rank systems (Dahrendorf 2021).
While Plato created inequalities and exclusion within a society based on human
“nature” or ability, Aristotle created exclusions based on citizenship or paradoxically
“freedom.” Both assume, as previously discussed, that the creation of the elite and the
inequality of social stratification come about as a result of natural capabilities
(Dahrendorf 20-21). Since Plato and Aristotle hold the assumption that unequal rank or
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social stratification is natural, however, it is unlikely that their works can provide
adequate accounts about the origins of elites, for they assume their existence rather than
detail their creation through social stratification (Dahrendorf 23). The matter of the
inequality of social stratification and, thus, elites’ origins remain a highly debated topic.
On one hand, political theorists like Schmoller hold that elites can find their origins in the
division of labor (Dahrendorf 25-27). And on the other hand, political theorists like
Parsons assert that elites came to being as a result of the existence of the concept of
evaluation or worth and its significance for social systems (Dahrendorf 27-30). Besides
the conceptualizations of Parsons and Schmoller there exists substantial literature on how
the inequality of social stratification came to being, whether as a result of historical
progression or deliberate societal necessity. With such a large variety of accounts of the
origins of elites, this work will look primarily at the role of elites in the inequality of
social stratification, with the baseline assumption that elites are also a result of social
stratification in some form.
Plato and Aristotle help us to understand, therefore, how societies can, even with
good or modest intentions, be inherently exclusionary to individuals who live within it
but are treated differently and denied full equality. Each had their ideas of society and
created notions of the people based on said notions; nevertheless, both were
conceptualizations of society and its exclusions based on their understanding of the
world. For any number or reasons, based on the situation of one's society or “natural”
assumptions of the functioning of the world, the people may be defined along
exclusionary or inclusionary lines in (Taylor 79-82).
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The creation of notions of citizenship and the people, and its increasingly
restrictive nature over past decades, have led to the continued solidification of inequality
within societies as non-citizens are relegated to “second-class” status (Taylor 100). While
we have been discussing the notion of the people as the constitutive dēmos, that being
those who can participate in the political community of society most often through
citizenship, the people may also be defined along ethnic lines as ethnos (Taylor 79-82).
For example, in Germany, if the people were understood as ethnos it would likely include
only those who were ethnically of German descent. Meanwhile, if the people in Germany
were understood as the dēmos then it would encompass all of those eligible to participate
in the political community of Germany and not merely those of ethnic German descent.
Put simply, while the phrase the people as dēmos, as we have described, creates unequal
hierarchies based on one's ability to participate in the political community, the people as
ethnos creates unequal hierarchies based on one's ethnic heritage.
The ability for the people to be defined or understood in so many ways means that
the people of a society are many things at once and yet nothing at all because of them
many ways to interpret or define them (Taylor 82). Plato, Aristotle, Taylor, and Agamben
help us understand a great deal about exclusion and inclusion: how regimes can be
created based on exclusionary practices, the role of citizenship in inclusion/exclusion,
and exclusive fragmentation of the populace. From the period of ancient Greek city-states
to the time of modern representative democracies, each of the aforementioned notions of
exclusion and inclusion has existed for centuries in human society and state formation.
Too often, however, the inequality of exclusion is understood as a result of natural
capabilities or worth; this understanding, however, like that of Aristotle’s and Plato’s

Gamble-Eddington 23
conceptualization of society is false. The inequality of society, which we see in modern
society is as a result not merely of natural capabilities but of social stratification and
social differentiation rooted in the formation of contemporary society and the defining of
the people (Dahrendorf 20-21). Although elites often take a leading role in defining the
people they are not always alone; it may be the case, as a result of discontent or an
overstepping of the bounds, that the people demand a redefining of who are the people in
some form and go against elite interests.

“We the [Desirable] People”:
Exclusion of the people can come from structural understandings of the ethnos or
dēmos that limit those included within the collective of the state but also through the
forced removal of included groups from the state. Intentional exclusion at the initiation or
the founding of regimes happens in all regimes, but it finds itself often in those regime
types intended to be the freest (i.e., democracies) or the most repressed
principalities/monarchies. Take, for example, the case of Bhutan. Bhutan is a small
country in South Asia that, for the majority of its history, had a monarchy. In 2007,
however, monarch Jigme Khesar Namgyel Wangchuck “gave” democracy to his people,
and the people quickly changed from only the aristocratic class who held
political/economic power to the masses (Taylor 79). In the years preceding the king
giving his people democracy, nevertheless, the monarchy sought to expand the people
through democracy and, at the same time, “redefine” them as a docile ethnos. As such,
the Bhutanese exiled over 110,000 of the ethnic minority group called the Lhotshampas
because they protested for democratic and cultural rights (Taylor 80). It is no accident
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that the forced exodus of one of the largest and most prominent ethnic groups in Bhutan,
a relatively homogenous country, occurred a short period before the elites of Bhutan
established Bhutanese democracy (Taylor 80-81). The monarchy of Bhutan—similar to
the elites at the formation of many societies— “reinvented” or carefully crafted who the
people would be within their society by “redefining” the people as ethnos of Bhutan and
exiling those who did not fit within a said classification (Taylor 79-82).
While the monarchy of Bhutan defined the people as Ethnos and excluded those
minority groups who protested or deviated from the majority “Bhutanese identity,” other
countries have modified ethnos and set the boundaries of the people along with larger
ideas of race and class (amongst others) that perpetuates a presupposed power structure.
As a result, the state, especially democratic ones, tend to be a seemingly perpetual
negotiation over those who will be included as “us” and those who will be excluded as
“them” (Taylor 81). Take, for another example, the United States of America. The US
constitution starts with “we the people of the United States of America declare…” and
then proceeds to outline those democratic rights imbued to the people of America
(Agamben 1). Upon closer examination, however, the people outlined in the American
constitution can be deduced as a select group of individuals who own property, are men
and are white; women, non-landowners, or racial minorities are not included in notions of
the gendered, racial and socio-economic conceptualization of the American people
(Taylor 81).
In colonial America, blacks were classified as either “other persons” in the case of
them being free or as “enslaved” individuals; in either case, they were excluded from the
political community by way of being considered property or unworthy of full citizenship
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and political participation (Taylor 81). Native peoples were “excluded from the body of
politics” by way of their “tribal sovereignty” and women were seemingly overlooked in
all regards as they were relegated to the private sphere (Taylor 80-81). According to
Astra Taylor, “The United States broke ground [in the 18th century] by binding the
democratic project to theories of racial difference, which offered pseudo-scientific
rationales for the Atlantic slave trade, colonialism, and a range of citizenship restrictions
(Taylor 84).” The American people were defined as a specific group of people within
American society and others were looked at as outsiders.6
The problem arises, however, not only because of the politics involved in defining
who the people are and the use of force to achieve said ends but also the fact that those
initially chosen to be the people will hold an institutionally powerful position in society.
As such, although who the people are may change over time, the initial group of
individuals who are defined as the people will often hold on to some tenable source of
institutional power in their society and contribute to long-term inequality within said
society through their holding of said power. Although inclusion or exclusion from
society, whether through forced exodus or some other manner, in general, are important
aspects of defining who the people of a society are, so too are the power or positions that
individuals have within said society once admitted.
Since the creation of American democracy and the onset of the French
Revolution, notions of the people as dēmos and ideas about governing through the
consent of the people have become increasingly popular. How to obtain the consent of

6

To a large extent, this trend of inclusion and exclusion can be seen virtually everywhere in contemporary
society. Take, for example, the deplorable conditions of migrant workers in California and Texas who are
underpaid, abused and exploited because they are excluded from the American concept of “the people.”
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the people or govern in their favor, however, has been a topic of great debate as the
people of a society have shifted over time (Taylor 78). Additionally, the people who give
their consent to be governed, although on paper they may all be equal, are often not
afforded equal rights or opportunity within a community as a result of the exclusionary
elements that underpin popular sovereignty in western democracies (Agamben 3-5).
What does this mean? An inherent “bio fracture” exists in the notion of the people,
especially in democracies, in which a fragmentation of the populace intended to be
included by right becomes excluded by circumstance (Agamben 3). As Agamben puts it:
“The same term [the people] names the constitutive political subject as well as the class
that is excluded–de facto, if not de jure–from Politics (Agamben 5).” So then, in addition
to the debate around exclusion/inclusion in the creation of the people that we have
discussed, we must also consider the exclusionary “bio fracture” within the people.
The “bio fracture,” like that of exclusionary notions of the people in general,
causes the creation of subclasses within a democratic society. Take, for example,
homeless citizens and ethnic minority citizens in many democracies. Homeless citizens of
a state should be included within the political community of their respective states
because they are entitled to a said right and, based on democracy, equal to all of their
fellow citizens. In reality, however, homeless citizens face extreme barriers and logistical
issues to political participation—such as not having an address to list for voting or merely
being unable to worry about politics as one struggles to survive—that limits their ability
to participate in their political community. Similarly, in many countries’, minority
citizens are entitled, as citizens, to be able to equally participate in the political
community but face opposition from other ethnic groups or even the political community
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itself; with examples ranging from intimidation or voter suppression to gerrymandering
and various other tactics (Taylor N.p.). The homeless citizen and minority citizen, in the
aforementioned cases, are examples of “bio fractures” in democratic regimes; they are
included within a system, and yet often excluded at the same time. When speaking about
the prevalence of “bio fractures” Agamben wrote:
Such a widespread and constant semantic ambiguity cannot be accidental: it surely
reflects an ambiguity inherent in the nature and function of the concept of people
in Western politics. It is as if, in other words, what we call people was actually not
a unitary subject but rather a dialectical oscillation between two opposite poles: on
the one hand, the People as a whole and as an integral body politic and, on the
other hand, the people as a subset and as fragmentary multiplicity of needy and
excluded bodies; on the one hand, an inclusive concept that pretends to be without
remainder while, on the other hand, an exclusive concept known to afford no hope;
at one pole, the total state of the sovereign and integrated citizens and, at the other
pole, the banishment – either court of miracles or camp – of the wretched, the
oppressed, and the vanquished (Agamben 3).

The fragmentation of the people, therefore, can be understood as the intentional or
unintentional segregation of power away from the institutionally powerless in the camp
of the underprivileged. So, are the effects of the people within a democracy being “bio
fractured” merely the creation of subclasses or fragments? Put simply, no. Exploitation
finds itself inherently associated with “bio fractures,” the same can be said of restrictive
bonds for classifying who the people are, for it intentionally excludes peoples from
underprivileged societal positions and amplifies the voice of the privileged. Additionally,
exclusion of any form, whether intentional or not, limits the rights of individuals within a
society or alienates individuals from their rights and can, as a result, be used as a tool for
their exploitation (Taylor 88). In these ways, within the notion of the people exists a
natural, although not often discussed, feeling of inferiority, exploitation, and
dispensability in regard to the voices or lives of those individuals who are part of a “bio
fracture” within society.
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Is “bio fracture” and the inequalities apparent in the ambiguous nature of the term
the people normal for modern democracies? While some political theorists, such as
Hobbes, would argue that the inequality we see in democratic regimes’ structures are
normal or even agreed upon by the citizenry through a covenant, such assertions fall
short. Instead, the inequalities apparent in the regimes result from societies, driven by
elites, class structure, class dynamics, the consequences of institutional choices and
various other aspects of social stratification, failing to ensure equal access and
opportunity. A concerted effort, through the increased inclusionary measures, can
“vanquish racist [or more generally unequal] practices of domination and advance the
individual and collective autonomy of subjugated people (Taylor 87).” The next step,
therefore, is to determine what changes can be made to existing structures or what
institutions can be created to facilitate the attainment of greater inclusivity in society.
The insights of Plato, Aristotle, Taylor, and Agamben have laid the framework for
us to understand exclusion; we must now teach ourselves how to embrace inclusion
through structural reform and intentional policy, but first, let's examine the democratic
structures currently in place and how they came to be. For, although elites often take a
leading role in defining the people, they do not possess a monopoly on said power. From
the American Civil Rights movement of the 1960s to the Women's Suffrage Movement,
the people can redefine those included in the people in some form, as has been the case in
numerous social movements that have given rights to minority or marginalized
communities and go against elite interests.

Athenian Democracy:
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There exists in the modern world, as well as previously in the ancient world, a
large number of different government or regime types; from aristocracies and monarchies
to democracies, the number of regime types seems almost endless when one includes the
numerous variations of each of the aforementioned classifications of regimes into their
count. The first form of government to include all citizens, however, in governance and
to ensure equal rights under the law came in the form of a democracy (Thucydides 91).
The Athenian leader Solon pioneered democracy and often receives praise for its
innovation in allowing the people to rule themselves; especially in the age of Greek citystates, where monarchies were the predominant form of government (Thucydides 9192).7 The word democracy, as we know it, has its origins in ancient Greek and comes
from the words dēmos meaning the people and Kratos meaning power or rule; combined
dēmos and Kratos create the word dēmoskratos and signify the governing of the state by
the people or the power of governance being held by the people (Ericksen 325). Notions
of the people, and the right to rule of the people are inherent to democracy and more
generally to the corpus of modern democratic theory; democracy can find its meaning in
both an aspirational concept of equality through popular sovereignty and the harsh
realities or failures of modern-day democratic governance (Taylor N.p).
With its origins in Athens, Greece, a democratic regime in its purest form is the
governing of the state by the people through the use of popular assemblies or other
political institutions (Schwartzberg 312-313). When the people take the place of the king
through a change of regime into democracy “the locus of power becomes an empty
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Although Athens, Greece is commonly believed and taught to be the birthplace of democracy, Democratic
processes can be tracked across continents in early periods of human history. Most commonly, Democratic
practices can be seen in tribal nations where leaders or elders were chosen from amongst the people and by
the people.
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place” with no one designated controller or “rightful” ruler (Näsström 1-3). Instead, the
central notion of democracy is the absence of one person with power or decision- making
power and the creation of equal power amongst individuals within a society. Democracy,
therefore, replaces any notion of aristocratic or divine right with the popular rule of the
people; this holds, especially, for ancient Athens where democratic governance came
from structural reform from below as a result of class conflict (Näsström 2-7). When
describing Athenian democracy to Athens’ citizenry, Pericles, the chosen leader of
Athens, said: “Our constitution is called a democracy because we govern in the interests
of the majority, not just a few. Our laws give equal rights to all in private disputes, but
public preferment depends on individual distinction and is determined largely by merit
rather than rotation: and poverty is no barrier to office… (Thucydides 91-92).”8 At first
glance, the Athenian model of democracy seems the same as modern democracies, like
that of the United States or France. The modern model of democracy, however, cannot be
traced solely back to Athenian democracy but rather to the creation of hybrid or mixed
regimes (which combine aristocracy and democracy). The topic of mixed regimes will be
discussed further in the next section so, for now, the notion will be left here.
To continue on the origins of democracy, the Athenian conceptualization of
democracy refers to modern notions of direct democracy where citizens directly
participate in the governance of the state and do not elect individuals to represent their
interests. In the Athenian model, individuals vote for generals, individual citizens are
chosen by lot to serve in the Administrative Council, and all-important decisions are
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Pericles gave this speech at the end of the first year of the Peloponnesian War, a war between the Delian
League led by Athens and the Peloponnesian League led by Sparta, to the Athenian military and citizenry
to arose pride in Athenians about their democracy.
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debated in popular assemblies (Schwartzberg 313). The people of Athens were defined as
a constitutive dēmos consisting of all Athenians able to participate in the Athenian
political community (i.e., citizens); although the dēmos of Athens did only include
citizens and not slaves or other non-citizens. As such, in the Athenian model citizens are
almost obliged to participate in the public sphere and every citizen directly participates in
said sphere through popular assemblies (Schwartzberg 312-313). Athenian democracy
broke ground as a regime type, but its critics have been vocal about its shortcomings.
Plato led the pack of democratic critics in his time. An Athenian born during the
Classical period in ancient Greece, Plato who founded the Academy, the first institution
of higher learning in the Western world, and wrote extensively on democracy, the ideal
regime, and the good life. On the matter of democracy, in his book The Republic, Plato
asserted that democracy’s obsession with freedom and inability to create a “just” or
structures even an effective form of governance (Plato Book IV). In the Republic, Plato
described democracy as “[seeming] to be the fairest of states, being, an embroidered robe
which is spangled with every sort of flower…” because people are the “masters of
themselves” (Plato Book I).” To Plato, democracy gives the allure of being the ideal
regime but fails to deliver justice or a harmonious social order, creating instead tyranny
(Plato Book I).9
When discussing the “democratic man” Plato wrote, “...he lives from day to day
indulging the appetite of the hour...[and] often he-is busy with politics and starts to his
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Beyond his ideological resentment, Plato also had a personal resentment against democracy because the
democratic government of Athens had executed his acquaintance Socrates. Additionally, Plato descended
from the last king of Athens, Codrus, as well as the Athenian statesman Solon, and as a result, may have
harbored disdain for a regime system that denied him (as one of a relatively distinguish bloodline in the
aristocracy) a more prominent political position in society.
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feet and says and does whatever comes into his head... his life has neither law nor order;
and this distracted existence he terms joy and bliss and freedom...” (Plato Book VIII).
According to Plato, democracy, as well as the democratic man, relies on freedom—rather
than Justice—as the cornerstone of society causes its deterioration into tyranny (Plato
Book I). Put simply, Plato asserts that a regime concerned primarily about individual
freedom will lead to a breakdown of the natural order: individuals who are unfit for
governance will lead rather than the guardians, people will lie for their benefit, and the
population will not be controlled for the benefit of society (Plato Book IV). Instead of
democracy, Plato offers his readers a meritocratic society in which those who are most
capable are elevated to the role of leader and everyone else fulfills their hierarchical
purpose within society (Plato Book I).
In response to Plato’s challenge that democracy will devolve into tyranny,
Aristotle does just that and introduces the notion of the mixed regime called the Polity (a
democratic regime ruled by citizens that are neither rich nor poor) as the superior form of
governance in existence that rules in favor of the majority (Aristotle Book III). Aristotle
wrote: “Deviations... are tyranny from kingship, oligarchy from aristocracy, and
democracy from polity. For tyranny is rule by one man for the advantage of himself,
oligarchy is for the advantage of the well-off, and democracy is for the advantage of the
needy. None of them is for what is profitable in common (Aristotle Book III).” For
Aristotle, aristocracy or monarchy fostered the ideal society (should there be someone or
a group of people so superior in virtue that they should rule), but the polity sufficed as the
best existing form of government and possibly the only viable one as societies grew
larger (Aristotle Book III).
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Similar to Aristotle, many of the founding fathers of the United States of America
(namely James Madison and Alexander Hamilton) wrote vigorously on the shortcomings
of “pure democracy.” In the Federalist Papers, a collection of 85 articles and essays by
some of America’s founding fathers to defend the US constitution, James Madison
argued that democracy exists as a flawed system because it cannot handle the
development of political factions, it fails to be logical for peoples to assemble in large
nations as a result of distance and the “common passion or interest will, in almost every
case, be felt by a majority of the whole… (Madison N.p.).” Instead of a democracy,
Madison advocates for a mixed regime, where there is a scheme of representation for the
populace, that he calls a republic. Madison’s, as well as many of the other founding
fathers’, fear of the “ineffectiveness” of Athenian democracy and the subsequent
“tyranny of the masses” that the believed it entailed led to the creation of the “American
democratic experience” based on not a direct democracy but a mixed regime.
Plato, Aristotle, and James Madison provide critical critiques of democracy and
present alternative regimes that they assert as better for society. The origins of
democracy, nevertheless, can be found not in modern notions of representing the people
through mixed democratic regimes but rather in the direct democracy of Athenian
society; where each citizen with a vote, a direct voice in government, and the power or
ability to govern. At the core of Athenian democracy, therefore, sat a notion of equality
amongst all citizens through equal participation —with no understanding or
conceptualization of the notion of representation or aristocratic moderation—and at the
core of mixed regimes with democratic institutions is the moderation of the people
through elite or aristocratic institutions and the relegation of power (Pitkin 336). As a
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result, mixed regimes promote an inherent inequality within the structures of democracies
that dilutes equality in favor of public moderation and political convenience.
The Roman Republic:
From the ashes of ancient Athens came various types of mixed regimes and the
modern forms of democratic governance: representative democracies. A mixed regime is
a combination of two separate regime types, such as democracy and aristocracy, in an
attempt to develop a “more effective” regime type that appeased the people and elites
(Madison N.p.).10 After the fall of Athens in the fifth century, the next major iteration of
democratic governance, in some form, came through the mixed regime of ancient Rome
in the sixth century; the Romans called their mixed regime a republicia or republic
(Machiavelli 181-182).
How did the Roman Republic, after over a century-long period, come to have a
mixed democratic regime? Originally, a monarchy and various aristocratic families
dominated ancient Rome, with the people having no say in the governance of the state of
politics (Machiavelli 181). The Roman people, therefore, were defined as the dēmos but
included only the aristocracy and royal family. However, class conflict between the
disenfranchised plebeians and a powerful aristocracy drove the peoples to demand regime
reform and drove the formation of the Roman Republic (Machiavelli 183-184). With the
creation of the Roman Republic came a shift in the dēmos of Roman society and the
people to include all citizens of Roman society rather than just the aristocratic class. In
the Prince and the Discourses on the First Decade of Titus Livius, Nicolo Machiavelli
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Mixed Regimes were a common suggestion of ancient political theorists, such as Aristotle, and later
democratic theorists who helped craft the constitutions of modern democracies.
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describes the republic as the perfect state for it provides a legal means for the people to
channel their hatred or difference of expression from the aristocracy (Machiavelli 193).
The Roman Republic, in its essence, consisted of four main institutions: (1) the
Senate controlled by the aristocrats (known as the patricians), (2) the Comitia Centuriata
controlled by monarchist/military (known as the praetor), (3) the Concilium Plebis
controlled by the people (known as the plebians), and (4) the Comitia Tributa open to all
citizens like the Athenian Assembly (Machiavelli 193). Although the aristocratically
controlled senate retained great power, the Roman Republic, for the first time since
Ancient Greece, gave a voice in government to the common people through the
Concilium Plebis and Comitia Tributa. The voice of the people, however, was moderated
by the aristocratic institutions of the senate and Comitia Centuriata to create a mixed
regime that inspired the creation of numerous democracies after its collapse.11 The
Roman Republic, in the aforementioned way, redefined democracy and created a vision
of what it would come to be in the modern era (Machiavelli 190-195).12 First came
moderation of the people through aristocratic institutions, then came moderation of the
people through notions of representative democracy.

The Adoption of Representation:
In the modern era, the mixed regimes that we call democracies have largely
replaced the aristocratic or monarchist institutions of ancient Rome and replaced them
11

For this essay moderate or moderation will be defined as the forcing of political views or attitudes
towards center-left or center-right views. Put simply, moderate or moderation is the rejection of radical and
extreme views that may unwind the elite-mass compromise or challenge elites' fundamental position in
society.
12
Following the collapse of the Roman Empire mixed regimes incorporation some aspect of democracy or
popular sovereignty could be found in various Italian city-states, in particular Florence, during the
Renaissance period of European history.
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with a new method of moderating the people, which were often seen as unreliable as a
result of lack of knowledge or rashness, called representation (Pitkin 334). According to
Hannah Pitkin, a political theorist and former professor at the University of California at
Berkeley, Representation as a political concept and practice can be traced back to the late
medieval period of European history when imposed as a duty by the monarch (Pitkin
336-337). For example, in England when the king needed additional revenue, he:
“required each shire and borough to send a delegate to commit the locality to special
additional taxes (Pitkin 337).” Representation, therefore, finds its origin in the imposed
duty placed on the people from above and a desire to enhance administrative capabilities,
bearing no notions of equality or democracy (Pitkin 337). Nevertheless, political theorists
adopted the notion of representation as a fundamental basis of new mixed regimes and
used not only to bring democracy to a national scale but to avoid the usage of direct
participation (Pitkin 335-338).
With the establishment of representation as a concrete political notion during the
late medieval period of European History, it began to be combined with notions of mixed
regime democracies during the English Civil War and then in the various eighteenthcentury democratic revolutions (Pitkin 338).13 With the growing demand for political
power to be vested in the people—similar to those calls that led to the formation of the
Roman Republic—pro-democracy supporters began seeing representation and the
extension of suffrage as a means to make large-scale democracy possible in their
societies (Pitkin 336).

13

Most notable of the eighteenth-century democratic revolutions was the American Revolution, the French
Revolution, and the Haitian Revolution which each brought about widespread democratic governance and
had international reach in promoting democratic governance.
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Contrarily, elites saw representation as a tool for preventing and blocking off the
possible rise of Athenian democracy and direct democratic participation; in this way the
elite support for democratic representation bears striking resemblance to the support of
the elites for adoption of democratic institutions in ancient Rome, both sought to
moderate the people's demands through mechanisms able to be manipulated or controlled
(Pitkin 335-338). On the topic of elites representing the masses, Astra Taylor wrote: “The
rhetoric of popular sovereignty may appeal to elites, but they also recognize the risks.
Seeking a veneer of democratic legitimacy but loath to let the people actually rule... their
challenge is creating a docile citizenry out of a democratically spirited one.” (Taylor 90).
While pro-democracy individuals saw an opportunity to expand the ideals of democracy
further, elites saw a method to limit the power the masses could obtain and develop a
docile citizenry who would not call for greater direct participation.
With both elites and pro-democracy individuals recognizing the value of
representation they incorporated into popular governance to form representative
democracies, representative democracy became a compromise between elites and the prodemocracy masses; in the elite-masses compromise, elections give the masses a right to
choose representatives to express their ideas but prevents the masses from actually
intervening directly in the ruling or governance of their society (Näsström 2). When
arguing for the benefits of representative democracies and mixed regimes over an

Athenian democracy James Madison wrote:

The two great points of difference between a democracy and a republic [a
representative democracy] are: first, the delegation of the government, in the latter,
to a small number of citizens elected by the rest; secondly, the greater number of
citizens, and greater sphere of country, over which the latter may be extended. The
effect of the first difference is, on the one hand, to refine and enlarge the public
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views, by passing them through the medium of a chosen body of citizens, whose
wisdom may best discern the true interest of their country, and whose patriotism
and love of justice will be least likely to sacrifice it to temporary or partial
considerations. Under such a regulation, it may well happen that the public voice,
pronounced by the representatives of the people, will be more consonant to the
public good than if pronounced by the people themselves, convened for the
purpose (Madison N.p).

When creating the elite-mass compromise and developing a representative democracy
relies on a notion of moderation or interpretation; the people's voice becomes interpreted
by elites to attain the “public good.” Moreover, representative democracy, since it relies
on the articulation of elites and not solely on the will of the people, appears as a
conservative form of democratic governance that inherently seeks to preserve existing
power structures of a society that benefit the elite class (Näsström 1-2).
When assessing the concept of representation and its underpinnings in the elitemasses compromise, one must also recognize that representation relies on elites’
articulation, as previously discussed, and places the elite at the center of the political
structure as representatives. This understanding of the elite-mass compromise gives way
to two critical questions regarding the legitimacy of democratic representation: (1) Can
the people be represented by elites or a representational structure? (2) And can elites be
adequate representations of the people and representatives for the people? To answer the
first question, It would seem evident to me that an individual can be represented within a
democratic structure but representation comes in many forms and is often not equally
accessible when “bio fractures” in the people are considered (Agamben 3-5). As such,
representation may be adequate or efficient for democratic governance, but the
inequalities embedded within it make it not preferable to reflect the will of the people or
democratic governance more generally (Madison N.p.). To the second question, the elites
can rarely be adequate representations of the people for they often lack any unifying or
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common characteristics; in the past, however, elites were able to provide greater
representation than they currently do.
In representative democracies, elites are placed at the center of the political
structure as representations of or representatives for the people (Madison N.p.). The elitemass compromise of representative democracy, however, only explicitly accounts for one
stratification of society, class. As representative democracies have become increasingly
diverse, however, the absence of institutions to account for said diversity causes the
already unrepresentative elite class to become even more unrepresentative of the people
(Agamben 3). Why? The elite class stagnants in terms of its ability to adequately
represent the people, as they become increasingly diverse, through a representative
democracy. A central conflict of the elite-mass compromise, therefore, becomes a
conservative elite class placed at the center of democracy that has become increasingly
unrepresentative of the people. The result can be seen in a deficit of democratic
legitimacy and a notion of the expendability of the individual’s voice in favor of an elitedriven moderation of the people (Mansfield 516).14
The elite-masses compromise that underpins representative democracy seems like
an one- way road in which the masses pronounce their desires and elected representatives
take the aspects they see fit and create policy; representatives in this form are intended to
be mere political agents of the people, their principal, although oftentimes they go
beyond these bounds to achieve their goals (Mansfield 516). Aside from the moderation
of the people by elites and the conservation of elite power structures, the elite-mass

14

Elite institutions not only moderate the voices of the masses in general and helps to suppress the
individual voices of those groups that fall within the periphery of society, namely minorities and
marginalized groups, that do not necessarily agree with the elite-mass compromise. As a result, there is a
notion of dispensability or expendability of marginalized voices in representative democracies.

Gamble-Eddington 40
compromise also leads to the alienation of segments of the people. The elite-mass
compromise considers the people as a whole or one, adopting a majoritarian connotation,
and not as individuals or parts; in the absence of proper considerations for the parts of the
whole, segments of the people become marginalized from political representation
because they do not align with the majority (Mansfield 515-16).

Representation Clarified:
The concept of political representation is misleadingly simple: everyone knows it,
yet very few can agree on one definition for the concept. Extensive literature exists, and
grows by the day, in democratic theory that offers numerous definitions of this elusive
concept of representation. What are the benefits of the representative model of
governance? In theory, the representative democracy “unburdens human beings from the
excess of responsibility that comes with the removal of an external authority [such as a
monarchy or oligarchy] in political affairs by sharing and dividing it equally [amongst
representatives]” (Näsström 2). For some, the relegation of the people's power inherent to
representative democracy means that representation comes with the expectation that
elected officials are reflective of or responding to the will of the people; for when
representatives cease to represent the will of the people, they stop being democratic
(Näsström 1). Others argue, however, that within democracies representatives are not
tasked with responding to the “will of the people,” but rather interpreting their will and
“rendering present the people they claim to represent” (Näsström 1). What representation
is, similar to our earlier discussion of the phrase the people, subject to interpretation and
can be defined in numerous manners to meet one's needs or predispositions.
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Traditionally, democratic theory on political representation has focused on
whether elected officials should act as delegates or as trustees of the people and
examined the inherently contradictory notions of the two concepts (Fox 1225).
Representatives who are delegates of their constituents simply follow the expressed
preferences of their constituents when drafting or voting on legislation. In contrast to
delegates, when representatives are trustees of their constituents, they follow their
understanding or judgment of the best action to pursue and do not rely merely on
conveying the will of the people (Fox 1225-1228). The democratic notion of
representatives as trustees, as it appears in political theory, seems inherently unequal to
those within a democracy; for one must relegate their power for four years to an elected
official in hopes that their policies will stay aligned with the shifting preferences of their
constituents. In reality, however, modern democracy expects the relegation of their power
to representatives throughout a representative's time in office; for the moment an elected
official act of their own volition and not in the interest of their constituents then they are
no longer representing anyone but themselves. Nevertheless, the theories of
representatives as delegates or as trustees offer those elected to office a contradictory
understanding of their role once in office and contradictory demands regarding behavior.
To address the contradictory nature of the representative as a delegate and a
trustee, Hanna Pitkin argues that the autonomy of both the representative and of those
being represented should be safeguarded; the representative, therefore, should be
independent of (as a trustee) and at the same time dependent on (as a delegate) their
constituents (Pitkin 54). In Pitkin’s conceptualization, the autonomy of the representative
to act of their own volition is preserved by allowing them to make decisions based on
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their understanding of the interests of the represented, and the autonomy of those being
represented preserves itself by having the constituent preferences influence
representatives’ decisions (Pitkin 59). The notion of combining the trustee and delegate
seems, at least to me, to be far more appealing than possibly having the occurrence of a
mere trustee; however, when placed in perspective, the great concern surrounding the
autonomy or the ability of representatives to act of their own volition while in office
seems misplaced; for these representatives run for office too, at a most basic level,
represent their constituents and their desires through some platform. That does not mean,
nevertheless, that a representative cannot represent oneself as well, but the representative
must count themselves as only one voice on equal footing with other constituents (their
voice should not be given great power merely for the office they hold). Pitkin advances
the debate surrounding representation substantially through her work, however, the
simplicity of the trustee/delegate dichotomy and its usefulness has remained at the center
of debates in democratic theory.
In developing the current corpus of democratic theory, the traditional notions of
Trustee and delegate have been revisited by modern political theorists and significantly
expanded on. In general, according to political scientist Lisa Disch, there are two
different schools of representation in democratic theory: (1) a Responsive School that
emphasizes the continuing responsiveness of the government to the preferences of its
citizens (i.e. representatives as reflections of the constituents’ wills) and (2) a Constitutive
School that adheres to the “traditional model of promissory representation,” in which
representatives hold to preexisting promises and pursuing policies that align with said
interests over time (Disch 100). Both schools of thought emphasize the assumption that
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constituents (i.e., those represented) can form opinions and hold preferences that are not
only coherent enough to be represented by elected officials but stable or consistent
enough to be represented (Disch 100-102). The Constitutive School of representation, in
addition to the aforementioned assumption, also relies on the notion that representatives
look backward to preferences that have been expressed and position their future actions
in a “speculative mode” toward what their constituency might want; in this
conceptualization, the representative becomes more than a spokesman of the people, they
are an interpreter of the people’s will (Disch 102-103). Both of the aforementioned
schools of Representation present their unique conceptualization of the role of democratic
representatives and their responsibilities.
While the Responsive School of representation would be ideal for ensuring that
the people’s voices are heard, since representatives would constantly be changing their
positions to represent the will of the people rather than merely the will of the people
when said representatives were elected, the Constitutive School of representation gives
way to a clearer understanding of the elite-masses compromise (Näsström 1-2).
Representatives, in many cases, are not true representatives of the will of people but
rather the moderator of the people's desires and informative mouthpieces for party
platforms. The people yell “revolution” and representatives respond with “moderate or
small-scale reform.” The people demand the defunding of police institutions or police
reform and representatives respond by playing with financial budgets to give the illusion
of budgetary change (Disch 102-104). Seemingly, for every demand or modification the
people may have for how to change society, representatives have an effective response to
moderate said demands to maintain the health of the elite-mass compromise and their
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power as part of the elite class; in this way, the people, although unintentionally, are
domesticated by elites’ whims and subjected to the enduring management of elite-driven
institutions unless they come together to demand an alternative (Disch 102).
A simpler method of moderation used by elites, in opposition to merely
moderating their demands, can be found in the manipulation of the will of the people
through the careful articulation of how constituents' policy preferences are expressed in
legislation. In this way, representatives can safely convey the will of the people, without
threat to their own power, because their will reflects the desire to propagate the elitemasses compromise (Disch 101-103). However, the notions of constituent manipulation
by representatives or elites relies on the assumption that the formation of constituents’
preferences depend on the way representatives communicate ideas to and “Educate”
constituents in their attempt to win elections; put simply, constituents must be
incompetent or uninformed enough to be privy to elite manipulation (Disch 102).
Another mode of elite manipulation is when, as Disch outlines in Toward a Mobilization
Conception of Democratic Representation, elite’s outright customization of constituents’
preferences through the democratic mobilization of the people towards a goal and the
participation of elites in the process of forming constituents demands or preferences
(Disch 107).
Similar to Disch’s argument about elites articulating the demands or preferences
of the masses through democratic mobilization, Edward S. Herman and Noam Chomsky's
Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media outlines how the
Media influences the masses (Herman 30). According to Herman and Chomsky, as part
of the elite’s institutions, the Media systemically propagates “propaganda” by imposing
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filters or frames on the information disseminated to the masses (Herman 30). As a result,
the media self-censors itself and makes its reports align with the dominant market or
government forces to propagate their power. Herman does concede, however, that media
coverage cannot be seen as a deliberate campaign of misinformation perpetrated by
conspirators, news anchors, journalists, or other members of the media community
(Herman 35-40). Instead, the structural integrity of the media system reinforces elite bias
in favor of those in power and against any dissenting views in the public sphere (Herman
120). Herman and Chomsky’s conceptualization of the elite-driven institution of the
media fits well into the understanding of representation as an inherently conservative and
often manipulative outcome of the elite-mass compromise, for elites can influence the
masses in various ways to accomplish their goals and moderate the masses desires.
In addition to the two schools of representation mentioned earlier, the Responsive
School and the Constitutive School, five general conceptualizations have come to
prominence over recent decades that outline the different forms of representation that an
elected official can engage with. The five types of representation, according to
Mansbridge's Selection Model, include (1) Promissory Representation, (2) Anticipatory
Representation, (3) Gyroscopic Representation, and (4) Surrogate Representation
(Mansbridge 515-516). Promissory Representation, falling nicely within the Constitutive
School of representation, focuses on the notion that during campaigns representatives
made promises to constituents, which they will ultimately keep or fail to keep during
their time in office (Mansbridge 516). Unlike Promissory Representation, Anticipatory
Representation falls in between the Responsive School and the Constitutive School of
representation. Anticipatory Representation centers around representatives not only
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holding to their promises made in past elections but also focusing on what they think
their constituents will approve of in the next election as well; in this way, representatives
adhere to traditional promissory representation and also are responsive to the changing
whims, often looking to the future, of the constituents they represent (Mansbridge 515517).
The last form of representation, Surrogate Representation, and Gyroscopic
Representation fall largely outside the bounds of the Responsive School and the
Constitutive School of representation. Surrogate Representation occurs when elected
officials represent the interests or desires of constituents outside of their districts
(Mansbridge 515). Surrogate Representation, usually, functions as a means of
representation only when those being represented via surrogate by the elected official fall
within the larger state-wide scheme of representation. For example, if an American
Senator from the state of Florida represented the interests of Massachusetts residents in a
congressional vote, rather than the interests of his Floridian constituents, then Surrogate
Representation would be occurring; for the Senator from Florida represents people who
are not their constituents, but who fall within their federal jurisdiction as a member of
congress.
Similar to Surrogate Representation, Gyroscopic Representation falls outside the
Responsive School of representation and the Constitutive School of representation.
Instead of representing the preferences of constituencies, Gyroscopic Representation
occurs when electors choose a representative who can be expected to act in a manner that
voters approve of without the need for external pressures (Mansbridge 520). As such, in
Gyroscopic Representation, representatives look within their own ideals and convictions
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as a basis for their actions, rather than the changing preferences of their constituencies
(Mansbridge 515-520). Gyroscopic Representation, as a result, appears the least
responsive to the changing nature of constituents’ desires because they are not centered
on constituent preferences but rather an individual personality or set of convictions
(Mansbridge 520).
While Mansbridge's Selection Model provides a rather complex mechanism for
understanding the different types of representations, her conceptualization of
representation is only one of many ways of defining or comprehending how
representation functions. Pitkin, for example, famously outlined her four categories of
representation in The Concept of Representation. For Pitkin, representation took shape in
one of four categories: (1) Formalistic Representation, (2) Symbolic Representation, (3)
Descriptive Representation, and (4) Substantive Representation (Pitkin 20-31).
Formalistic Representation occurs as a result of the institutional arrangements that
initiate representation such as regularly elected offices in government. Symbolic
Representation happens when representatives “stands for” the represented or serves as a
symbol of the represented (Pitkin 23). Descriptive Representation can be defined as the
extent to which a representative resembles, usually in terms of personal identity or
background, those in which they are representing (Pitkin 22-24). Lastly, Substantive
Representation occurs when the actions taken by a representative, both past and present,
are of the interest of those being represented (Pitkin 23-26).
Unlike Mansbridge’s classification, Pitkin focuses on how the representative as an
individual's person represents their constituents, rather than merely examining the
mechanisms by which one could classify the actions taken by a representative.
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Additionally, Pitkin’s classification of the types of representation gives way to great
overlap when applied to real-world instances and can be used, as can Mansbridge’s to an
extent, to extrapolate inequalities in society. For example, if my elected official aligns
with my political beliefs and comes from the same background or looks like me, I would
enjoy a high level of representation according to Pitkin’s model. Specifically, I would be
Substantively Represented, Formalistically Represented, and Descriptively Represented
by my representative. However, if my neighbor comes from a completely different
background or doesn't look like his representative he would only be Formalistically or
Substantively Represented at best, assuming their political views align. On a small scale,
this often is not a problem for one cannot assume to be represented in every regard.
Nevertheless, when inequality in representation becomes systemic, meaning one group of
people tend to enjoy a larger amount of representation, then institutional inequality
becomes apparent and must be addressed. There are, as have been described, numerous
methods for defining representation and understanding the modes in which representation
can occur. Nevertheless, representation as a whole tends to not fit neatly within a box or
category, but rather overlaps boundaries.
Representative democracy can be an effective tool for mixed regimes to employ
in order to achieve some level of democratic representation. However, when assessing the
institution of representative democracies, and representation itself, one must note the
inherent inequalities in the system and the vast relativity of classifications. Throughout
this chapter, we have looked at the unequal nature of defining the people (being arbitrary
in modern cases and “natural” or given in pre-modern cases) of a state, the origins of
direct democracy in Athens, the development of mixed regimes that incorporate
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democratic practices, the elite-masses compromise, and, finally, the adoption of
representation by mixed regimes. In each of the aforementioned cases, inequality is key
to understanding or interpreting the formation of modern democratic states; one must
define the people, one must define the state and who or how one gets represented. In each
case, a decision must be made to determine who gets included in the state and its
institutions and those excluded from the state. As we saw in the previous discussion of
defining the people, however, being included may not be sufficient; for you may be
excluded, even if you are entitled to be included, based on circumstances beyond your
control. Similarly, even when one does achieve inclusion the elite-masse compromise
that underpins representative democracy, places elites and the “original people” in
positions of greater power than the masses and grants them the ability to moderate or
censor the masses representative democracy seems to be, as are many regimes, a rope
around the neck of the masses and a tight noose for those in disadvantageous societal
positions (such as minority or marginalized groups).
Democracy has a complex history, often being misconstrued, whose point of
origination can be found in the direct democracy of ancient Athens and the pact made
between citizens and the Athenian state. However, modern representative democracy,
although also able to claim its heritage in ancient Athens to some extent, more notably
dates back to the democratic institutions of ancient Rome and the representative
structures of some Medieval European nations, which are combined to form the basis for
the democratic revolutions of the 18th century. Nevertheless, whether in the case of direct
democracy or representative democracy a narrative had been built that celebrated
democracies modern achievements while simultaneously hiding its shortcomings (namely
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exclusionary practices, marginalization of minority groups, and the fragmentation of the
population).
What is the solution to inequality in the democratic state? How do we provide
representation to all of those entitled to it and guarantee adequate representation?
Inequality seems inescapable, even in democratic societies, but institutions can, and
should, be reformed to mitigate the inequalities of society. In normal times, elites are
placed in the driver seat of governance and can use their privileged position to moderate
the demands of the masses or propagate inequalities in the interests of elite power. In
abnormal times, however, elites are unable to use institutional forces or moderate the
peoples’ demands for a host of reasons, ranging from a lack of trust and repeated failures
of governance to merely asking for too much of the populace. The people may regain,
however, the upper hand in the elite-mass compromise and progress their demands unmoderated by elites, possibly even overthrow those in power or force a change in course.
In these instances, democracy can be transformed to progress democratic governance and
address the institutional inequalities of a given regime.
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CHAPTER 2- Representative Democracies and Ethnic Politics
Defining a Representative Democracy:
How does a representative democracy develop its institutions? Are democratic
institutions created to address inequalities rooted in the elite-mass compromise or are
they meant to perpetuate said inequalities? With the adoption of mixed regimes in the
form of representative democracies and the usage of representation as a form of elite
moderation, societies across the globe have developed varying types of democracies
(Almond 391). From regimes that focus on consensualism (primarily seen in
Consociational or Semi-Autonomous regimes types) to those emphasizing the will of the
majority, representative democracies come in many forms and are designed to fit the
realities of the societies they are in; the number and type of representative democracies
are truly only restricted by societal need and the bounds of human imagination (Almond
391). Classifications or typologies of representative democracies, according to political
scientist Gabriel A. Almond, attempt to group similar types of democracies based on their
orientation to political action and the interdependence of political systems (Almond
395).15
Like the variation in types or representative democracies, literature is abundant by
political comparativists that attempts to classify democracies into coherent typologies
(Almond 392). Many of the existing classifications of democracy, pioneered before to the
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For Almond, the concept of a political system implies that these roles are interdependent and that a
significant change in any one role affects changes in the others, and thereby changes the system as a whole.
Additionally, Almond argues that the political system is embedded in “attitudes toward politics, political
values, ideologies, national character, cultural ethos.”
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20th-century, tend to focus on defining democratic regimes based on the number of
political parties (two-party and multi-party systems), the power of the executive office or
branch of government (democracy-dictatorship), and the method of selection for the
executive office (parliamentary-presidential systems) (Almond 391-392). Each
classification has its benefits for analyzing or classifying representative democracies and
contributes to the modern conceptualization of which factors are important to examine.
The fact remains, however, that any political scientist concerned with the general
problem of classification of political systems and representative democracies will find
that all of the existing bases of classification leave something to be desired or exclude
some aspect found important by others (Almond 392).
In 1965 Almond developed his famous typology of political systems and
distinguished three types of Western democratic systems; the Almond typology, unlike
other existing typologies, sought to examine representative democracies based on their
political culture.16 For Almond, every political system is embedded in a particular
“pattern of orientations to actions” that can be derived from their political culture of a
society (Almond 396). Almond (1956) defines political culture as the particular pattern
of orientations to political action developed in society and, in 1963, revised his definition
to clarify that political culture was the “distribution of patterns of orientation” (Stephan
419-421). Almond’s notion of political culture allows for conceptualization of certain
regime types being inherently fit for certain types of societies, based on their existing
political culture or culture, and also gives way to the understanding of society as being
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Political culture does not coincide with a given political system or society. Additionally, political culture
is not synonymous or interchangeable with the general culture and cultural traditions of a given society.
However, political culture and culture can often function together or underpin each other.
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able to be influenced or changed by a powerful political culture (Almond 399).
Almond’s typology outlined the Anglo-American political systems (the UK and
the USA), the Continental European political systems (France, Germany, and Italy), and a
“third category” consisting of the Scandinavian and Low Countries of Europe that is
rarely discussed (Almond 392). According to Almond, the Anglo-American systems as
those having a homogeneous political culture and segmented role structures for society
(Lijphart 207). In contrast, the Continental European democracies are characterized by a
fragmentation of political culture with separate political subcultures (Lijphart 207-208).
While Anglo-American democracies often have a high degree of stability and
effectiveness, the Continental European systems tend to be unstable because of internal
fragmentation. Continental European systems, also, face the threat of a “Caesaristic
breakthrough” and a lapse into totalitarianism as a result of the political immobilism
caused by fragmentation (Lijphart 208). In Almond’s conceptualization of the typology
of democracy fragmentation and stability are mutually exclusive characteristics of a
democratic regime; put simply, when a regime is fragmented it is not stable and when a
regime is homogenous it is stable (Almond 396). There have been cases of democratic
regimes that are fragmented, such as those in Belgium and Bosnia, but are still stable. In
those cases of fragmented but stable democracies, political theorist Arend Lijphart adds
to the typology of Almond and develops the classification of “consociational
democracies” (Lijphart 211).17
Almond’s typology of democracies provides great contextualization to the factors
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Lijphart describes “stable” or “stability” as the masses being able to select their leaders and the ability of
governmental elites to meet the demands placed upon them by the masses, as well as the continuation of the
constitution or regime form. Additionally, Lijphart classifies stability as the absence of violence,
revolution, or other signs of dissatisfaction.
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essential in classifying modern representative democracies into appropriate categories
and recognizing the various complexities that underpin said regimes. At the same time,
however, Almond’s typology falls short of encompassing all of the possible variations of
regime types and focuses only on Western democracies.18 Even in his descriptions of
what affects the formation of different political cultures, and thus facilitates the suitable
adoption of one regime type over another, Almond identifies five factors that all-around a
country's ability to be “western:” (1) the type of traditional cultures, (2) the auspices
under which Westernization has been introduced, (3) the functions of the society which
have been Westernized, (4) the tempo of the Westernization process and (5) the type of
Western cultural products introduced (Almond 401-402). Almond’s typology of
representative democracies is by all accounts incomplete and does not encompass all of
the variations possible or present in the modern world. Most importantly, as a result of
the time frame in which he published his work, Almond leaves out representative
democracies similar to those of the Continental European category, such as the semiautonomous regime of Spain.19 However, since this essay will focus on Western
democracies exclusively, as symbols of democracy more generally, Almond’s typology
will serve as a suitable framework for understanding some of the regime types in Europe
and North America and develop a vague outline; while also developing the typology
further to clarify it. As such, while recognizing the wide variation in representative
democracies, this essay will use a typology that focuses on the three most different types
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In his groundbreaking 1965 work, Almond recognizes that his typology does not cover all of the
variations in representative democracies but encapsulates “most” of them. Additionally, Almond also
acknowledges that his typology is focused primarily on the western hemisphere.
19
Almond published his typology in 1965, but Spain didn't move to its current political structure with
autonomous regions until the 1970s.
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of representative democracies: the Anglo-American majoritarian system, the Semiautonomous system, and the consociational system. By examining these three vastly
different types of representative democracies, this essay will shed light on the variation
possible in democratic institutions and assess to what extent each has institutions that can
handle or promote increased diversity in the public sphere.

Anglo-American Majoritarian Political Systems:
As one might tell from its name, the Anglo-American political classification
draws its inspiration from the majoritarian political systems of the United States of
America, the United Kingdom, and other former colonial holdings of the United
Kingdom. The basic premise of the Anglo-American majoritarian political system is the
Lockean dependence on majority rule or majoritarianism as the preferred choice of
forming governments or selecting elected officials.
John Locke was a 17th-century British political theorist who was primarily focused on
human nature, the formation of the state, happiness, and individual property; in his
analysis of the creation of contemporary societies, however, he provides the essential
underpinnings to the notion of Majoritarianism or rule of the majority (Locke 8). In
Locke’s Second Treatise he wrote:
Whosoever therefore out of a state of nature unites into a community, must
be understood to give up all the power, necessary to the ends for which they
unite into society, to the majority of the community, unless they expressly
agreed in any number greater than the majority. And this is done by barely
agreeing to unite into one political society, which is all the compact that is,
or needs be, between the individuals, that enter into, or make up a
commonwealth. And thus that, which begins and actually constitutes any
political society, is nothing but the consent of any number of freemen
capable of a majority to unite and incorporate into such a society. And this
is that, and that only, which did, or could give beginning to any lawful
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government in the world (Locke 99).
For Locke, the creation of the state or the commonwealth is driven through the consent of
the people—who are all completely equal in their natural state and equally entitled to
anything on earth since it was given to them all “in common” by God—and their
willingness to join political society to resolve common disputes (Locke 14). The purpose
of political society, therefore, is to create a “common judge” that can arbitrate between
equal individuals, govern in the “common good” of the people, and to protect
individuals’ rights to property (Locke 17).20 The creation of the state, according to Locke,
and the decisions that it makes are to be decided by the majority of those within a given
society; a political concept that informed the formation of Anglo-American political
systems and more generally representative democracies over recent centuries.
Majority rule is the view that the legitimate political authority of the state is
expressed through the will of the majority of those subject to its authority (Locke 99).
The majority will, in conceptualization, is intended to aim for the common good of all in
society, and not pursue their sectional interests. The notion of working in the “common
good,” however, often finds itself falling short as elites tend to work in their interests and
minority political groups or opposition are often excluded to some extent from decisionmaking even if they received a substantial portion of the votes. Why? Under the notion of
majoritarianism, there is no need for attracting more votes than is necessary to form a
majority, even if that is only 50.06% or 51% of the people; for this reason, the AngloAmerican model is often believed to only, to some extent, be functional for homogenous
countries (Meisburger 155-156). Additionally, the majority will is often conceptualized
20

In his first treatise, Locke describes property as a more expansive term than modern conceptualizations
and includes, in particular, one's labor as a key component of the concept of property.
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as something that is not “constantly” in existence, it is something formed only following
the process of aggregation or selection (Meisburger 155-156). The most notable aspect of
the Anglo-American system, in comparison to other regime types, is its ability to permit
and possibly even encourage, the exclusion and suppression of views outside of the
majority.
As we saw in the previous discussion of defining the people, in chapter 1, being
included in the political community may not be sufficient to ensure adequate
representation; for you may be excluded, even if you are entitled to be included, based on
circumstances beyond your control or by political concepts like majoritarianism that
institutionally marginalize non-majority view. As such, even when one does achieve
inclusion in a representative democracy the elite-mass compromise or the institutions that
arise from it, which places elites and the “original people” (who are often larger segments
of the population) in positions of greater power, can alienate minority or marginalized
groups (Meisburger 155-156).
In Almond’s typology of representative democracies, he identifies AngloAmerican political systems as those that enjoy a high level of stability and effectiveness
(Almond 397-398). Almond describes four key structures of Anglo-American political
systems. First, Anglo-American political systems are highly differentiated as a result of
the specialization of every government-related role. Second, they are “manifest,
organized, and bureaucratized” as a result of the relative autonomy in the various
government-related roles or agencies (Almond 399). Third, Anglo-American political
systems are characterized by a high degree of stability in the functions of the roles.
Lastly, Anglo-American political systems are likely to have a diffusion of power and
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influence within the political system due to the breath of civil society, mass media,
representation, and mass education (Almond 399). When discussing the characteristics of
the Anglo-American political system Almond wrote:
It is a homogeneous culture in the sense that there is a sharing of political
ends and means. The great majority of the actors in the political system
accept as the ultimate goals of the political system some combination of the
values of freedom, mass welfare, and security. There are groups which
stress one value at the expense of the others; there are times when one value
is stressed by all groups; but by and large the tendency is for all these values
to be shared, and for no one of them to be completely repressed (Almond
398).
Put simply, according to Almond, Anglo-American political systems are highly stable
regimes because of their insular nature, centralized government, secularized political
systems, and shared political culture and goals (Almond 397-398). To reiterate, AngloAmerican political systems stability stems from their shared political culture and
homogeneous political goals; the absence of these qualities in a system, therefore, causes
instability.
The Anglo-American political system, as previously stated, can best be seen
through the political structures of the United States and the United Kingdom, where the
majoritarian principle underpins their Majoritarian election system (Gay 118). In
Majoritarian systems, votes are often cast in a first-past-the-post system, which is a direct
application of the concept of majoritarianism for every election ranging from local offices
to national offices; the first past “the post” or the benchmark of votes, that being 51% of
voters or a number greater than all other opponents, is chosen as the winner and there is
no need to have or develop a consensus with opposing parties to form a government (Gay
118-120). According to political theorist Oonagh Gay, Majoritarian systems “concentrate
power in the hands of the government, which promotes clarity of responsibility for policy
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choices and enables voters to hold governments to account for their performance. The
central weakness of this vision of democracy, however, is that it affords less nuanced
representation (Gay 119).” Majoritarian systems tend to produce single-party majorities
in a political system, excluding the other parties from partaking in ruling and removing
the need to form coalitions to form a government or control the executive branch.
Additionally, Majoritarian systems concentrate policy-making power in the hands of the
ruling party and result in single-party governments (Gay 118). The Majoritarian system
of governance, per the general notion of majoritarianism, often allows the majority to rule
unilaterally with minimal opposition or consensus from opposing parties until the next
election occurs.
Besides the exclusion inherent in the Majoritarian system and the notion of
majoritarianism, Majoritarian systems can have additional constitutional institutions that
lead to exclusionary practices or the perpetuation of the elite-mass compromise. In the
United Kingdom, one of the most notable of the constitutional institutions that cause
inequality and exclusion is the House of Lords. The House of Lords, also called the
Upper House, is the second chamber of the British Parliament (Politico N.p.). Members
of the House of Lords come from the British aristocracy and are not elected by the British
people like in the House of Commons, also known as the Lower chamber. As a result, the
House of Lords does not have virtually any of the same powers as the House of
Commons, such as forming governments or controlling taxation. Nevertheless, the House
of Lords does retain the right to revise and scrutinize the Government's actions and
legislation (Politico N.p.). As such, the House of Lords holds tangible power, using its
extensive expertise and influence brought on by its members privileged and titled
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upbringings, to influence or moderate the national policies created in the House of
Commons; members of the House of Lords will often wield their power by asking
Ministers to rethink their stances on legislation and amending bills rather than vetoing or
outright rejecting whole pieces of legislation (Politico N.p.). In this way, the House of
Lords—tucked within the majoritarian principle of the United Kingdom’s AngloAmerican Majoritarian regime—acts as a form of elite moderation and institutional
perpetuation of the elite-mass compromise. The House of Lords adds to democratic
inequality by expanding the apparatus of moderation that is inherent to the notions of
representation and representative democracy discussed in the previous chapter; the people
become moderated not only through elites who gain office in the House of Commons but
also through elites who institutionally hold power merely as a result of their social class.
In sharp contrast to the Anglo-American majoritarian system, but still partially
adhering to the notion of majoritarianism, is the Proportional Representation (PR) system
of choosing elected officials. In the PR system divisions or fragmentation in an electorate
are reflected proportionately in elections, with parties receiving a share of seats in the
legislative branch that is equally proportional to their share of the vote (Gay 119). PR is
typically seen
as a procedure that promotes inclusion and consensus. According to Oonagh Gay, a PR
system “promotes broad and nuanced representation and a participatory policy process in
which representatives’ bargain and negotiate with each other in a flexible and
accommodative fashion (Gay 119).” In PR systems elections are designed to, as
accurately as possible, reflect
citizens’ diverse views in the process of reaching a consensus between parties and
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forming a coalition or grand coalition; although the PR system does not prompt
majoritarianism on a micro-scale in terms of electing officials, the coalition aspect of PR
adheres, albeit partially, to the notion of majoritarianism because it requires parties to
work together to form a majority and create a government (Gay 120). Since parties are
required to work together to run government in a PR system, the emphasis is placed on
consensualism to some extent; PR can have a majoritarian feel if a single party is in
charge or if opposing parties are outright excluded from all governance, but coalitions
require political compromise amongst parties and the formation of a mutual consensus.
Majoritarianism, in contrast, conveys the idea of a single party with a majority of
representatives domineering and running the political show (Gay 119-122). Although PR
is a far more representative method of electing officials, it too has drawbacks. Most
notable amongst PR’s drawbacks is the fact that the PR system does not afford clarity of
responsibility because of the multifaceted nature of coalitions and policies are the
outcomes of bargaining, the proportionality of the vote allows fringe parties to obtain
office and the majoritarian nature of forming a coalition still leads to the inherent
exclusion of non-coalition parties and views (Gay 119-122). The PR system improves the
ability for segments of the people or their representatives to be present in crucial
deliberations; at the same time, however, it acts merely as a cover to mask some of the
many faults inherent to the Anglo-American system, namely enhanced inequality and
exclusion.
The Anglo-American majoritarian system is one most notable for the inequality
and exclusion it can perpetuate by its varying adherence to the principle of Majority rule
and alienation of consensus. However, according to Almond, the Anglo-American model
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is the most stable amongst the many variations of representative democracy because of its
homogenous nature and shared political goals; additionally, in the Anglo-American
model, there is the underlying assumption that all parties agree to play by the “rules” and
work within the political system or state apparatus to progress their agendas (Almond
399). Almond, nevertheless, describes the Anglo-American system as “fun” and almost
“game-like,” since the political sphere is a constant competition for gaining power
through government but rarely the erosion of said systems of power to meet political aims
(Almond 399-400). Almond’s analysis, both then and now, falls short of examining those
left out by the Anglo-American majoritarian system that gave it the sense of “stability” or
“fun” Almond so greatly admires.
In an increasingly diverse and globalized world, nevertheless, the exclusionary
nature of the Anglo-American majoritarian system leaves much to be desired in terms of
providing adequate representation to the people and accounting for marginalized or
minority communities. As a result, the conceptualization and application of
majoritarianism in representative democracies cause “bio fractures” to be formed in the
political realm and leads to the exclusion of, possibly substantial, segments of the
population or elected officials from expressing their voice (Agamben 3). Put simply, a
“bio fracture” is artificially created in any system that employs the majority principle
because said system necessitates the fragmentation of those intended to be included
(elected officials) by excluding them completely or partially from the political process
(Agamben 3). Instead of the “fun” Almond described, we are left only with questions.
What happens when the homogeneity of the system becomes fractured by the
heterogeneous nature of a diverse society? Will homogenous stability remain a defining
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feature of Anglo-American political systems or does, instead, their homogenous nature
leads to instability as diversity increases within them?

Semi-Autonomous Political Systems:
The classification of Semi-Autonomous political systems encompasses the
Continental European system (France, Germany, and Italy) outlined by Almond, but also
those regime types similar to the Continental European system by expanding those types
of political subcultures included in the typology (such as Spain). To understand the SemiAutonomous classification we must, therefore, understand the Continental European
system outlined by Almond in his typology. In contrast to the homogenous political
culture and stable qualities of the Anglo-American majoritarian system, the Continental
European system has a fragmented or heterogeneous political culture and is unstable
(Almond 405). The fragmentation of the political culture in Continental European
systems is brought about by “an uneven pattern of development” rooted in the remnants
of “older cultures” or “political manifestations” that were held in common by some
segment of the society (Almond 405-406). Almond classifies the remnants of “older
cultures” or “political manifestations” as political subcultures.
According to Almond, the political subcultures within the Continental European
system—the Catholic Ancien Regime areas in France, Southern Italy, and the Islands,
and parts of Bavaria—are rooted in three distinct remnants of “older cultures.” Those
who fall within the first political subculture are religious minorities in France, Germany,
and Italy that failed to be integrated into the state through the process of middle-class
secularization in the 19th century (Almond 406). The second type of political subculture
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is the older middle classes who are still, over a century later, primarily concerned with
the secularization of the. In societies that have only partially secularized, Almond
outlines a third type of political subculture associated with the modernized and
industrialized parts of these societies (Almond 406-407). The major political subcultures,
therefore, are (1) the pre-industrial, primarily Catholic, (2) the older middle-class, and (3)
the industrialist (Almond 406).
According to Almond the aforementioned political subcultures, and their
subsequent fragmentations into smaller political subcultures, cause the large-scale
fragmentation of the Continental European system because they have differing political
goals and an unwillingness to work within the system. The central tendency of the
Continental system is often not bargaining in the “game” of politics but imposing one's
will on competing views. When describing the Continental system Almond wrote:
Since in the last century the political issues have involved the very survival
of these sub-cultures, and the basic form of the political system itself, the
political actors have not come to politics with specific bargainable
differences but rather with conflicting and mutually exclusive designs for
the political culture and political system. This has involved a further
fragmentation at the level of ideology and political organizations (Almond
407-408).
The fragmentation and political subcultures of the Continental European systems causes
elites not to want to “exchange, compromise, and adapt” in hopes of bargaining with
political opponents, but rather to “preach, exhort, convert, and transform” the system
through demoralization or transformism (Almond 407). Where does political subcultures’
nature to transform and demoralize come from? Almond argues that political subcultures
are inherently militant and get their decisiveness from the groups that are embedded
within them or that they correlate with more generally; for the Catholic political
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subculture, for example, the Church itself and the Catholic apparatus of services that
surrounds it embeds subcultures with ideals that politically alienates them from the
bargaining process (Almond 406). The defining factor for Continental European systems,
as a result of the failure to bargain, prominence of political subcultures, and
fragmentation is the normalization of political immobilization in the political culture
(Almond 406-407).
Almond’s analysis of political subcultures provides valuable insights into what
can cause the fragmentation of political cultures and lead to regime instability; Almond,
however, fails to account for other types of subcultures that may be prominent in a given
society and the resulting government types they form (Almond 406-407). Political
subcultures, in a modern context, must also include those racial or ethnic elites that are
remnants from past states or past organizations of the modern state; Almond could
expand his definition of the “older middle class” political subculture, but that too would
leave at the role of “older societal elites” from ethnic minority groups or cultures
(Almond 407). Therefore, to increase the accuracy of Almond’s typology “ethnic elites”
and other types of marginalized cultures, which often run contrary to mainstream cultures
or society, must be considered as parts of the political subcultures that cause
fragmentation in the Continental European systems. To continue, the naming of the
system as “Continental European” in and of itself—while only referring to France,
Germany, and Italy—fails to encompass the expansiveness of the different types of
government systems with strong political subcultures in Continental Europe and abroad.
Instead, Almond should look at the larger similarities between regimes in continental
Europe which suffer from high levels of fragmentation, prominent political subcultures
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and political immobility (Almond 406-407). As such, this essay will not only expand
Almond’s definition of political subcultures to include ethnic elites but also classify the
Continental European systems of France, Germany, and Italy into the category of semiautonomous systems; the decentralization of power and the creation of semi-autonomous
segments of the state as a result of political subcultures (being those outlined by Almond
and expanded upon in this work) is a recurring commonality amongst France, Germany,
Italy and other European countries such as Spain.
The “semi-autonomous'' characteristics of a system can come about either through
formal means or through marginal means. Almond describes the Continental European
systems as lacking the ability to bargain, primarily as a result of the existence of the
fragmentation of the national political culture by political subcultures with different
objectives or political goals. In Almond’s example, political subcultures work on the
margins, in an informal sense, to establish semi-autonomy and exert power on the
political system or cause fragmentation (Almond 406-407). When semi-autonomy is
formally granted, however, the “inability” of some subcultures to bargain can be
overcome. Semi-autonomy through formal means comes about primarily as a result of the
creation of institutional or constitutional frameworks to give power or relative political
autonomy to political subcultures within a given society. Examples of the granting of
semi-autonomy based on political subcultures can be found in the Spanish autonomous
communities of País Vasco or Catalonia and the French provinces of New Caledonia, and
Corsica. In each case the level of autonomy of a specific community varies based on the
country, region and even the period one is examining; in general, nevertheless, the basic
premise of semi-autonomy is that a political subculture is given relative dominion over
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their community or region (Specia N.p).
Most often, the political subcultures given semi-autonomy are a prominent
ethnolinguistic or religious minority that has long-established roots in the country and is a
“remnant” of an older political system or community (Specia N.p). Semi-autonomous
regimes may grant varying types of autonomy such as fiscal autonomy, domestic-political
autonomy, ethnolinguistic autonomy, or, in very rare cases, international-political
autonomy. While ethnic elites and political subcultures may enjoy differing levels of
autonomy, said autonomy can quickly be stripped away. At the same time, those ethnic
elites who compose a particular political subculture may find themselves with relative
semi-autonomy at one instance a none at another, as their marginal semi-autonomy is
eroded over time or their formal semi-autonomy is destroyed from above through systems
of uniformity or assimilation. While semi-autonomous systems are in place, however,
ethnic elites can work within the system to bargain with others and enjoy representation,
at least on the local level. Unlike Almond’s description of Continental European systems,
therefore, the broader semi-autonomous category may be fragmented to; both,
nevertheless, suffer from some form of fragmentation within the political subculture,
decentralization on the national or local level, and the occasional immobilization of the
political system (Almond 406-407).
The political system and means of governance of semi-autonomous states most
often fall within the category of Proportional Representation (PR); although semiautonomous states are often more conducive to the usage of PR systems, they are not
necessarily a requirement for a semi-autonomous state (Gay 119). In the PR system, as
previously mentioned, divisions or fragmentation of the electorate are proportionately
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represented in the granting of seats or power to the varying parties and the institution of
coalition building is essential in forming a government (Gay 119-122). The PR system
helps to improve the ability of political subcultures to be present in crucial deliberations
and, at the same time, participate more inclusively in the larger political community.
The classification of regimes as semi-autonomous entails a level of guaranteed
representation, brought about primarily by decentralization and the granting of relative
autonomy, and consensus that is absent from the Anglo-American majoritarian political
system (Almond 399). The exclusionary nature of the Anglo-American majoritarian
system leaves much to be desired in terms of diverse representation and can create “bio
fractures” in the political community (Agamben 3). The semi-autonomous system seeks
to address some of the shortcomings of a purely majoritarian system by granting
representation and power to political subcultures in a given society; this granting of
relative autonomy may foster the bargaining that is absent from the Continental European
systems outlined by Almond or merely cause greater immobilization depending on the
state (Almond 406). Either way, however, the fact remains that the semi-autonomous
system intentionally includes greater segments of the people into the ruling of the
political community than the Anglo-American majoritarian system does.21 Additionally,
the semi-autonomous system of governance emphasizes the consensus amongst important
segments of the state's political culture while the Anglo-American majoritarian system
promotes exclusionary topics and the dominance of the majority.

Consociational Political Systems:
21

It is important to note that while this essay makes a clear distinction between the Anglo-American
majoritarian system of governance and the semi-autonomous system of governance can overlap.
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The largest types of representative democracies left out of Almond’s typology are
those cases of cultural fragmentation or heterogeneous regimes, which Lijphart describes
as pluralism, that are highly stable (Schendelen 154-155). Political scientists Arend
Lijphart classifies those fragmented but stable democracies not considered by Almond as
“consociational democracies” (Lijphart 211). Unlike semi-autonomous political systems,
consociational systems come about when elites make deliberate efforts to counteract the
immobilizing and destabilizing effects of cultural fragmentation through grand coalitions
or shared executive power with equal representation on all lower levels of government
(Lijphart 212-214). The institution that is central to a successful in the design of a
Consociational democracy are: (1) executive power sharing through grand coalitions; (2)
bicameralism and minority representation; (3) proportional representation; (4)
decentralization of the government through a federalist system; (5) minority veto (Pales
2011). Belgium’s institutions have allowed it to maintain national stability, in the wake of
numerous mutually reinforcing social cleavages, and foster an “ideal Consociational
system”. In this way, consociational democracies guarantee complete representation for
political subcultures at every level of government through power sharing; meanwhile,
semi-autonomous regimes often only guarantee partial representation on a local or
regional level. Consociational political systems require, however, a specific set of
conditions to be met for them to come to fruition.
According to Lijphart, the creation of a consociational democracy requires three
prerequisites for societal elites and one base or underlying assumption about elites'
understanding of fragmentation. First, elites must be able to manage or to accommodate
“the divergent interests and demands of the [political] subcultures” (Lijphart 217-219).
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Second, political subcultures and elites must be able to transcend cleavages to work with
elites of rival political subculture. Third, there must be a commitment to the maintenance
of the political system and a general willingness to partake in the improvement of said
systems’ cohesion or stability (Lijphart 217-219). Lastly, all of the aforementioned
requirements for the development of a consociational democracy are contingent on the
assumption that elites understand the perils or danger of political fragmentation and are
willing to take steps towards fixing them or crossing social cleavages to work with
others; the mutual working together of different political subcultures is defined as
accommodation by Lijphart (Schendelen 155-156). Put simply, the formation of a
consociational system requires elites to be able to overcome political fragmentation and
differences to work together and support a power sharing system.
The consociational system, similar to that of the semi-autonomous system but far
more expansive, is the system most notable for its emphasis on inclusion and consensus
amongst political subcultures (Lijphart 217-219). Unlike the societies where the AngloAmerican majoritarian system or, in some cases, the semi-autonomous system are
created, consociational systems come into existence in societies with extreme
fragmentation; the extreme fragmentation of the state and the existence of powerful
political subcultures can, and has, led to the undermining of the state, political
immobility and the outbreak of violence (Almond 399). In the societies in which
consociational states come into being, therefore, there is not always pre-existing
assumptions that all elite parties agree to play by the “rules,” that the state has a
monopoly on the legitimate use of force or that elites will work within the state apparatus
to progress their agendas. As such, said assumption is often developed by elites as a

Gamble-Eddington 71
cornerstone to the development of a fragmented, yet stable regime known as a
consociational political system (Lijphart 218). Chief amongst the consociational state’s
ability to get elite stakeholders from different political subcultures to come to the
discussion table is the creation of institutions that guarantee their interests will be
preserved. Put simply, consociationalism aims for government stability by fostering
power-sharing across political subcultures, developing sustainable institutions that can
overcome political immobility, and by avoiding the outbreak of violence by political
subcultures aggrieved at political systems that fail to represent them (Lijphart 217-219).
The key, in every facet of consociationalism, is consensus and sharing.
Examples of consociational political systems can be found all-around, despite the
focus often being on European consociational systems, and have enjoyed varying levels
of success. The four classic examples of a consociational state, as Lijphart outlined
extensively in his various works, are Switzerland, Belgium, Austria, and the Netherlands
(Lijphart 219). Since the initial inception of the idea of consociationalism, however, more
countries have begun to fall under the auspice of the consociational political system as
regimes change. Switzerland began being characterized as a consociational system in
1943, Belgium following World War I, Austria between 1945 and 1966, and the
Netherlands from the period of 1917 to 1967 (Pales N.p). Other notable consociational
political systems, at some point in time, are those of the former nation of Czechoslovakia,
India, Colombia, Malaysia, South Africa, Cyprus, Bosnia, Macedonia, and Lebanon.
Those nations who have ceased being consociational states, after having been classified
as such, usually were met with great normative success in terms of governance or merely
ceased to exist. In rare cases like that of Lebanon and Cyprus, however, the result was a
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Civil War (Pales N.p). Nevertheless, since Lijphart’s introduction of the concept of
consociationalism in the 1960s it has grown in popularity and increasingly been adopted
by constitution makers in fragmented societies, but that is not to say that
consociationalism does not have a sizable amount of literature criticizing it.
Besides the requirements for the development of a consociational system, some
characteristics tend to promote the development of consociational systems but are not
necessary for its creation. First, the existence of an external threat to the country or the
existence of the elite-mass system (Lijphart 217). The second condition is elites'
recognition of the need for cross-ethnic co-operation or a more general willingness to
engage across political subcultures (Lijphart 217). Thirdly, the presence of “relatively
low total load on the decision-making apparatus” or the existence of an easily changeable
structure or “decision-making apparatus” (Lijphart 217-219). Other important factors for
a consociational state are distinct social cleavage with high levels of internal political
cohesion and widespread acceptance of the principle of “government by elite cartel”
(Lijphart 221-222). “Government by elite cartel,” according to Lijphart is a society's
acceptance that elites, through the elite-mass compromise, are the principal players in the
decision-making process and said elites can overcome their differences to form a stable
government (Lijphart 222). The acceptance of “government by elite cartel” and the
presence of the various aforementioned conditions in a fragmented society aids in the
formation of a stable state with a consociational political system by elites.
Consociational democracies tend to succeed when there is no clear ethnic
majority can be found and ethnic groups are willing to compromise, granting equal veto
power and status or representation to all of the constituent ethnic groups while
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recognizing the country's ethnic diversity (Smooha 26). Consociational political systems,
as a result, can “create” (or rather recognize/enforce) virtually separate societies within a
state that are based on political subcultures’ ethnic affiliations, while uniting said
separate states together through some shared national identity and overarching
institutions that not only unite them but guarantee their places and in the political system
(Smooha 32-33). The political subcultures represented, nevertheless, within a
consociational stature are not necessarily stagnant in society; those political subcultures
represented can change overtime based on size, prominence, and various other factors.
Lijphart emphasizes that representation does not have to be given through very rigid
guidelines for specific groups to have power, but rather for power to be shared amongst
the most important groups in the society (Lijphart 103). The result is a political system
based on consensus amongst relevant elite stakeholders that is hypothetically able to
evolve or change with a state's ethnic composition.
Critics of Consociationalism and Other Approaches:
Aside from the semi-autonomous regime and the consociational regime, there
exists an extensive literature in political science on how to approach ethnic conflict or
fragmentation; conflict-regulation in diverse societies can range from partition, violence
(seen often through genocide and forced removal), and domination (often through
imposed assimilation or involuntary segregation) to accommodation (most notable
observed in partition and power sharing). Each of the aforementioned modes of conflictregulation has a large number of variations and adaptations. As a result, no “uniform”
mode of conflict-regulation can work for every or all given cases (Smooha 26). The
existing debate is conflict management, nevertheless, focuses on the scope of ethnic

Gamble-Eddington 74
representation and the quality of representation, looking at if expanded representation is
necessary, useful, or harmful in stabilizing ethnically divided societies (Ishiyama 252).
Political scientist Sammy Smooha, however, presents four dominant forms of dealing
with deep internal conflict and fragmentation within a democracy: (1) the development of
a consociational political system, (2) the employment of partition, (3) the development of
an ethnic democracy, and (4) the development of liberal democracy (Smooha 26-27).
Each of the aforementioned present different approaches on how to address or overcome
intense fragmentation of the political culture by, primarily ethnic, political subcultures;
at the same time, however, each approach also has drawbacks and sharp criticisms that
limit its applicability or suitability for most cases.
Consociational political systems, as previously discussed, are those regimes that
are simultaneously stable and yet highly fragmented; they are defined primarily by the
guaranteed existence of institutional representation in every facet of governance, crossethnic power sharing, and a mutual veto. According to Smooha, consociational
democracies work best when no clear ethnic majority but rather a few or more political
subcultures that can be brought together to form a compromise. In this way,
consociational political systems recognize the ethnic diversity of a given country, and the
often-separate societies that exist, and they develop a government based on ethnic
affiliations, with some shared identity or overarching institutions (Smooha 32-33). The
“consociational group” contends that the increased incorporation of as many ethnic
groups as possible proportionally (often through PR and some form of power sharing)
into governance creates the conditions for inter-ethnic cooperation and moderates
political demands from any one group (Ishiyama 252-253). Consociationalism, although
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appearing ideal in terms of granting representation within a highly fragmented society has
faced substantial criticisms since its 1960s conceptualization by Arend Lijphart.
Criticisms of Lijphart’s theory of consociationalism vary greatly but, according to
political scientist Schendelen, they fall within one of four shortcomings: (1) a lack of
conceptual clarity or various imprecisions, (2) the “mutability” of consociationalism’s
core concepts, (3) the difficulty of measuring the defining characteristics of a
consociational state and (4) the absence of scientific support or qualifications
(Schendelen 154-155). Another category of critics of consociationalism, not mentioned
by Schendelen, are those who criticize the strong elite-based orientation or domination of
the theory of consociationalism; namely that the conceptualization of the “elite cartel”
ruling over society and the delegation of the people to a “somewhat” subjected statues
that must adhere to elite rule. Each set of criticisms of consociationalism attacks a
specific aspect of the theory, whether it be its evidence, applicability, results, or
formulation.
Chief amongst the skeptics of consociationalism is political scientist Rinus van
Schendelen. Schendelen has argued that Lijphart uses evidence selectively and, as a
result, his publications clarifying his theory of consociationalism use differing definitions
of key concepts such as democracy and stability (Schendelen 156). To begin, Schendelen
asserts that a key component of the evidence Lijphart uses, as indicators of stability, is
the absence of violence, revolution and dissatisfaction, and the presence of cabinet
stability and constitutional continuity (Schendelen 157-159). According to Schendelen,
however, Lijphart’s definition of stability and its indicators not only fluctuates between
his works—at times looking at negative indicators and at other times looking at positive
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indicators—but fails to even account for the government turnover that is common in
consociational systems (Schendelen 164-168). To continue, Schendelen asserts that no
matter what definition of stability Lijphart chooses to use, there is no empirical evidence
that the absence of negative indicators causes political stability or constitutional
continuity in any form; put simply, the correlation between negative and positive
indicators does not, necessarily, necessitate the causation of positive indicators by
negative ones or vice versa (Schendelen 157).
In addition to Lijphart’s selective and vague use of evidence, Schendelen also
asserts that the pillarization that causes the prominence of political subcultures in some
societies was weakened by the 1950s—especially in the Netherlands which is one of
Lijphart’s “classic cases”—and formerly cohesive or coherent political subcultures were
fading away (Schendelen 165).22 Therefore, the “cross-dimensional co-operation” that
Lijphart makes note of as qualities of consociational regimes are, instead, indicators of
the dissolution of political subcultures, and elites pursuit of self-interests; political elites
choose to form coalitions and engage in accommodation, as such, and negotiate with the
opposition to improve their power and their party’s power (Schendelen 165-170). Besides
the structural flaws in Lijphart’s argument, Schendelen questioned whether a
consociational system could even be called a democracy and “isn't somehow ruled out by
definition” because of the guarantees it puts in place for political subcultures. Schendelen
provides valuable insights into some of the shortcomings of the theory of
consociationalism and its applicability to the real world or the cases outlined by Lijphart.

22

When Schendelen uses the term pillarization they are referring to the rigid “pillars” of political
subcultures in society. The term pillirization is one used, originally, by Lijphart and built upon by
Schendelen.
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While Schendelen questioned the evidence for the theory of consociationalism
and its applicability, political scientist Brian Barry called into question the scope of
consociationalism and argued that it was not widely applicable, and it only moderately
worked for a few small countries (Barry 484). According to Barry, the major Swiss
parties are proportionally represented since 1959 in the executive branch of the Swiss
government known as the Federal Council; unlike Lijphart’s consociational description of
the Federal Council, however, members of the Federal Council are viewed as
“individuals administering departments” rather than as party “oligarchs” or
representatives of a political subculture that reaches across societal segmentation (Barry
482). Despite Barry's questioning of “how consociational” Switzerland is, he concedes
that the country is consociational both descriptively but substantively because “political
parties cross-cut cleavages in the society and provide a picture of remarkable consensus
rather than a highly structured conflict of goals” (Barry 501). Although Barry asserts that
Switzerland is a consociational regime, he also scrutinizes consociationalism’s
applicability to the Netherlands as “doubtful.”
In the case of the Netherlands, Barry asserts that the religious and class
segmentation of the country is not strong enough to cause the sufficient fragmentation of
the national political culture to necessitate a consociational system (Barry 505). In the
Netherlands, Lijphart outlines religion as one of the primary causes of political
subcultures, cultural fragmentation, and, thus, the applicability of the consociational
model; while Barry agrees that religious divisions exist in the Netherlands, he argues that
the Dutch don’t “believe or act as if” said divisions are large enough to warrant special
considerations or cause political instability (Barry 502-504). Barry wrote: “the whole
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cause of the disagreement was the feeling of some Dutchman ... that it mattered what all
the inhabitants of the country believed. Demands for policies aimed at producing
religious or secular uniformity presuppose a concern...for the state of grace of one's
fellow citizens” (Barry 504). In sharp contrast to the Netherlands, Barry discusses cases
such as that of Northern Ireland or other deeply fragmented societies, where he says
religion creates political subcultures strong enough to fragment society. Barry ultimately
concludes that the Netherlands case, as well as other more modern cases discussed by
political scientists, are much “more doubtful than commonly supposed” and the
consociational model does not fit them as it does Switzerland or Belgium (Barry 503505).

Other Critics of Consociationalism:
Although outright critics of consociationalism are numerous, so too are those
political scientists with alternative theories to address strong ethnic divisions in
democratic societies. In his various works, political scientist Donald L. Horowitz argues
that consociationalism is a “one-size fits all solution” to societal division (Lijphart 99).
Why? Consociationalism focuses on diverging identities or political subcultures and how
to make them work together rather than integrating a society’s identities and
institutionalizing said integration through mandatory structures of representation
(Horowitz 5). Additionally, through its codification of political subcultures through
mandatory institutions or representation, consociationalism exacerbates competition
amongst the political subcultures or possibly even leads to the creation of competition in
the first place (Horowitz 5-7). In contrast, Horowitz proposes a centripetalists form of
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conflict mediation that encourages voluntary pre-electoral coalitions of moderates that cut
across societal fragmentation and foster the accommodation of political subcultures
(Horowitz 6). The centripetal model makes use of moderates’ preferential advantage with
voters to appeal at the margins to voters outside of their group and to “form an interethnic
vote-pooling coalition” that can fend off monoethnic or extremists’ parties; centripetal
systems are best adopted, therefore, in deeply divided democracies that have a
preference-based voting system (Horowitz 8-9). “Vote-pooling coalitions” come about
primarily as a result of international recommendations or a need of a party from the
majority group to include a minority political subculture (Horowitz 9). Horowitz
provides key insights into how one can address strong societal fragmentation without
necessarily developing the complex institutions of a consociational system.
Similar to Horowitz, Paul Brass believes the issue of governance lies not in the
scope of representation but with its quality, criticizing consociational theory for only
“freezing” ethnic conflict rather than eliminating it (Ishiyama 253-256). Instead, Brass
proposes individual competition and an individually based system to weaken and
eliminate ethnic cleavages. Along similar lines to Brass, Ishiyama argues that when an
electoral system promotes individual competition it is apt to promote individuals who
value compromise (of all forms including cross-ethnic) within parties and when group
competition is emphasized the opposite is likely to happen (with increased group
competition and leaders pursuing ethnic political goals) (Ishiyama 254-257). Horowitz’s,
Brass’s and Ishiyama’s approaches follow a similar trend in their criticisms of
consociationalism—namely that consociationalism solidifies political subcultures,
possibly even empowers political subcultures presence or prominence and causes

Gamble-Eddington 80
heightened long-term division—but they too are not perfect and have met criticisms by
consociationalist.
In “Constitutional Design for Divided Societies,” Lijphart addresses the
alternative model to power sharing proposed by Horwitz and determines it to be inferior
for societies with strong ethnic divisions; ceding only that the method may be superior in
a majoritarian society than the plausible alternatives (Lijphart 99). In general, Lijphart
denoted the participation of representatives of all significant communal groups in
political decision-making is essential in the development of a constitutional system
within societies with deep ethnic divisions. Lijphart emphasizes, however, that
representation does not have to be given through very rigid guidelines for specific groups
to have power, as Horwitz outlined in his criticism of consociationalism, but rather for
power to be shared amongst the most important groups in the society (Lijphart 103).
One of the primary methods advocated for highly fragmented societies, outside of
consociationalism or centripetalism, is the partition or division of the state into separate
homogeneous states; with relevant political subcultures in the fragmented society
maintaining their presence in part of a new nation as the majority or ruling class. Partition
is believed to be, by its proponents, the most “humane” method to solve ethnic conflicts
after they have advanced into conflict because it allows the state to separate along ethnic
lines, “save lives” that would be lost from ethnic fighting and creates a “lasting” solution
to societal ethnic division (Kumar 23-24). In light of large-scale immigration and
growing diversity, however, the “lasting” quality perpetuated by partition advocates as an
inherent part of the process is rather weak; overtime, it is possible, if not even plausible,
that a country will become fragmented to some extent.
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A successful partition requires organized population transfers into the countries
which are aligned with their ethnic group and, thus, are homogenous (Kumar 24). The
success of partitioning, therefore, is often dependent on internal decision-making (rather
than external imposition) about the applicability of partitioning and it necessitates
voluntary population transfers (Smooha 31). Additionally, partition is only suitable for
situations where the ethnic groups have incompatible nationalisms and they are, largely,
territorially separated from each other (Smooha 26). The erasure of fragmentation and the
creation of a homogenous and stable society is the goal of partition but said ends can only
be met once a set of specific conditions are present in a given society.
Despite its “well-intentioned” purposes or conceptualization, the history of
partition has been dotted with its imposition by colonial powers on other countries and
the fear of possible endless partitioning (Kumar 25). In many historical cases, colonial
powers' desire to withdraw from their overseas commitments and territories led to the
partitioning of countries that were former European colonies (Kumar 24-26). Rather than
a desire to assist in the process of self-determination or to develop stable states, colonial
powers used partitioning as a tool to develop arbitrary borders across their vast colonial
empires and, often, ignored actual societal fragmentation (based on language, tribal
affiliations...etc.) for convenience's sake. As a result, partitioning has often resulted not in
the creation of homogenous states but rather the development of further fragmentation
and even violence as colonial powers attempted to make one ethnic group dominant in a
territory (Kumar 24-26).
In addition to the historical misuse or imposition of partition, many political
scientists have also outlined countless possible shortcomings that the use of partition can
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cause in fragmented societies. To begin, a fear exists that the use of partition will beget
further calls for partition by different ethnic communities within the old state or new
state, creating an unstoppable avalanche of secessionist movements (Kumar 31). As such,
partition can lead to greater regime instability rather than stability. In addition to fears of
secessionist movements or further partition, political scientists like Sammy Smooha have
found that partition does not, often, make sense for any country because it places them in
a dis-favorable position politically since a sovereign state is relinquishing parts of their
land and economically in the global market since smaller nations are often overlooked
(Smooha 31).
While partition seeks to divide states along ethnic lines to develop homogeneous
states and consociationalism seeks to promote consensus, the ethnic democracy and
liberal democracy approaches seek to exclude or ignore political subcultures (Ishiyama
253). Ethnic democracy and liberal democracy adhere to notions of majoritarianism that
systematically exclude groups from the decision-making process. As a result, they both
inadvertently increase the likelihood of violence or ethnic conflict (Ishiyama 253). The
ethnic democracy approach to intense fragmentation focuses on working within the
system and adhering to principles of majoritarianism. Ethnic democracy combines
majoritarian electoral procedures and respect for the rule of law and individual
citizenship rights with the institutionalized dominance of a majority ethnic group over a
society. In its essence, ethnic democracy is the articulation of the majority ethnic group’s
political agenda on an ethnic nationalist platform and the ignoring or suppression of other
segments of the population (Smooha 26-27). The ethnic majority, in this sense,
simultaneously espouses exclusionary nationalism and a commitment to the principles of
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democracy (Smooha 32).
In contrast to ethnic democracy, liberal democracy is when a large portion of the
population deny/ignore or wish to deny/ignore ethnic affiliations and political subcultures
within a given society (Smooha 26). In a liberal democracy, the individual citizen rather
than the group (embodied by different political subcultures), is considered the
cornerstone of societal representation, and ethnic affiliations are ignored by those within
society; concepts of ethnicity, in this way, become something that is privatized and
personal affiliation to the individual but not a visible or public affiliation to drive the
political culture (Smooha 32-33). The mere ignoring of political subcultures or groups in
favor of the individual, however, does not make political subcultures disappear or
arguably improve government functionality. As a result, liberal democracies can often
face a lack of, or loss of, trust in government protections for non-discrimination by
various ethnic groups and calls for group rights recognition; they, at times, find
themselves outright denying the existence of political subcultures or discrimination
against said political subcultures (Smooha 33).
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CHAPTER 3- Case Studies
Case Study Selection:
This essay will draw on several case studies to illustrate how the three types of
representative democracies that are the focus of this study (Anglo-American
Majoritarian, Semi-Autonomous regions, and Consociational) function in the real world,
test the effectiveness of the previously outlined typology, and highlight the variety of
political subcultures within each case. Recognizing that adherence to typology’s
characteristics varies from case to case and hoping to add breadth to the discussion, this
essay will use two case studies for each of the three types of representative democracies
instead of just one per section. To begin, each case study will look at the development of
the cases’ political subcultures through historical analysis, their adherence to their
respective typology, and a handful of empirical data from three data sets—the EPR-Core
Data Set, Democracy Index, and V-DEM Data Set—to help examine the current state of
their political subcultures and descriptive representation for minority groups.
The cases that are examined are the United Kingdom and the United States in the
Anglo-American Majoritarian category, Spain and Canada in the Semi-Autonomous
category, and Bosnia and Belgium in the Consociational section. The United Kingdom
and the United States were chosen to represent the Anglo-American Majoritarian
category because they fall soundly within the classification of the Anglo-American
Majoritarian system and are held to be the most preeminent models of said system.
However, both countries also have different political subcultures and government types.
Similar to the UK and USA, Spain represents its respective category because it falls well
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within the said classification as a result of its granting of autonomy, in varying forms, to
the respective ethno-linguistic cleavages of Spanish society. To contrast the staunch
autonomy of the Spanish Semi-Autonomous system, this essay provides the case of
Canada and the province of Québec as an example of a more “moderate” semiautonomous representative democracy. Lastly, Bosnia and Belgium were chosen as
representations of their categories because they too fit well within their categories on
paper and Belgium is a preeminent model for consociationalism since Lijphart first
presented the theory in the 20th century. Additionally, despite their strong adherence to
the characteristics of their category, both countries share different political subcultures
and government structures.

Anglo-American Majoritarian Political Systems: The United Kingdom (UK)

(A) The UK and Power Distribution
The United Kingdom is a medium-sized country of 66.5 million people in
Western Europe that is governed by some five parliamentary bodies and a strong federal
government in London. The V-DEM Datasets, created by the University of Gothenburg,
indicate that the United Kingdom is firmly in the top 10% of “Liberal Democracies” in
the world with a score of more than .75 out of 1 (V-DEM 24-26). Similarly, according to
the 2020 Democracy Index ratings from the Economists, the United Kingdom is a “full
democracy” that is ranked 16th in the world with a score of 8.54 out of 10: the United
Kingdom has a perfect ranking of 10 out of 10 for “Electoral process and Pluralism,” a
7.50 out of 10 for the “Functioning of its government,” 8.89 out of 10 for “Political
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Participation,” and a 7.50 out of 10 for “Political Culture” (Democracy Index 9).23 In
comparison to other European democracies, especially in Western Europe, the United
Kingdom ranks in the center for virtually every factor studied by the Democracy Index.
In particular, the United Kingdom’s “Political Culture,” is more fragmented or weak than
most of its Western European neighbors, with only Belgium and Portugal having lower
ratings. Despite their shortcomings in having a fully unified political culture, likely as a
result of the various ethno-linguistic identities in the country, the United Kingdom has a
highly functional and effective governing apparatus (Democracy Index 9-13). The
creation of the modern country of the United Kingdom and the formation of its AngloAmerican Majoritarian model which grants it stability dates back to the 19th-century.
In 1801 the United Kingdom
came into existence through the Act of
Union, formally uniting Great Britain
(England, Scotland, and Wales) and
Ireland as the United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Ireland (CIA N.p).
Since 1801, the borders and name of
the UK have changed—with the 1921
Image 1.1 Map of the modern-day UK
borders and the countries within it. From the
BBC Country Profile

23

Anglo-Irish Treaty partitioning Ireland
into Northern Ireland and the Republic

The Democracy Index measures the health of contemporary democracies and classifies countries as Full
Democracies, Flawed Democracies, Hybrid Regimes, and Authoritarian Regimes. The Democracy Index
uses four indicators to classify regimes: the presence of a competitive and multiparty political system,
universal adult suffrage, regularly contested and secure elections conducted with secret ballots and public
access of major parties to the electorate through the media or campaigning.

Gamble-Eddington 87
of Ireland and the name being officially changed to simply the United Kingdom in
1927—but the general structure of the country has not. The UK is a federalist
parliamentary democracy under a constitutional monarchy. The UK’s federal government
consists of three primary sections: the executive branch, judicial branch, and legislative
branch. The Belgian monarch, currently Queen Elizabeth II of England, serves as the
head of the British state and is responsible for appointing parliamentary confirmed
candidates to the judiciary and executive branches of government (CIA N.p). The Prime
Minister (PM), who is chosen from the majority coalition based on the principles of
majoritarianism, serves as the head of government and is responsible for conducting the
country’s day-to-day business (United Kingdom N.p).
The UK’s legislative branch, consisting of the House of Lords and House of
Commons, is responsible for drafting laws and federal regulations for the entirety of the
country. The House of Lords, also called the Upper House, is the second chamber of the
British Parliament and consists of 792 seats (Politico N.p.). Members of the House of
Lords come from the British aristocracy and are not elected by the British people in
recurring election cycles. As a result, the House of Lords does not have virtually and of
the powers invested in the federal government—such as control over taxation or forming
a government—and is more of a symbolic aspect of the British government that has the
power to scrutinize legislation or externally use their power to influence elections. The
House of Commons, on the other hand, is the first chamber of the British parliament and
consists of elected representatives from the constituencies in the six countries that make
up the UK (United Kingdom N.p).
The House of Commons currently has 650 parliamentary constituencies, and thus
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650 representatives, across the four countries that comprise the United Kingdom:
England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland (United Kingdom N.p). Currently, the
British House of Commons is comprised of the Conservative Party with 365 seats, the
Labour Party with 200 seats, the Scottish National Party with 47 seats, the Liberal
Democrats with 11 seats, and the Democratic Unionist Party with 8 seats. Additionally,
the House of Commons consists of the Plaid Cymru with 3 seats, the Social Democratic
and Labour Party with 2 seats, the Alliance Party with 1 seat, the Green Party with 1 seat,
Independent with 4 seats, and Sinn Féin with 7 seats (Johnston 10-12). British elections
(locally and nationally) are based on a first-past-the-post system, as discussed in the
previous chapter, that calls for the candidate with the most votes out of the poll of
candidates to win a given election. The most votes out of the pool of candidates,
however, are not synonymous with a majority of the total votes cast. Whether receiving a
majority of the total vote or merely a larger number of votes than their competitors, each
constituency in the UK elects only a single member of parliament (MP) to the House of
Commons every five years (United Kingdom N.p). The number of seats in the House of
Commons is fixed at 650 but the allocation of seats between each of the four nations of
the UK is calculated based on the proportion of the registered voters in each (Johnston
20). The election system of the UK is a clear-cut embodiment of the principle of
majoritarianism in the selection of legislative representatives. However, the principle of
majoritarianism embedded in British elections is challenged, albeit on a relatively smallscale, by the presence of a federalist system that grants some autonomy to the four
countries within the United Kingdom (Gay 119).
The use of a federalist system allows the countries within the UK, although often
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dominated by England, to all have some level of regional autonomy and to play an
important role in the composition of the federal government. The United Kingdom
consists of four countries: Northern Ireland, England, Scotland, and Wales. Each of the
countries has a unique culture, language, and heritage that is indigenous to the region.
Additionally, each of the four countries has its own parliament to handle regional affairs,
enforce federal legislation and maintain the cultural/linguistic heritage of each region
(United Kingdom N.p). Despite having some power, the theory of majoritarianism
embodies even the moderately devolved nature of this system since any laws or
regulations the countries make is subject to federal laws and cannot go against it. It is the
majority party in Parliament that puts its stamp on the entire national legislation; the
British parliament still has greater power and can override local and regional
governments and, therefore, this is still a majoritarian system (United Kingdom N.p).
Recognizing that the UK adheres to majoritarian principles in its governmental
structure, how does the UK stacks up the characteristics common to the Anglo-American
category of representative democracies? The UK, unlike many countries, embodies
virtually all of the core principles that are central to a successful Anglo-American system.
(1) Despite its global nature, the UK demonstrates a tendency towards an insular nature
politically and economically, as can be seen through Brexit and the UK’s ongoing push
towards less reliance/connectedness with continental Europe (Democracy Index 7). (2)
The United Kingdom’s government is highly centralized, as discussed earlier, and every
one of the UK’s four countries at the periphery of society is subject to the decisions of the
British parliament at the center (Dunin-Wasowicz 1). (3) Even though the UK has a state
religion, Anglicanism, the country has secularized political systems that do not
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emphasize any particular religious affiliation. (4) British politicians share a political
culture that emphasizes democratic debate, progress towards the common goal of
improving the country, and a mutual sense of unity (Dunin-Wasowicz 1-3). (5) The UK
federal government is “highly differentiated” because each government-related role is
specialized, and the country has a strong bureaucratic structure. In total the UK has 23
ministerial departments that administer virtually every facet of the British public sector,
20 non-ministerial departments that provide expert opinion, and 300+ agencies that work
to enforce and execute government decrees (United Kingdom N.p). The UK bears every
characteristic or requirement outlined by Almond for a country to fall within the category
of an Anglo-American system. As a result of its adherence to the characteristics of the
Anglo-American model, the UK should, and does, have a high level of stability and
effectiveness in governing (Almond 397-398).
Is the UK divided by political subcultures that fragment the country? How does
the UK fit within the conceptualization of political subcultures? The UK is a relatively
homogeneous country in terms of the political culture, as Anglo-American majoritarian
systems tend to be, and political outcomes because of the moderate stance embedded into
the core of Majoritarian-based systems. The measure for the homogeneity in the political
culture is the absence of many, or any, political subcultures with diverging goals that can
fragment the national political culture or the presence of political subcultures who tend to
align with the majority in terms of the mode of governance. British political parties—
whether it be the ruling Conservative party or the opposing Labor Party—tend to
compete for the center of British politics with the ultimate result of enacting moderate
legislative reform. The British political structure, often, is a relatively positive
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phenomena because its institutions incentivize party behavior in centripetal or centrifugal
directions in a PR system, encouraging party differentiation and limiting extremism. As a
result, those who voted for a losing party in one election could often expect similar
policies to be passed by an opposition party to those their preferred party would have
enacted (Christoph 632-634).
Although the UK is a diverse state of four nations, territory-based or culturally
based political subcultures within the UK were largely erased or engulfed into a single
left-right dimension of political competition encapsulated in the Conservative and Labor
parties (Dunin-Wasowicz 4). British politics has long been dominated by two big parties,
one right moderate and one left moderate party, and a small number of “floating” voters
between the two parties. In the 1950s, for example, over 80% of the electorate voted for
the Labour party (the left moderate party) or Conservative party (the right moderate
party) (Taylor N.p).
Since the 1950s, the two-party domination of the UK has remained strong with
them holding a combined 86% of the British parliament. This is not to say that British
parties all share the same ideology, but rather that there is an innate sense of pragmatism
and moderation embedded in the British system that ultimately results in similar
outcomes across party lines (Taylor N.p). Additionally, as British parties become closer
in any given election to obtaining power or participating in a ruling coalition they tend to
“shed” extremist or non-conforming political subcultures from the public light to make
themselves more palpable to the British electorate (Christoph 636). The force causing the
embeddedness of moderation in the British system is the combination of proportional
representation, federalism and the omnipresent left-right dimension that superseded
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individual parties. While the left-right dimension may seem all-encompassing, it turns out
to be rather weak in practice and has little, if any, unifying factor among ideological
groups (Dunin-Wasowicz 2-4). Even with a relatively homogeneous political culture and
strong two-party domination, some political subcultures do exist in the UK and they have
increasingly come to prominence as the “floaters” between the two main parties have
increasingly gravitated towards nationalist parties within the UK’s four countries since
the 1950s. Nevertheless, said political subcultures’ power was often minuscule in
comparison to the dominant left-right dimension of political competition. In recent times,
however, the political culture of the UK has increasingly fragmented as the country’s
ethno-linguistic political subcultures, embodies in the Scottish parties, have obtained
greater amounts of representation and power in the country. What was once political
consensus or the simple ignoring of ethno-linguistic differences in policy outcomes, has
become the source of modern political splintering on issues such as BREXIT. On a
similar note, the left-right dimension of the UK has also weakened in recent years as the
Labour party has become a symbolic shell of itself. The result is, in the UK at least, a
weakening or erasure of the previous institutional consensus and moderation.

(B) A Comparative Look at the United States and the UK
Although the left-right dimension of political competition is prominent in the UK, it is
not unique to the country but rather a common trend in Anglo-American majoritarian
countries that tend to “overlook” or ignore racial and ethnic divides to the detriment of
democratic representation. According to the 2020 Democracy Index ratings, the United
States is a “flawed democracy” that is ranked 25th in the world with a score of 7.92 out
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of 10: the USA has a 9.17 out of 10 for “Electoral process and Pluralism,” a 6.79 out of
10 for the “Functioning of its government,” 8.89 out of 10 for “Political Participation,”
and a 6.25 out of 10 for “Political Culture” (Democracy Index 43). In comparison to
other North American democracies, the USA ranks in the bottom for virtually every
factor studied by the
Democracy Index
(Democracy Index 43).
Despite its low
rankings, which have
consistently decreased
over recent years in a
process of
“Autocratization,” the
V-DEM Datasets
Image 1.2 Map of the modern-day USA borders and the
countries within it. From the CIA Country Profiles.

indicate that the USA is
in the top 20% of

“Liberal Democracies” in the world with a score of more than 0.50 out of 1 and lower
than 0.75 out of 1 (V-DEM 24-26).
In the USA, which also fits within the Anglo-American majoritarian model, the
country has solidified a two-party system with a left-right dimension to which the
electorate largely adhere (Lee 138). Voters tend to choose between “the left” embodied
with the Democrats or “the right” embodied with the Republicans. However, the left-right
dynamic has increasingly become an “identity” rather than a mere political affiliation in
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the USA, as the political culture weakens and fragments from a fledgling trust in
government institutions (Democracy Index 20). As a result, third parties in the USA have
played a minimal role, if any role at all, in the governance of the American political
system throughout its history and tend to capture a small number of “floating” voters who
trend between a fringe party, independent candidates and one of the major parties (Lee
138-140). Similar to the UK, historically at least, is the moderate nature of the American
political culture and the innate sense of pragmatism in the American political system that
tends to lead to moderate compromise (Jacobson 388-390). In the United States, as in the
UK, there is a dual factor at play, each working in conjunction to produce moderation. On
one hand is the country’s homogenous political culture, as well as the country’s political
subcultures willingness to coalesce in political organizations/parties often not
descriptively representing them, and on another hand is the country’s institutions that
propagate a left-right dynamic.
In recent years, polarization in the American political system has played a role in
causing the major parties’ inability to “shed” extremist segments of their party as the
voter base has become radicalized, party loyalty is heightened, swing districts have all
but evaporated due to gerrymandering and policy has begun shifting away from the
center (Jacobson 388). In its place, the American two-party system has begun
propagating less-moderate left-right political views and witnessed decreasing levels of
pragmatism/compromise since the 93rd American Congress in 1973 (Jacobson 690).
Despite its increasing polarization, the left-right dimension of the USA holds in the
present, embodied by the Republican and Democratic parties, and bears striking
similarities to political culture and the configuration of the British political landscape.
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In order to identify the political subcultures of the UK, based on race and
ethnicity, this essay makes use of the aggregate data from the EPR Core dataset. Based
on the EPR Core dataset ethnic political subcultures in the UK currently consist of (1)
Afro-Uruguayans, (2) Scots, (3) Asians, (4) Afro-Caribbeans, (5) Welsh, (6) Catholics in
Northern Ireland, and Protestants in Northern Ireland (Bormann 744-771). Of those major
political subcultures present in the UK, however, the EPR Core dataset identifies the
ethno-linguistic identities (Scots, Welsh, and Northern Irish) of the UK’s four
countries—excluding England which is the majority—as the only politically relevant
political subcultures based on their power/influence. The Scots, Welsh and Northern Irish
all have relative access to state power, although at times it wanes, and play roles in the
fragmentation of the British political culture based on ethno-linguistic cleavages (Vog
1327-1342).
Although a state of four nations that largely debate along ideological lines, the
linguistic and ethnic dimensions of the UK have fostered slight fragmentations in the
British political culture since the formation of the state (Dunin-Wasowicz 1-3). To begin,
although largely carrying a British identity and adhering to the political culture of the
UK, Northern Ireland has a diverse history with a unique culture, a native language, and a
strain of “Irish” identity. The desire for Northern Irish separation from the political
culture and the UK more generally can be seen through the Sinn Fein party, which holds
7 seats in the British parliament (Johnston 10). Similarly, the Scottish political subculture
(as seen through the Scottish National Party with 47 seats) and the Welsh political
subculture (as seen through the Plaid Cymru with 3 seats) cause a fragmentation of the
British political culture as each one holds tenable sway and influence on their respective

Gamble-Eddington 96
geographic regions based on ethno-linguistic cleavages (Johnston 10). Fragmentation in
the UK is a sliding scale, with many of the country's political subcultures vying for
independence; most prominent on the scale, in recent times, is the Scots who have been
sliding towards independence for several decades and whose representatives have
continuously walked out of the House of Commons in protest. Although many may
disagree, say a Scottish or Irish nationalist, the fragmentation of the UK political culture
has been relatively isolated to a handful of political parties and, notability, the
referendums held in some of the ethno-linguistic regions that diverge from the “majority”
view. In the legislature, nevertheless, the parties all still adhere to the fundamental
commitment to represent their constituents in British democracy and work across ethnolinguistic lines to get legislation passed (Johnston 10).
Many of the aforementioned parties have strong policies for their respective
ethno-linguistic political subculture to secede from the UK if given the opportunity
through a referendum, with the popularity for secession growing amidst the fallout of
BREXIT (Langfitt 2). The combination of all of these parties, nevertheless, only 57 seats
in the 650-seat parliament of the UK, meaning that the political fragmentation is limited
to less than 9% of the total British parliament (Johnston 10). In addition to the parties
attributed to a political subculture in the UK, British political subcultures are also present
to some extent within the left-right dimension of the political parties with both the
Conservative party and Labor party having members from the four countries of the UK
that identify with their ethno-linguistic identity; the overarching and cross-cutting
political parties in the UK or USA are a sharp contrast to countries like Belgium with
highly fragmented pirates along ethno-linguistic lines (Johnston 10-12). The
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fragmentation of the British political culture is limited to some extent by the winner-takeall electoral system limit third party representation and, thus, limit parties strictly
identifying with one ethno-linguistic group, keeping their political fragmentation score
low Although growing in numbers, at the present, the political subcultures of the UK are
still subject to the whim of the left-right dimension of British politics that largely
“transcends” or disregards ethno-linguistic differences inherent to the four countries that
compose the UK. Modern representation, however, could be out-of-step with an evolving
British political culture that is increasingly fragmenting but at present this has a slow-tono effect on national representation given the country’s electoral method.
Similar to the UK, the major ethno-linguistic political subcultures of the USA
have some political power in the political system. The power of American ethnolinguistic political subcultures, however, is often encapsulated in individual
representatives or senators within one of the two major parties. Based on the EPR Core
dataset ethnic political subcultures in the USA currently consist of (1) Latinos, (2)
African Americans, (3) Asian Americans, (4) American Indians, and (5) Arab Americans
(Bormann 744-771). Of those major political subcultures present in the USA, however,
the EPR Core dataset identifies only Latinos and African-Americans as politically
relevant political subcultures based on their power/influence (Vog 1327-1342). The
formulation of American political subcultures in the USA political system is not identical
to that in the UK. In contrast to the UK, primarily as a result of the configuration of the
American political system along two-parties, there are no ethno-linguistic parties within
the USA that advocate for a specific political subculture. Instead, as is the case in the UK
to a lesser extent, political subcultures are incorporated into the left-right dimension and
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serve under one of the major parties.
The United Kingdom’s Anglo-American Majoritarian system creates a highly
stable governmental apparatus that engages with the various segments of British society
on a national level through a left-right dichotomy and embraces, to some extent, the
diversity of the country’s ethno-linguistic political subcultures on a regional level
through federalism. In all cases, however, the central government in London is
responsible for deciding policy and the British political structure ignores the ethnolinguistic political subcultures in the creation of most parties or legislation, to the
detriment of said ethno-linguistic political subcultures.

Semi-Autonomous Political Systems: Spain
Spain is a medium-sized country of 46.94 million people in the westernmost
portion of Europe with strong democratic institutions. The V-DEM Datasets indicates
that Spain is firmly in the top 10% of “Liberal Democracies” in the world with a score of
more than .75 out of 1 (V-DEM 24-26). Furthermore, according to the 2020 Democracy
Index ratings, Spain is a “full democracy” that is ranked 22nd in the world with a score of
8.12 out of 10: Spain has a ranking of 9.58 out of 10 for “Electoral process and
Pluralism,” a 7.14 out of 10 for the “Functioning of its government,” 7.22 out of 10 for
“Political Participation,” and an 8.13 out of 10 for “Political Culture” (Democracy Index
50). In comparison to other Western European democracies, Spain ranks in the lower
center for virtually every factor studied by the Democracy Index. In particular, the
functioning of the Spanish government and the level of political participation in Spain is
particularly lower than most of its Western European neighbors. Despite its below-
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average performance, by Western European standards, Spain has a stable administrative
structure and a political culture rooted in a constitutional framework that ensures ethnolinguistic representation for the country’s political subcultures. The creation of modern
Spain and the formation of its Semi-Autonomous model dates back to the 15th century
(Democracy Index 9).
In the 15th century, the
Spanish state came into existence
as a monarchy through the union
of Ferdinand II, the King of
Aragon (the eastern portions of
modern-day Spain), and Princess
Isabella of Castile. Since its
Image 1.3 Image of modern-day Spain and its
major cultural regions. From the Encyclopedia
Britannica.

creation, the country of Spain has
undergone a series of

constitutional transformations that have shifted it from a centralized monarchy to a
decentralized democracy. Starting in 1883, and up until 1930, Spain continually had a
parliamentary system written into its national constitution in some form but gave
substantial power to the Spanish monarchy (Shabad 111-112). In 1931, a social
revolution occurred, and Spain became a democracy, albeit a highly unstable and
dysfunctional one, for a brief period. Spanish democracy lasted until July 17th of 1936,
when the Spanish Civil War began between the nationalist forces of Francisco Franco
and the republican forces of the 2nd Republic of Spain. The War resulted in the collapse
of the fledgling Spanish democracy and the formation of a highly centralized dictatorship
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under Francisco Franco in 1939 (Shabad 111).
Spain had a long history of being a highly centralized state, similar in many
regards to the Anglo-American Majoritarian model, with a single administrative and
governmental authority embodied through leaders like Francisco Franco. In the 1970s the
Spanish government, under the Franco regime, underwent a concerted effort to centralize
and standardize the Spanish state along with the ideals of “castilianization,” whereby
non-majority cultures and languages in Spain were suppressed in favor of the dominant
Castellano culture/language (Shabad 111-115). Despite Franco’s attempts to repress
Spain’s minorities and progress an assimilationist policy, the major minority groups in
Spain maintained their ethno-linguistic identity and persevered throughout the 1970s. The
repression that Spain’s minority groups faced during the period served as a renewed
catalyst for calls for regional autonomy and ethnolinguistic self-expression throughout
the late 20th century (Shabad 111-112). Upon the death of Franco in 1975, however, that
all changed. In 1975 Spanish King Juan Carlos I became the head of the Spanish state,
succeeding Franco as his hand-picked heir, and he began the process of nationwide
democratization.
Following Franco’s death, ethno-linguistic parties such as the Partido
Nacionalista Vasco and the Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya quickly rose to
prominence on a platform of increased self-autonomy (Shabad 112). Spain is not like
other European multinational societies, which have often taken the form of a
consociational state because Castellano is the country’s clear dominant culture and
language, but the government guarantees the autonomy of its ethno-linguistic political
subcultures (Shabad 114). For Spain, therefore, the problem wasn’t one of mediating
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between relatively equally sized ethno-linguistic identities but rather between the
Castellano ethno-linguistic majority and a few prominent ethno-linguistic political
subcultures that accounted for some 28% of the country’s total population (Shabad
114).To minimize the political challenges to the existence of the Spanish state, the
Spanish political elites began the process of governmental decentralization in 1977 and
gave varying forms of regional autonomy to the different ethno-linguistic political
subcultures within their respective regions of the country (Shabad 112). In 1978 a new
Spanish constitution explicitly recognized the multinational and multilingual character of
the Spanish state, a sharp departure from the historically unitary emphasis of Spanish
constitutions. The 1978 constitution established Spain as a federalist parliamentary
democracy under a constitutional monarchy, while simultaneously establishing the
principle of decentralization of the Spanish government and the granting of relative
autonomy to the major ethno-linguistic political subcultures of Spain (Shabad 112-113).
With a new constitution in place, the process of gaining autonomy began for the
“historically” autonomous Basque, Catalan, Gallego, and Valencian communities
(Shabad 113). In 1979 the Basque provinces and Catalonia regained the autonomy to
address a host of economic, social, and cultural issues within their respective regions.
Additionally, and uniquely, in the Basque provinces of Guipúzcoa and Vizcaya the
Conciertos Económicos were reestablished, allowing the regions to have greater
economic control over (Shabad 113). Similar to the Basque provinces and Catalonia,
Galicia passed its own autonomy referendum and gained new levels of autonomy over
their region. Soon after Galicia, the southern region of Andalusia, with no major claim to
ethno-linguistic difference with the Spanish state or historic autonomy, became the fourth
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region to be granted autonomy (Shabad 112). Autonomy during this period came as a
result of increasing support for radical ethno-linguistic nationalist parties—such as Herri
Batasunam in the Basque provinces—in the different ethno-linguistic regions, a renewed
call for secession by some ethno-linguistic political subcultures, and escalating violence
by the Basque separatist organization Euskadi ta Askatasuna (ETA) (Shabad 114). Like a
tidal wave of discontent with the state, power faded away from the centralized state, and
autonomy flooded towards the ethno-linguistic political subcultures. The ethno-linguistic
political subcultures of Spain called into question the very nature of Spanish
representation and democratic practices to gain autonomy (Shabad 111).
In 1983, the creation of el Estado de las Autonomías officially ended with the
creation of 17 autonomous communities and the continued delegation of power to
regional governments (Shabad 112). According to political scientist Goldie Shabad: “As
of June 1985, 300,000 functionaries of the central government had been transferred to the
regions, and by the end of that year all but a few regional governments had received the
full measure of competencies granted to them by their statues of autonomy (Shabad
112).” By 1980, nevertheless, it seemed as if the new nature of the Spanish state and the
differences brought about by the prominence of ethno-linguistic calls for autonomy had
all but been solved. Unfortunately, the problem of autonomy and succession did not end.
The Basque provinces (also known as Euskadi or Pais Vasco) and Catalonia, set the
groundwork for other “historically autonomous” regions with a non-mainstream ethnolinguistic political subculture laid the groundwork for the formation of the Spanish state
as a Semi-Autonomous regime type (Shabad 114-116).24
24

Interestingly, the autonomy granted to the “historically autonomous” communities of Spain set a
precedent of granting autonomy, to some degree, to the various regions of Spain even if they did not
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Although power has moved away from the central state and towards the
peripheries, embodied by the new autonomous communities, the national government of
Spain maintains the vast majority of the essential functions of the state, such as
conducting foreign relations and maintaining a military (La Moncloa n.p). The power that
has been granted to the autonomous communities primarily allows them to regulate their
education, promote their language/culture, have substantial influence over
finances/management, and run the political/administrative functions of their respective
regions. According to the Moncloa of Spain:
Autonomous Communities have considerable freedom in terms of
economic and financial management. They are able to approve their own
annual budgets and determine their own resources through taxes, rates and
surcharges. The general funding system of Autonomous Communities,
which also includes taxes assigned by the State and participation in national
taxes, is set multilaterally by the State and Autonomous Communities,
ensuring inter-regional solidarity and an equal threshold in the provision of
basic public services throughout Spain thanks to a range of financial
mechanisms. Furthermore, Comunidad Autónoma del País Vasco and
Comunidad Foral de Navarra, have two special systems by virtue of their
regional systems: the Economic Agreement (Concierto Económico), in the
case of the Basque Country, and the Agreement (Convenio), in the case of
Navarre. With these financial systems, these Communities agree with the
State, their contribution to its support and to the harmonization of their own
tax system with that which prevails in the rest of national territory (La
Moncloa n.p).
In this way, the autonomous zones are allowed to enjoy a great amount of freedom in the
way they govern and administer themselves on a day-to-day basis. On a national scale,
however, the autonomous zones must work with the national government of Spain to
determine some aspects of regional policy and all aspects of a state-wide policy. The
powers of the autonomous zones do not permit their contradiction of the federal

technically have a historic claim to self-governance such as Andalusia. With the granting of Andalusian
autonomy in 1980, the ruling Spanish party UCD weakened in power and new questions arose about the
future of the Spanish state.
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government or their unilateral acting on the international stage (La Moncloa n.p).
With the general timeline behind the formation of the current Spanish state in
mind, let us now examine the various facets of the Spanish government. The Executive of
Spain is divided between the head of the Spanish state current King Felipe VI, who
performs mostly ceremonial activities and holds little actual power in the political
realism, and the Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez Pérez-Castejón (La Moncloa
n.p). The legislative branch of the government is called Les Cortes and, similar in some
regards to that of the United Kingdom, it is divided into the Congress of Deputies and the
Senate (La Moncloa n.p).
Unlike the United Kingdom with a relatively straightforward system based on
first-past-the-post and single-member districts, the Spanish method of conducting
elections is a bit more complex (La Moncloa n.p). The Spanish election system
legislative system is based on proportional representation with some minimum guarantees
put in place, in terms of seats and representation, for the various provinces of Spain based
on population. Additionally, Spain makes use of a run-off system that ensures that
candidates receive a majority of the votes, making run-off elections occur amongst top
vote-getters, in a given election to enter the office (La Moncloa n.p). Run-off elections,
proportional representation, and territorial guarantees for representation are essential
aspects of selecting representatives for the legislative branch.
The Senate of Spain consists of 266 senators and guarantees a small degree of
territorial representation for Spain’s comunidades autónomas or autonomous
communities, many of which speak on behalf of one of the country’s ethno-linguistic
political subcultures (La Moncloa n.p). Of the 266 senators in the Senate, 208 of them are
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elected directly to their office through universal suffrage: each of the 47 mainland
provinces is granted 4 senators, there are 3 senators for each of the three largest islands
(Gran Canaria, Mallorca, and Tenerife), each other island (Ibiza-Formentera, Minorca,
Fuerteventura, Gomera, Hierro, Lanzarote, and La Palma) has 1 senator and Ceuta and
Melilla each have 2 senators (La Moncloa n.p). Additionally, there are another 58
senators who are appointed by the legislative assemblies of the autonomous communities.
Each of the legislative assemblies of the Autonomous communities each appoints a
senator (guaranteed) and then is allowed to appoint another senator for every million
inhabitants of their respective territory (La Moncloa n.p). The Senate can veto or amend
legislation passed by the Congress of Deputies, but the ultimate passage of legislation
must be decided on by the Congress of Deputies. Through the use of appointed seats in
the Senate by the autonomous communities, the legislative structure of Les Cortes
reinforces the representation or power of the different autonomous communities in Spain
and complements the autonomy each community has the decentralized federalist model
(La Moncloa n.p).
In contrast to the Senate, the Congress of Deputies is composed of 350 members
who are all chosen through direct elections, in either multi-member or single-member
districts, with universal suffrage (La Moncloa n.p). Each of the 50 Spanish provinces is
guaranteed at least two seats in the Congress of Deputies and the cities of Ceuta and
Melilla are guaranteed one seat. Of the remaining seats in the Congress, they are
allocated proportionally based on the size of each constituency (Congreso de los
Diputados n.p). The current ruling coalition of Spain is led by the Spanish Socialist’s
Working Party (PSOE) with 120 seats and Unidos Podemos (UP) with 35 seats.
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Additionally, the ruling coalition is supported by several smaller parties: The Republican
Left of Catalonia (ERC) with 13 seats, the Basque Nationalist Party (PNV) with 6 seats,
Euskal Herria Bildu (EH Bildu) with seats 5 seats, a pluralist group with 7 seats and a
mixed group with 5 seats (Congreso de los Diputados n.p). In opposition to the ruling
coalition are the People’s Party (PP) with 88 seats, Vox with 52 seats, the Citizens party
(Cs) with 10 seats, a plural group with 5 seats, and a mixed group with 6 seats (Congreso
de los Diputados n.p). It certainly seems, based on the current structure of the Spanish
government and its promotion of ethno-linguistic political subcultures relative autonomy,
that Spain is a good example of a Semi-Autonomous system.

(A) A comparative Look at Spain and Canada
Is the Spanish political system unique in its granting of political representation to
its country's political subcultures or is it part of a larger category of semi-autonomous
countries? More pressingly, however, do other semi-autonomous countries like Canada
produce the centripetal dynamic we saw in Spain for so long? To answer these questions
let us, briefly, look at the North American country of Canada and its Semi-Autonomous
system. The V-DEM Datasets indicate that Canada is firmly in the top 10% of “Liberal
Democracies” in the world with a score of more than .75 out of 1 (V-DEM 24-26).
Furthermore, the 2020 Democracy Index ratings show that Canada is a “full democracy”
that is ranked 5th in the world with a score of 9.24 out of 10: Canada has a ranking of
9.58 out of 10 for “Electoral process and Pluralism,” an 8.93 out of 10 for the
“Functioning of its government,” 8.89 out of 10 for “Political Participation,” and a 9.38
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out of 10 for “Political Culture” (Democracy Index 8).25 In comparison to other Northern
American democracies, and the world more generally, Canada ranks at the top for
virtually every factor studied by the Democracy Index. In particular, Canada’s robust
“Political Culture,” “political participation” and government functioning are exceptional
outliers in the democratic world (Democracy Index 8). The creation of the modern
country of Canada, its granting of relative autonomy to its provinces, and the formation
of its Semi-Autonomous model dates back to the formation of the state.
Before exploring the formation of the Canadian state, as a comparison to Spain,
let us examine the political subcultures of the country. To identify the political
subcultures of Canada, based
on race and ethnicity, this
essay makes use of the
aggregate data from the EPR
Core dataset. Based on the
EPR Core dataset the ethnic
majority in Canada is the
Image 1.4 Image of modern-day Canada and its
provinces. From the Encyclopedia Britannica.

English-speaking population of
the nation and the ethnic

political subcultures consist of (1) the Aboriginal peoples, and (2) the French-speaking
population of Québec (Bormann 744-771). Of those major political subcultures present in
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The Democracy Index measures the health of contemporary democracies and classifies countries as Full
Democracies, Flawed Democracies, Hybrid Regimes, and Authoritarian Regimes. The Democracy Index
uses four indicators to classify regimes: the presence of a competitive and multiparty political system,
universal adult suffrage, regularly contested and secure elections conducted with secret ballots and public
access of major parties to the electorate through the media or campaigning.
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Canada, the EPR Core dataset identifies the French-speaking population of Québec as
politically relevant based on their power/influence and the Aboriginal peoples as a group
discriminated against. The Quebecois population of Canada—with a history dating back
to the colonization of the region by the French—plays the primary role in fragmenting the
Canadian political culture, similar to the ethno-linguistic political subcultures of Spain,
and has historically demanded socio-political power and representation (Vog 1327-1342).
Since the creation of the Canadian federation in the late 20th century, the province
of Québec has claimed its right to relative or complete political, cultural, and social
autonomy. On a national level, the Canadian system differs from Spain because there is
no level of guaranteed representation for the country’s ethno-linguistic political
subcultures. Instead, Canada has a bicameral parliamentary system that resembles
something more similar to the Anglo-American Majoritarian model. In the Canadian
House of Commons, each representative is individually elected to represent their
constituents within a single-member constituency and through a first-past-the-post voting
system (Parliament of Canada N.p). Additionally, in the Canadian Senate individuals are
appointed by the Governor-General to represent Canada’s provinces/territories
(Parliament of Canada N.p). In this way, the ethno-linguistic political subcultures of
Canada are absorbed into the federal government on a national level.
Despite a large amount of difference in the national legislative structure of
Canada and Spain, both countries give relative autonomy to their country’s ethnolinguistic political subcultures on a regional level. On a local level, Canada grants a high
degree of autonomy to its provinces, including that of Québec, to control everything from
education and private judicial disputes to cultural heritage and local administration.
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Similar to Spain, therefore, the Canadian system delegates power over how the different
regions of the country are governed to its respective provinces and assumes the general
responsibilities of national governance itself. Based on a comparative analysis of Spain
and Canada, the Spanish system grants a greater level of representation/autonomy on a
national level and similar quality or level of autonomy/representation on a local level to
its ethno-linguistic political subcultures.26
With the nature of the Spanish national system explored, one may come to
wonder, how does Spain compare to the typology of Semi-Autonomous representative
democracies outlined in the previous chapter? According to Almond, the Continental
European systems can only develop semi-autonomy from the margins as the systems’
inability to bargain causes the fragmentation of the national political culture by political
subcultures (Almond 406-407). In reality, however, the “semi-autonomous''
characteristics of a democratic system can come about either through formal means or
through marginal means. In the case of Spain, as we have seen, the semi-autonomous
nature of its system has come about through a formal and systematic approach to
decentralize power to the Spanish autonomous communities through the country’s
constitutional frameworks (Almond 406). The classification of Spain as semiautonomous recognizes a level of guaranteed ethno-linguistic representation—brought
about primarily by decentralization and the granting of relative autonomy but also by the
means of choosing/guaranteeing representation in the national legislator—and consensus
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The greater semblance of political autonomy on a national level may be a result of Spain merely having
a greater degree of fragmentation in its country, with numerous distinct ethno-linguistic political
subcultures in distinct regions of the country. As such, while both Spain and Canada give a great degree of
autonomy to their administrative provinces/communities, the Spanish system seems more inclusive because
there is more to include.
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that is absent from the Anglo-American majoritarian political system (Almond 399).
With semi-autonomy given formerly to Spain’s ethno-linguistic political subcultures, and
more generally to its autonomous zones, Spain fits well into the characteristics of being a
semi-autonomous state.
In addition to granting relative autonomy to the country’s ethno-linguistic
political subcultures, the reason for granting autonomy and the type of autonomy granted
also fits well into the Semi-Autonomous framework outlined in the previous chapter. To
begin, in Spain the political subcultures given semi-autonomy, or at least the greatest
amount of autonomy, is the prominent ethno-linguistic minorities in the Basque Country,
Catalonia, Galicia, and Valencia. Each of the prominent ethno-lingustic communities
have long-established roots in Spain and is a “remnant” of an older political system or
community (Specia N.p). Unlike the semi-autonomous structure outlined in the previous
chapter, however, some of the regional identities in Spain are not limited merely by one's
ethno-linguistic identity at birth (Shabad 133). Politicians in regions like the Basque
provinces welcomed immigration to their region and claimed that being Basque is not
limited to being born there or speaking the language. Instead, being Basque was the
concerted effort to work within Basque society and to contribute to it (Shabad 133).
Despite the nature of “becoming” a member of one of Spain’s ethno-linguistic political
subcultures, the fact remains that the culture, language and heritage of each region are
prominent in Spain and have a long history of being in the Iberian Peninsula. In a similar
manner to granting relative autonomy to its ethno-linguistic political subcultures, Spain
also grants varying types of autonomy such as fiscal autonomy, domestic-political
autonomy, or ethnolinguistic autonomy to its autonomous communities (Specia N.p).
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Based on the characteristics of the Spanish system it is quite clear that Spain fits perfectly
within the category of a semi-autonomous state. Additionally, the centripetal dynamic of
Spain allows for the diversity of the country to be represented in various facets in the
political realm of Spain that prevent the complete fragmentation of the nation.
While semi-autonomous systems are in place ethnic elites can work within the
system to bargain with others and enjoy representation, at least on the local level. At the
same time, however, the granting of autonomy to different regions of Spain has lessened
the political friction between the country’s ethno-linguistic political subcultures but has
also, arguably, aided in entrenching Spaniards’ identification with one's ethno-linguistic
or regional affiliations (Shabad 130). The division in Spanish society could be seen from
the earliest periods of the modern Spanish state and the current Spanish constitution,
which reassured and recognized ethno-linguistic semi-autonomy. Look, for example, to
1983 and 1984 when the “Guerra de las Banderas” or “war of the flags” occurred in the
Basque Country. In the “Guerra de las Banderas” Basque politicians and local
governments refused to fly the Spanish flag on appropriate occasions next to the Basque
flag or they removed Spanish flags when visible (Shabad 131). Since then, instances of
division between the national governments and autonomous regions, as well as a
prominent sense of regional nationalism, have remained a common feature of Spanish
society or politics.
A prime example of the fragmentation of the Spanish political culture and the
prominence of the Catalan independence movement. Since 2008, in particular, tensions
between Catalonia and the Spanish government have been heightened due to the 2008
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financial crash and Catalan resentment of Spanish public spending (BBC N.p).27 As such,
in 2014 the legislature of the autonomous community of Catalonia held a symbolic
referendum to ask the citizens of Catalonia if they wanted to secede from the country of
Spain. Shortly before being held, however, the Spanish government outlawed the
referendum and prevented it from occurring. In the following year, with secessionist
sentiments high, a pro-secessionist legislature entered office in Catalonia, and they
moved to have an official independence referendum in 2017 (BBC N.p). After the
referendum, the Catalan legislature declared independence and the Spanish government
moved swiftly to quell the autonomous region’s actions and declare the referendum
illegal. The Spanish government imposed direct rule on the region of Catalonia and
invoked Article 155 of the Spanish constitution to dissolve the Catalan parliament and
hold a snap election (BBC N.p).
The 2017 snap election, again, gave power to a secessionist majority in the
Catalan legislature and further intensified the discontent in the region. Since the snap
election and referendum, 9 of the Catalan officials—including former Catalan VicePresident Oriol Junqueras—who voted to secede were arrested and charged by the
Spanish courts (BBC N.p). In the wake of mass unrest in the region of Catalonia and calls
for greater autonomy or independence, the semi-autonomous state of Spain has not been
able to fully stop the fragmentation of the Spanish political culture or overcome ethnolinguistic political subcultures preference in their native regions. Despite obstacles faced
by the Spanish system, the semi-autonomous structure nature of the country has given the
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Important to note is that Catalonia is one of the wealthiest portions of Spain and the autonomous
community has continuously butted heads with the national government overspending and taxes, often
holding the sentiment that they are contributing “too much” to the national system and have “too little”
control on the financial outcomes.
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central government and the ethno-linguistic elites of the nation the leeway to negotiate
with each other, while guaranteeing a certain degree of autonomy/representation in
politics (BBC N.p).
The Spanish institutions worked at first, producing a more stable, centrist, and
coalition-style of politics, but there has been a cultural shift towards more prominent
ethno-linguistic identifiers. Now the Spanish institutions (autonomies) are conducive to
fragmentation and polarization, as can be seen in the case of Catalonia. Why, one may
wonder, did the institutions that moderated and fostered dialogue in the past fail to do the
same in the present? Institutions are inanimate rules developed in the past that bend to
very animated cultural moments of the present. When created in the mid-to-late 20th
century, the modern Spanish institutions sought to be responsive to cultural demands of
the country’s ethno-linguistic political subcultures and it is representative of citizens.
While the semi-autonomous structure of Spain grants representation, it can also be used
by radical right cultural movements to the point of regime transformation and the
deterioration of others' representation.
For many, the instability brought about by the fragmentation in the Spanish
political culture may seem unique or even strange. In reality, however, separatist
movements are a common feature of many Semi-Autonomous systems. One needs not to
look further than Canada, for example, and the numerous referendums that the province
of Québec (Dumont 1). In 1980 Québec held its first referendum to gain independence
from Canada and the referendum failed with 60% of voters opposing independence.
Again, in 1995, Québec held a referendum on leaving Canada and the margins were far
narrower, with 51% of voters against independence and 49% of voters for independence

Gamble-Eddington 114
(Dumont 1-3). The Quebecois claims for independence stem from calls for greater
political autonomy in the region and a desire for increased francophone representation in
all facets of Canadian society (Dumont 1-3). The juxtaposition of the Spanish and
Canadian cases of Semi-Autonomous systems provides valuable insights into a common
feature of the aforementioned system, and systems with strong ethno-linguistic political
subcultures in general, their fragmentation makes them prone to independence or
secession movements. At the same time, however, their embracing of native ethnolinguistic political subcultures has driven ethnic elites to work with each other to reach
compromises and maintain the integrity of the central state.

Consociational Political Systems: Belgium
(A) Belgium and Political Fragmentation
Belgium is a small nation in Western Europe with a population of about 11.5
million people, more than six parliamentary bodies that govern the country, and a weak
federalist government in Brussels. According to the 2020 Democracy Index ratings,
Belgium is a “flawed democracy” that is ranked 36th in the world with a score of 7.51 out
of 10: Belgium has a ranking of 9.58 out of 10 for “Electoral process and Pluralism,” a
7.86 out of 10 for the “Functioning of its government,” 5.00 out of 10 for “Political
Participation,” and a 6.88 out of 10 for “Political Culture” (Democracy Index 50). In
comparison to other Western European democracies, Belgium ranks in the bottom for
virtually every factor studied by the Democracy Index. It would seem, according to the
rankings, the only thing the Belgian democracy is exceptional at is not mobilizing
citizens to participate in politics and having a highly fragmented “political culture”
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(Democracy Index 9). Despite its below-average performance, by Western European
standards, the V-DEM Datasets indicate that Belgium is firmly in the top 10% of “Liberal
Democracies” in the world with a score of more than .75 out of 1 and has extensive
democratic institutions that ensure representation for the county’s ethno-linguistic
political subcultures, which date back to the 19th and 20th-centuries (V-DEM 24-26).
Nestled between France,
Luxemburg, Germany, and the
Netherlands, Belgium houses the
headquarters of the European Union
and is a nation that often plays a
leading role in European politics. In
comparison to other Western European
nations, however, Belgium is a fairly
Image 1.4 Image of modern-day
Belgium and its provinces. From
the Encyclopedia Britannica.

new state. In 1815, at the Congress of
Vienna, Holland (then known as the
Northern Netherlands) and Belgium

(then known as the Southern Netherlands) were united into one state under the rule of
King William I (Belgium N.p).28 Belgium and Holland’s unification did not last long, as
opposition to the protestant King William I mounted in Belgium. Following a series of
demands and incidents, Belgium declared independence from the Netherlands in 1830
and the country’s catholic elites chose a new catholic monarch and adopted a progressive
constitution (Belgium N.p). After a series of reforms, and fearing the centralization they
28

Before 1815, the territory that now comprises Belgium often transferred hands between different
European powers.
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had experienced under Holland’s rule, the fledgling Belgian state transformed into a
federalist parliamentary democracy under a constitutional monarchy in 1831 (Belgium
N.p). Since 1831 the Belgian state has built out its institutions and expanded its
bureaucratic structure, but it has maintained the same borders and regime. The modern
Belgian state consists of the executive branch, the judicial branch, and the legislative
branches of government.
The executive and legislative branches play the greatest role in administering the
Belgian state. In the executive branch, the Belgian monarch, currently Philippe of
Belgium, serves as the head of state and is responsible for appointing parliamentary
confirmed candidates to the judiciary and executive branches of government (CIA N.p).29
Additionally, the Prime Minister, who is usually chosen from amongst the parties in the
majority coalition of the legislative branch, serves as the head of government and is
responsible for conducting the day-to-day business of the nation. Aside from the
executive branch of government, the Belgian legislative branch plays the leading role in
administering the Belgian state and developing laws/regulations.
To understand the composition of the Belgian legislative branch it is important,
first, to take a closer look at how Belgium governs not only nationally but regionally.
Belgium is divided into three different communities based on political subcultures, along
with ethno-linguistic cleavages, in the country. In Belgium there is a Flemish (a dialect of
Dutch), a French, and a German-speaking Community within Belgium (Belgium N.p).
Each of the Belgian communities has its parliament to handle issues related to their

29

It is important to note that while the monarch “appoints” candidates they don’t bear any significant
power over the process. As the head of state, the monarch is more of a ceremonial symbol of the Belgian
state than a mechanism of its administration or governance.
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community and its governance. In addition to the Belgian communities, Belgium is
divided into three larger administrative regions with their parliaments (Belgium N.p). The
three regions of Belgium are Flanders (which encapsulates the historic Dutch-speaking
region), Wallonia (which encapsulates the historic French-speaking region, and the
German-speaking region in the city of Liege), and the capital region of Brussels. The
Brussels parliament is the federal parliament of Belgium, and thus is composed of
representatives from throughout the country, while the other two parliaments focus on all
issues related to their region or populace (Belgium N.p). There are, therefore, 3 regional
parliaments, 3 parliaments for the different Belgian ethnic communities, and 1 federal
parliament based in the Brussels region. The power to make decisions in Belgium is
complex and, as a result of its decentralized federalist structure, is no longer in the
exclusive power of the federal government. Instead, each of the 7 parliaments, to some
extent, exercise their authority within their respective domains and come together to
create a vague administrative apparatus (Belgium N.p). The legislative branch of
government, although mostly composed of only the federal parliament in Brussels, can be
thought of more broadly in Belgium to encompass regional and ethno-linguistic political
subcultures to some degree.
In order to identify to what extent, the Belgian political system truly encapsulates
or represents the current political subcultures of Belgium, based on race and ethnicity,
this essay will make use of the aggregate data from the EPR Core dataset. Based on the
EPR Core dataset ethnic political subcultures in Belgium currently consist of (1)
Walloons, (2) Flemish, and (3) Germans (Bormann 744-771). Of those major political
subcultures present, however, the EPR Core dataset identifies the ethno-linguistic
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identities of the Walloons and Flemish as the only politically relevant political
subcultures based on their power/influence. It would seem, therefore, that the
complicated legislative system of Belgium and its granting of power to the Flemish and
Walloons within their respective regions is proportional to the influence/power they
wield in Belgian national politics and society.
The complicated nature of the Belgian system does not stop in its sheer size or
relegation of power but rather extends into the administration of the country. As one
might suspect, an overcomplicated system with high levels of autonomy is usually not
ideal for having uniform governance. What’s more, Belgium’s political system is a series
of opposing federal and regional legislative bodies that tend to compete with each other
for influence or power (Pale 5). Since Belgium’s constitutional reforms of the 1970s, the
country has given greater and greater amounts of power to its autonomous communities
to empower the dominant ethno-linguistic political subcultures within the nation
(Toharudin 30). The parliaments of the autonomous regions can not only manage their
education systems, run their news networks, and regulate inter-region modes of
transportation but conduct foreign relations and draft laws that contradict or override
national laws if they see fit (Pale 3-6). What does that mean? That means that the
autonomous regions have expansive, contradictory, competing, and overlapping
jurisdictions with the federal legislative body of Belgium (Toharudin 24-27).
The complexity of the Belgian governing system does not merely stop at
jurisdiction, it extends into every aspect of governance on a national level as well. The
traditional legislative branch of Belgium consists of the Chamber of Deputies and the
Senate. The Chamber of Deputies consists of 150 seats that are elected by the general
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populace of Belgium through universal suffrage, which is compulsory for citizens over
the age of 18 (Belgium N.p). Elections in Belgium, in stark contrast to the United
Kingdom, are conducted through the practice of proportional representation, and seats are
assigned to parties in proportion to the percentage of the total vote within one of the
eleven constituencies (Chamber of Deputies 1-2). Belgium’s political parties are divided
primarily amongst the Flemish and Walloon population, both of them seeking to advance
their ethnic groups' interests over those of the nation as a whole. Currently, the Chamber
of Deputies is composed of Government the Socialist Party (PS) with 19 seats, the
Reformist Movement (MR) with 14 seats, Ecolo with 13 seats, the Christian Democratic
and Flemish party (CD&V) with 12 seats, and the Open Flemish Liberals and Democrats
(Open Vld) with 12 seats (Chamber of Deputies 1-2). Additionally, the Chamber of
Deputies is comprised of the Flemish Socialist Party (sp.a) with 9 seats, Groen with 8
seats, the New Flemish Alliance (N-VA) with 24 seats, Vlaams Belang (VB) with 18
seats, and the Workers Party of Belgium (PVDA-PTB) with 12 seats. Minor parties
include the Humanist Democratic Center (cdH) with 5 seats, DéFI with 2 seats, and
Independents with 2 seats (Chamber of Deputies 2). As one might tell from the sheer
number of parties, the Belgian system is highly fragmented and has a prolific number of
parties with more than 11 parties currently holding seats in the Chamber of Deputies.
In contrast to the Chamber of Deputies, the Senate has 60 members that are
chosen by a combination of electoral results and appointments based on ethno-linguistic
affiliation.30 In the Senate, 50 senators are appointed by the Parliaments of the

30

Although the 10 co-opted senators may be chosen based on which groups performed the best in certain
elections, the positions themselves are not directly voted on by Belgian citizens. All senator positions are
appointed.
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Communities or the Regions from among their members based on population, and 10 of
the senators are co-opted based on election results (Belgium N.p). Currently, the Senate
consists of 10 members from the French-speaking community’s parliament, 8 members
from the Parliament of Wallonia, 29 members from the Flemish Parliament, 2 Frenchspeaking members from Parliament of the Brussels-Capital Region and 1 member of the
Parliament of the German-speaking Community. The 10 remaining Senators are all coopted based on the electoral results in a given election (Belgium N.p). Within the Senate,
at least 1-2 seats are reserved for the small German community in Liege to ensure
representation. The Belgian political system, as is common in Consociational systems,
has a highly complicated administrative structure that grants power to political
subcultures and ensures ethno-linguistic representation.

(B) A Comparative Look at Bosnia and Belgium
Despite the complexity and competing interests in the Belgian administrative
institutions, Belgium is not the only consociational state with elaborate governance
structures. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, for example, the political structure is equally complex
with the three major ethnic groups (the Bosniaks, the Serbs, and the Croats) guaranteed
representation in regional and national governance; not only are there three major ethnic
groups but also two major religions, Islam and Christianity, that often serve as dividing
factors in the country (Radio Free Europe N.p). Based on the EPR Core dataset ethnic
political subcultures in Belgium currently consist of (1) Bosniaks, (2) Serbs, (3) Croats,
and (4) Roma (Bormann 744-771). Of those major political subcultures present, however,
the EPR Core dataset identifies the Bosniaks, Serbs, Croats as the only politically
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relevant political subcultures based on their power/influence. With strong political
subcultures apparent in the country, Bosnia-Herzegovina is divided into three relatively
autonomous regions, the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Brcko, and the Republika
Srpska, based on the country’s ethno-linguistic and religious political subcultures. Each
of the two main autonomous regions (the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the
Republika Srpska) has its own president, two deputies (based on the ethnicity of the
president), a prime minister, a council of ministers, and a bicameral parliament (Radio
Free Europe N.p).
Similar to Belgium, Bosnia-Herzegovina is a decentralized federalist state and the
autonomous regions of the nation handle a large portion of the nation’s governance.
Despite its relative lack of power, the federal structure of Bosnia still remains very
complex. In total, BosniaHerzegovina has 13 prime
ministers and more than
700 members of parliament
(Radio Free Europe N.p).
Additionally, the Bosnian
system has a tripartite
presidency that rotates
every eight months
Image 1.5 Image of modern-day Bosnia and its provinces. From the
Encyclopedia Britannica.

between one Bosniak, one

Serb, and one Croat that is directly elected. The tripartite presidency also chooses a multiethnic cabinet that is evenly divided amongst the different ethno-linguistic political
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subcultures of the nation (Radio Free Europe N.p). The division within and the
complexity of the Bosnian state, along with numerous other factors, has created one of
the lowest ranking democracies in Europe, which some consider to no longer even
constitute a democracy. According to the 2020 Democracy Index ratings, BosniaHerzegovina is a “Hybrid-Regime” that is ranked 101st in the world with a score of 4.81
out of 10: Bosnia-Herzegovina has a 7.00 out of 10 for “Electoral process and Pluralism,”
a 2.93 out of 10 for the “Functioning of its government,” 5.56 out of 10 for “Political
Participation,” and a 3.13 out of 10 for “Political Culture” (Democracy Index 33). In
comparison to other European democracies, Bosnia-Herzegovina ranks at the absolute
bottom for virtually every factor studied by the Democracy Index with its highly
fragmented “political culture” and dysfunctional governments (Democracy Index 9).
Additionally, the V-DEM Datasets place Bosnia-Herzegovina firmly in the bottom 4050% of “Liberal Democracies” in the world with a score of less than .5 out of 1 (V-DEM
24-26). In the presence of the complex and highly underperforming Consociational
system of Bosnia, the Belgian system does not seem quite as abnormal, dysfunctional, or
elaborate as one might first assume.
With the complexity of government institutions and division along with political
subcultures in Belgium, one may ask how does the country truly stack up to the
characteristics common to the Consociational category of representative democracies? Is
Belgium an overly complicated administrative structure that panders to its political
subcultures, “defusing” power by merely granting autonomy to every restless area within
the state, or does Belgium’s institutions foster accommodation? Belgium, as one of
Lijphat’s classic examples of consociationalism, embodies all of the core principles
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needed to create a consociational democracy: (1) Belgium has executive power-sharing
embedded into its political system through the use of grand coalitions to form
governments (Pales 3-6). (2) The Belgian federal structure, as described previously,
embraces bicameralism with its House of Deputies and Senate structure. Additionally,
minority representation is guaranteed in the federal structure through the use of allocation
systems for the various ethno-linguistic communities and a minimum guarantee for said
communities. (3) Belgium uses the system of proportional representation to guarantee
accurate representation (Lijphart 218). (4) Belgium is a decentralized state that makes use
of a federalist system to delegate autonomy to the different regions of the country. (5)
Lastly, Belgium makes use of a minority veto capability—that requires ¾ support in
parliament—to ensure that the different ethno-linguistic political subcultures feel
represented, can oppose legislation that goes against their interest, and encourage
cooperation across political subcultures to pass legislation (Lijphart 217-219). Belgium’s
system grants ethno-linguistic political subcultures autonomy to conduct their affairs,
representation through power-sharing arrangements, and proportional representation and
security in the form of a minority veto.
In addition to meeting the baseline requirements to be a consociational state,
Belgium has also historically fulfilled some of the characteristics Lijphart outlined as
conducive to a successful consociational state being created (Lijphart 217). To begin, the
existence of an external threat to the country and the existence of an elite-mass system at
the formation of the Belgian state aided in its creation (Lijphart 217-219). Belgium,
nestled between world powers and formerly part of the Netherlands, has historically seen
their neighbors as an external threat to their political, cultural, and economic interests. As
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such, Belgium declared independence in the first place during the 1830s. The fear of an
“external threat” unified the divided elites of modern-day Belgium and facilitated their
compromise across ethno-linguistic lines to accomplish the common goal of defeating
their enemies (Belgium N.p). To a large extent, the fear of an “external threat” present at
the formation of the Belgian state has since left and the sense of unity gained by said
threat has vanished.31 Nevertheless, it is possible that some semblance of a smaller
“external threat” arises, in particular in the economic realm, from the active role Belgium
plays in politics with its more powerful neighbors.
The second condition Lijphart outlines as conducive to the formation of a
consociational state are elites' recognition of the need for cross-ethnic cooperation or a
more general willingness to engage across political subcultures (Lijphart 217). In
Belgium, there has been a large historical emphasis, once in office, for elected officials to
engage in cross-ethnic cooperation with other political subcultures to pass legislation. Put
simply, a democratic ethos is present in Belgium that defines their political culture that
encourages cross-ethnic cooperation. However, in the modern-day, the ethno-linguistic
political subcultures in Belgium seem not to be up to the task of cross-ethnic cooperation,
as the political realm has become increasingly fragmented amongst different parties and
the growing power of the autonomous regions fostered heightened ethnic politics
(Toharudin 30-35).
Instead, the political elites in the Belgian government have often found
themselves unable to accommodate or reach any agreement, often failing to even form a
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Similar concepts of the “External threat” can be seen in numerous countries both past and present as a
catalyst for unity. In Yugoslavia, for example, the external threat of the USSR disappeared after the
collapse of the Soviets and unity seemingly dissolved overnight.
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ruling coalition. Between 2017 and 2008, Belgium went without a proper government for
over six months of infighting in the ruling coalition between the Flemish and Walloon
contingents (Traynor N.p). Similarly, between 2010 and 2011, the ethno-linguistic
political subcultures in Belgium were unable to reach a compromise and form a ruling
coalition.32 As a result, Belgium went 589 days without an elected government and broke
world records for one of the longest periods that a democratic country has gone without
an elected government (Traynor N.p). Once again, in 2020, Belgium lacked a government
for most of the year as political infighting between the Flemish and Walloon broke down
the ruling coalition. Belgium’s new 2020 record days without having a government is 653
days (Bock 1-3). Over the past decade, alone, the Belgian people have spent a total of
over three years without a ruling coalition to govern the country (Bock 1).
Despite the dysfunctionality of the Belgian government and the frequent inability
of the ethno-linguistic political subcultures to compromise, Belgium does surprisingly
fulfill the characteristic of having cross-ethnic cooperation (Lijphart 217). How, one
might ask, can Belgium possibly be conducive to cross-ethnic cooperation when its
coalitions consistently break down? The key to understanding lies in the fact that despite
their ardent disagreements, the ruling coalition’s contain both Flemish and Walloon
elected officials, and dialogue between the two political subcultures is constant, as they
seek to pursue their policy objectives (Bock 1-3). The willingness, or more so need, of
the political subcultures to work together has fostered Belgian politicians'
accommodative ability to work together despite great differences. Political cultures, like
that of Belgium and the UK, can develop democratic norms that have a
32

The ruling coalition prior to the one outlined above had only held power for a mere five months before
collapsing because of similar ethno-linguistic divisions.
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stickiness/stability and can really constrain the worst impulses towards fragmentation.
Thirdly, Belgium has historically had the presence of a “relatively low total load
on the decision-making apparatus” or the existence of an easily changeable “decisionmaking apparatus,” both of which Lijphart emphasizes as conducive to a strong
consociational system (Lijphart 217-219). The prominent political subcultures
represented within Belgian society today, along ethno-linguistic lines, have not always
been the country's main political subcultures. Instead, in the 19th-century Belgian society
fractured over the political subcultures of class and religion (Mughan 437-440). As such,
the Socialist and Catholic parties stood at the center of the fragmented Belgian political
culture and competed with each other in a seemingly endless cycle of political chess to
obtain power; between 1947 and 1999 every ruling Belgian coalition consisted of either
the Catholic or Socialist party as the leading coalition member (Mughan 447). The
existence of large political parties with set ideological differences, similar in many
regards to the right-left political dichotomy of the British majoritarian system, fostered
the creation of broad coalitions in early Belgian history that united the citizenry and
facilitated political accommodation amongst the parties. Over the decades, nevertheless,
the Catholic and Socialist parties began to wane in power as the major parties began
being seen as incapable of pushing reform and unrepresentative of the general populace.
As a result, a third option, in the form of the Liberal Party emerged as a political
alternative and aided in the fragmentation of the Belgian political realm (Mughan 443448).
Another shortfall of the Socialist and Catholic parties, according to Lijphart, was
their inability to articulate or appeal to ethno-linguistic political subcultures, which
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prompted large scale disassociation with them (Lijphart 210). With the Belgian electorate
shifting away from their prominent class-based political subculture and the Liberal party
rising in popularity, new parties based on ethno-linguistic political subcultures arose to
monopolize power. Unlike the Socialist or Catholic parties, which often appealed across
ethno-linguistic political subcultures to get elected, the new parties based on ethnolinguistic political subcultures focused on appealing to their ethno-linguistic groups to
gain office. The ethno-linguistic focus in Belgian politics has remained unchanged, more
or less, since the late 20th century (Traynor N.p). In modern times, you can find the
ethno-linguistic political subcultures commonly clashing with each other on everything
ranging from Flemish secession or the maintenance of ethno-linguistic heritage to the
perceived “oppressiveness” of the other ethno-linguistic groups (Traynor N.p).
With new political subcultures in charge, Belgian society changed quickly over
the following decades as the “decision-making apparatus” of the country changed to meet
the desires of the country’s ethno-linguistic political subcultures. A primary example of
Belgium’s ability to change is the country’s constitutional reforms in 1970. Belgium’s
constitutional reforms of 1970 pushed the country away from a more centralized
federalist state and into a highly decentralized federalist state with the most prominent
descriptive factor in politics being one's ethno-linguistic identity (Toharudin 30). In this
way, Belgium has demonstrated its “relatively low total load on the decision-making
apparatus” and ability to change its “decision-making apparatus” to meet the needs of the
political subcultures ruling the nation, thus making it a country conducive to
consociationalism according to Lijphart (Lijphart 210).
Belgium’s ethno-linguistic division and government instability are not unique to
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the country, instead, it seems to be a common feature of Consociational systems.
Returning to the example of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Bosnian government has
historically suffered from political immobilization and coalition collapse as a result of
differences between the ethno-linguistic political subcultures of the country (Reuters 12). In fact, in 2018 Bosnian lawmakers were faced with coalition collapse over the
differing political agendas of the Serbs and Bosniaks, resulting in a 14-month period in
which no coalition could be formed (Reuters 2). The ethno-linguistic and religious
differences in Bosnia, despite their more recent appearance in many newspapers, are not
new; the political subcultures in the country are so strong that ethnic conflict and
widespread violence has broken out in the country amongst the different political
subcultures on multiple occasions over the past few decades (Reuters 3). When looking at
the division of the Consociational system in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the fragmentation
of the political culture, the instability and ineffectiveness of the Belgian system do not
seem like so much of an anomaly. Instead, the condition of the Belgian system and
politics takes form as more of a symptom, rather than a cause, of the ethno-linguistic
division in the country or possibly even a result of the Consociational system itself. What
Belgium has in its back pocket are those thick democratic norms, a cultural resource not
evident in Bosnia’s recent history.
Despite Belgium’s historically “low total load on the decision-making apparatus,”
the shift in prominence of the country’s ethno-linguistic political subcultures in the latter
half of the 20th century has caused increasingly large divisions amongst the Belgian
populace within the consociational state (Smooha 32-33). The Consociational system
intended to accommodate ethnic divisions political subcultures and foster intra-ethnic
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cooperation has unintentionally codified historic ethno-linguistic rivalries (Smooha 33).
In its wake, virtually opposing ethno-linguistic societies with high levels of autonomy
have been developed and empowered within the framework of the Belgian state. “The
country operates on the basis of linguistic apartheid, which infects everything from public
libraries to local and regional government, the education system, the political parties,
national television, the newspapers, even football teams” (Traynor N.p). Despite the
presence of virtually separate societies, however, the Belgian consociational system has
united its separate states (Flanders and Wallonia) together through a national identity
based on a shared history, majority religion, and various other cultural factors viewed by
Belgians as distinctive from other countries (Smooha 32-33). Additionally, Belgium’s
consociational institutions have allowed it to maintain national unity, although unstable at
times, in the wake of numerous mutually reinforcing political subcultures and diverging
political interests.

Putting the Pieces Together:
Through the contextualization of three main case studies (Belgium, Spain, and the
United Kingdom) this chapter has sought to analyze if these countries fit within the
typology of representative democracies outlined in the previous chapter and explore
representation for ethno-linguistic political subcultures in each country. Moreover, by
juxtaposing the case studies with other countries within the typology of representative
democracies with other cases that are similar continuity of the typology can be seen,
showing that each case is not singular in modern times but symbols of their respective
type of representative democracy. Lastly, this chapter has explored how each case study
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manages, or ignores in the case of the Anglo-American Majoritarian model, to represent
the cleavages within their respective societies through means ranging from guaranteed
seats in the national legislature and autonomy to a mutual veto.
Overall, five generalizations become apparent by study different types of
representative democracies. (1) Political culture matters, as can be seen in the political
change that resulted from culture shifts in the UK but the stagnation of British institutions
and could be just as essential if not more important than institutions in determining
outcomes. (2) A political culture of thick democratic norms can overcome other cultural
tendencies towards fragmentation, as seen by the centripetal force leading to thick
democratic norms in Belgium and Britain. (3) Contrarily, the absence of said “thick”
democratic norms and a centrifugal force, as in Bosnia, can lead to the heightened
fragmentation of a society. (4) It appears to be a good thing to
revise and reform institutions to make them compatible with a changing political culture.
Therefore, institutions need to be able to change and have built-in mechanisms for said
revision or reform; Spain and Belgium are primary examples of having flexible systems
built to maximize representation and change when necessary. (5) Systems that give
autonomy to regions, whether based on ethno-linguistic identity or mere geography, give
local elites the opportunity to rule. As a result, said autonomy leads to centripetal politics
(the need for coalition partners between center/regions, and local ruling parties concerned
about governing at the local level) or to centrifugal politics (the reinforcement of
particular identities at the expense of general or national identities). Autonomy, therefore,
is a double-edged sword that can not only foster local governance or representation but
erode the very fabric of state unity. With such variety in addressing ethnic diversity and
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the fragmentation of the national political culture, the question remains, what is the best
mode of managing ethnic diversity and cross-ethnic demands for representation?
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CHAPTER 4- A New Way Forward?
What We’ve Seen: Another Look at the Three-Pronged Typology
Representative democracies, at their core, are a system of government intended to
not only grant a voice to the masses in a society but to moderate said voices through an
elite-mass compromise and mutually reinforcing institutions. However, representative
democracies have often failed to truly represent all of the masses because they do not all
ensure that ethnic or racial minority political subcultures are given a say in their
governance. Democratic institutions define the people of the state in a seemingly clear
and all-encompassing manner but in reality, the people are an ambiguous
conceptualization of the majority group in a given society (Agamben 3-4). What’s more,
many of the democratic systems of representation that modern societies rely on are over a
century old and are legacies of past generations, even though the world we live in today
is so drastically different (Klein 1-3).
Although they seem inclusive, many types of representative democracies often
fall short of providing descriptive political representation and power to marginalized
ethnic or racial political subcultures—unless they outline such in the democratic
institutions of their society—because they were not necessarily built to do so (Klein 1). Is
the lack of change in so many democratic societies the result of their effectiveness? Or is
it a result of our inability to change or develop new representational institutions (Klein 12)? Of the three models of representative democracy observed in this essay, we’ve seen
that only the newer models of representative democracy or models developed in deeply
divided states, like Consociationalism, have managed to even consider the necessity of
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racial or ethnic inclusion (Democracy Index 9). In contrast, older models like the AngloAmerican Majoritarian system in the USA lack virtually any regard for the
aforementioned inclusion and have remained relatively stagnant in their ability to create
new institutions. The problem lies, for many representative democracies, in the fact that
they were not built for the purposeful representation of political subcultures because said
political subcultures were not relevant at the time when democratic institutions were
being developed (Klein 1). The question of ethnic or racial representation for political
subcultures, nevertheless, has become the center of growing debates in the 21st century.
National political cultures have become increasingly fragmented by heightened levels of
immigration, wide-spread enfranchisement, the growing prominence of political
subcultures, and a general disenchantment with majoritarian rule have all become more
common over the past century (Democracy Index 1-4). The political landscape of the
countries we see today, in most regards, does not resemble the same landscape that they
once were.
A culture of “thick” democratic norms and institutions representative of a
country’s major ethnic or racial political subcultures can overcome other cultural
tendencies towards fragmentation if it can meet the societal demands of the present. From
the basis of representative democracies have come the three different models, each
granting different levels of minority or political subculture representation in government,
explored throughout this essay: the Anglo-American Majoritarian model, the SemiAutonomous model, and the Consociational model. While each of these models differs
greatly in their ability to provide representation to ethnic or racial political subcultures in
their country, they also vary in their effectiveness or plausibility is given the historical
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context of the country (ACE Project N.p). The commonality amongst these models,
however, is that they all adhere to the elite-mass compact and confine the role of the
people to choosing or consenting to certain elites holding power rather than the various
segments of society being able to exert their political power (Klein 2-3). In some cases,
such as the Consociational or Semi-Autonomous models, the elite-mass compromise can
hold because the diversity of representatives is ensured for the major political
subcultures. In other cases, such as in the Anglo-American Majoritarian model, the elitemass compromise can work towards delegitimizing democracy because the major
political subcultures lack adequate representation or an ability to exert their political
power beyond elites whom many members of said subcultures may feel don’t represent
them (Klein 2). The question must be, therefore, how do we create institutions that move
beyond merely holding representatives accountable, at best, and towards mechanisms that
ensure not only accountability but representation?
The Consociational model of representative democracy and the SemiAutonomous model grant the greatest amount of ethnic or racial representation to a
country’s ethno-linguistic political subcultures, as seen in Spain, Canada, Belgium, and
Bosnia. The Semi-Autonomous model allows political subcultures to have a relative
autonomy and guaranteed representation in the national legislature (La Moncloa n.p). As
a result, a relatively centralized state can delegate regional autonomy to its different
administrative units (provinces, states...etc.), grant representation nationally, and still
maintain the essential powers of a stable and unified state through cross-cutting
coalitions. On a regional level, however, members of an ethno-linguistic political
subculture who are not a majority of the population in the region can still be under-
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represented or overlooked depending on the electoral method used (La Moncloa n.p).
Additionally, regional discontent can lead to the propagation of secessionist movements
for calls for greater autonomy by ethno-linguistic political subcultures, as seen in Canada
and Spain (La Moncloa n.p). Nevertheless, the Semi-Autonomous system provides
stability, high levels of effective governance and limits the fragmentation of the political
culture by recognizing and granting political power/representation (Shabad 114-116).
While a Semi-Autonomous system can function properly in various contexts and be
largely encapsulated by a decentralized federalist system, a Consociational system can
only work in nations with prominent ethno-linguistic political sub cleavages that are
deeply divided and relatively concentrated in distinct geographical regions.
Of the three types of representative democracies studied, the Consociational
system grants the greatest amount of ensured representation to a country’s different
ethno-linguistic political subcultures through mechanisms such as the mutual veto.
However, as seen through Belgium and Bosnia, the governmental institutions of a
Consociational system are overly complex, help to cause the frequent collapse of the
ruling coalition, codify the fragmentation of the political culture, and are overall
ineffectual in running a national government (ACE Project N.p). Additionally, similar to
the Semi-Autonomous system, members of an ethno-linguistic political subculture in
certain regions who are not a majority of the population in the said region can be underrepresented or overlooked depending on the electoral method used. Despite its
shortcomings in providing an effective and stable form of governance, Consociational
systems are often only used in the most divided of states and they help to keep an already
highly fragmented political culture from completely shattering by attempting to ensure
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representation for political subcultures (ACE Project N.p). A Consociational system
would not lend itself to being very effective, nor was it intended to be, in a country that is
not highly divided or that does not have multiple large/prominent political subcultures
like in the United States of America.
Unlike the Consociational system and the Semi-Autonomous system, the AngloAmerican Majoritarian system provides very few or virtually no guarantees for a
country's political subcultures, opting instead to ignore or devalue them in favor of a
traditional left-right dimension (ACE Project N.p). The Anglo-American Majoritarian
system, seen in the UK and the US, has a relatively high level of government
effectiveness and is highly stable, being governed by fundamental majoritarian principles.
Political subcultures, however, are often left without any institutional protections and
guarantees for representation on the local nor the national level, leaving them in a
vulnerable position to endure under the whim of the majority (ACE Project N.p).
In all of the three different types of representative democracies studied, the level
of governmental effectiveness on a national level seems to decrease with the increasing
regional autonomy and guaranteed representation for political subcultures (ACE Project
N.p). At the center of the fragmentation of each case study’s political culture, however,
lay the ethno-linguistic differences of the country and the political subcultures’ desire for
greater representation. Ethnic and racial representation of political subcultures, therefore,
seems to be at the center of the possible effectiveness of different types of representative
democracies, a desire for a country’s ethnic and racial political subcultures, and the chief
complaint of said political subcultures; representation is a double-edged sword. How then
can democratic institutions be made in a way that simultaneously ensures the
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effectiveness of government, the representation of the people, and the racial or ethnic
political subcultures within it?
Rule by the majority, and the deprivation of rights for other minority groups
entailed within it, has the effect of leading to the undermining of the rights of individuals
(within the majority ethnic group and minority groups) and of notions of power resting in
the many (Snyder 324). Additionally, majority control only works “effectively” when the
minority population decides it is “better to be second class citizens [working within the
system] then first-class rebels” and there is some ideological or racially based
justification of ethnic subordination; the claim of dominance by the majority, however, is
often weak and under threat of fragmentation by political subcultures (Snyder 323).
Institutions, therefore, need to turn away from elite-based notions of representation on the
local level, ensure adequate political representation for political subcultures nationally,
and institute a combination of direct and representative democratic techniques to ensure
that the whole of the people (rather than just a majority) have a say in the governance of
their country. Institutions need to be built to change, have an integrative approach to
representation, and promote cross-ethnic political alliances (Snyder 329-330).
Minority Empowerment Thesis: The Value of Representation
Besides being at the center of conflict and conflict resolution in the three types of
representative democracies studies, the creation of institutions that ensure ethnic or racial
representation of political subcultures has been shown to not only prevent the complete
fragmentation of the political culture but to provide beneficial results that strengthen
democratic regimes. The Minority Empowerment Thesis holds that minority
representation, and increases in the said representation, strengthens representational links,
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fosters more positive attitudes toward government, and encourages political participation
(Banducci 535). Opposition to the minority empowerment thesis holds that descriptive
representation, that being representation along racial or ethnic lines, has unintended
negative effects on minorities within the political system; possibly weakening incentives
to vote or be politically engaged (Banducci 540-545). There is statistical evidence,
nevertheless, for the minority Empowerment Thesis. The most abundant of said evidence,
as one might assume, comes from Anglo-American Majoritarian systems of
representative democracies (especially the United States of America) where minorities
tend to have the least amount of political representation and be the least prone to using
proportional representation.
In “Minority Representation, Empowerment, and Participation,” political scientist
Susan Banducci explores the validity of the minority empowerment thesis by looking at
African-Americans in the USA and the Maori people in New Zealand. In particular,
Banducci explores if descriptive representation [representation by those with similar
descriptive features/characteristics] has tangible results over substantive representation
[representation by those who work in your best interest or along policy lines beneficial to
you] (Banducci 535). Banducci’s study found that the effects of minority empowerment
were significant in the USA where blacks were more likely to recall the name of their
representatives, more likely to contact representatives, and more likely to approve of their
performance when they were descriptively representative of their race or ethnicity
(Banducci 549). Similarly, in New Zealand, Banucci found that the Maori who have
descriptive representatives were more likely to believe they had a say in government and
more likely to vote or participate in politics (Banducci 552). Lastly, Banducci found that
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the absence of a descriptive representative can cause some “constituents to face barriers
communicating and identifying with their representative” (Banducci 539). Another study
by political scientists Lawerence Bobo and Franklin Gilliam, using a rare survey that
oversampled blacks in the USA, sought to accomplish a similar objective as Banducci
and to examine if increases in black empowerment would affect the level of black
political participation (Bobo 377). Bobo’s study found that blacks in “high-blackempowerment areas,” as seen by the race of the mayor, were more politically active and
had greater trust in government than blacks living in areas without black mayors (Bobo
387-389). The studies conducted by Banducci, Bobo, and Gilliam help to illustrate the
benefits of having descriptive representation of ethnic or racial political subcultures in
government, removing barriers to perceived access, and encouraging better democratic
participation/practices.
Banducci, Bobo, and Gilliam’s studies were not unique in their determination that
minority empowerment and representation have tangible benefits for democratic
societies. In “Race and Trust in Government: Testing the Political Reality Model,”
political scientists Susan Howell and Deborah Fagan showed that black citizens in New
Orleans, where there are many black administrative officials, are more than 50% more
trusting of the government than African Americans in a national sample. Howell and
Fagan attribute this difference in trust to the presence of not only black officials but a
black mayor in New Orleans, which gives black citizens a feeling of representation and a
perceived “voice” in the system (Howell 340-345). Howell speculates that while the
presence of black city administrators changes black attitudes about their political
position, it does not have the same impact on white American citizens; possibly because
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white Americans, as the majority, are more “likely to choose among multiple dimensions,
only one of which is the racial dimension” (Howell 346). Ultimately, Howell and Fagan
conclude that “black voters, because of their racial identification, are more likely to
approve of the mayor regardless of their evaluations of general and specific city
conditions” but are also more likely to feel represented when they share descriptive
features/characteristics (Howell 348). Based on the data gathered by various political
scientists, it would seem that an increase in descriptive representation or the general
presence of elected officials who are descriptively representative promotes ethnic or
racial political subcultures to participate rather than fragment. When combined with the
information gathered from the three types of representative democracies studied, these
studies show that political representation can be used as a powerful tool to mitigate the
fragmentation of the political culture while simultaneously promoting minority
participation and inclusive notions of the people (Howell 346-348). The question
remains, however, how can one create effective institutions that ensure the representation
of ethnic or racial political subcultures in a representative democracy on not only a
national level but a local level?
There are many institutional ways to enhance the representation of ethnic or racial
political subcultures in a representative democracy. Primary amongst said institutional
methods are electoral systems with intentional precautions or encouragements put in
place to facilitate minority representation (Schiller 34-36). To begin, reasonably large
voter districts can help to encourage parties to nominate candidates from minorities
because balanced tickets will increase their electoral chances. To obtain larger voter
districts, however, the power to draw districts and to change them would need to be
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wrestled out of the hands of political elites who tend to gerrymander them and given to
neutral state or federal government administrators (Schiller 30). Additionally, the
replacement of majoritarian first-past-the-post systems with PR systems that have a very
low threshold, or no formal threshold, can facilitate the representation of ethnic or racial
political subcultures by encouraging the formation of parties specifically representing
them (ACE Project N.p).
In terms of ensured representation, seats can be set aside in the legislature for
ethnic or racial political subcultures to ensure representation in the legislature (ACE
Project N.p). Representatives for guaranteed seats are often elected in the same manner as
other representatives, but they can sometimes be elected within the political subculture
depending on the conditions outlined in the country’s electoral law (ACE Project N.p).
Another possibility to give representation to political subcultures is “the best loser
system” used in some countries such as Mauritius. “The best loser system” takes the
highest polling losing candidates from a particular ethnic or racial political subculture and
awards them seats in the legislature in order to ensure that it has balanced ethnic
representation (ACE Project N.p). Instead of the overt guaranteeing of seats to political
subcultures or granting of seats to the highest polling losing candidates, which some
political scientists claim may “breed resentment on the part of majority populations and
exacerbate mistrust between various cultural groups” institutions can also be designed to
“overrepresent” regions with concentrated racial or ethnic political subcultures (ACE
Project N.p). An example of “overrepresentation” can be seen in the case of the UK
where Scotland and Wales have more representatives in the British House of Commons
than they would be entitled to if seats were allocated based on population size alone.
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Lastly, political substantive representation for ethnic or racial political subcultures can be
facilitated on a local level through systems of direct democracy that encourage elected
representatives to be responsible to their constituents, including the major political
subcultures within a given constituency.

Where Can We Go: A Case for Direct Democracy?
On a local level, state governance in the three types of representative democracies
studied occurs along with the typical electoral systems of representative democracy;
citizens go to the polls and vote for representatives to speak on their behalf on town
governments, city councils, state legislators, or various other types of administrative
structures (Schiller 34). The problem, however, lies in the fact that on a local level the
desires of some of the country’s ethnic or racial political subcultures can easily be
ignored if they are not a part of the majority or numerous in number, highly concentrated
in one area. As a result, ethnic or racial political subcultures are often not adequately or
proportionally represented in local politics, neither descriptively nor politically (Schiller
34-36). Now, one could seek to solve this problem by creating a complex system that
guarantees representation for the major demographic groups in a given region. Such
systems, unfortunately, tend to lead to ineffective governmental functioning if a society is
highly divided. Another plausible solution, however, would be to simply keep the
fundamental system of electing representatives on a local level but allow every citizen the
opportunity to affect important legislation and hold representatives responsible through
local direct democracy; democracies could, therefore, embrace a hybrid model of
democratic governance on a local level.
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In his Two Treatises on Civil Government, John Locke wrote: “For if the consent of the
majority shall not in reason, be received, as the act of the whole, and conclude every
individual; nothing but the consent of every individual can make anything be the act of
the whole: But such a consent is next to impossible ever to be had.” Locke was correct, in
some regards, that the consent of all individuals cannot usually be attained on any one
issue. Locke failed to consider, however, if there were democratic mechanisms that could
attain the consent of the people and still be inclusive of the various segments of society.
In his defense, nevertheless, it is probable that such a notion was not overlooked but
rather ignored since his vision of a representative legislature and individual consent was
limited to those included in his ideal of the people; for Locke the people were white,
male, property owners. In the absence of the consent of every individual, democracy can
at least attempt to obtain the consent or opposition of as many citizens as possible on
essential government issues through direct democracy.
Direct democracy, in the modern-day, can be defined by a handful of core
institutions that are distinct from the fundamental mechanisms of normal representative
democracy (Schiller 34). The primary features of direct democracy are decision-making
by popular votes and public deliberation of political issues (Schiller 36). Direct
democracy, similar in some regards to the Athenian system of direct democracy
discussed in earlier chapters, is based on the fundamental democratic principles of
popular sovereignty, freedom, and political equality amongst citizens (Schiller 36).
Unlike the Athenian system, however, modern direct democracy tends to serve as a
supplement to representative democracy with key democratic enriching and supplemental
functions (Schiller 36).
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Modern direct democracy can take various forms to help supplement
representative democracy, but it most often is symbolic of increased political
power/influence for voters through referendums (Schiller 13-14). There are four primary
types of referendums: (1) citizen-initiated referendums where a group of citizens initiates
a proposition to be voted on, (2) popular referendum in which citizens can request from
the government in order to reject or accept a new political decision, (3) governmentinitiated referendums were the executive or legislative branch can call for the people to
vote on a proposed or existing policy, (4) and mandatory referendums on specific
subjects that are required by law (often outlined in the state’s constitution) to be voted on
(Schiller 13). In addition to the use of the referendum, direct democracy gives power over
elected officials back to the people living within a constituency through the use of a recall
vote. Similar to a vote of no confidence on a national level, a recall vote is when
constituents can vote to recall elected officials from their current office and replace them
with an interim representative or a completely new representative in a snap election
(Schiller 13-14).
The use of referendums and recall votes take power away from representatives
and place it back in the hands of citizens in a given area. Additionally, referendums and
recall votes force representatives to reorient themselves from focusing only on large or
national issues to focusing on local issues that are often the most relevant for constituents
(Schiller 13-14). Most importantly, however, direct democracy allows constituents to
decide for themselves what are the issues most important to them and to ensure that their
elected official pursues said issues. Direct democracy, as such, can be a useful tool to
help eliminate some of the obstacles faced by ethnic or racial political subcultures to
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express their voice in policy on a local level, is relatively simple to implement, and is
intended to have a meaningful influence over elected officials, even if they do not
necessarily descriptively represent a certain political subculture.
Direct democracy functions well not only on a local level but also on a national
level. On a national level, direct democracy can be seen in its various forms in different
European democracies and democratic institutions (especially in constitutions). In
Eastern Europe after 1989, as countries vied for independence and transformed into
democracies, several countries introduced direct democracy at the national level as an
instrument of popular sovereignty (Schiller 12-13). Some of the Eastern European states
extended direct democracy initiatives and referendum instruments not only on the
national level but also on the municipal level, except for the three Baltic states (Schiller
13-15).

Figure 1.1 From The Potential of Direct Democracy: A Global Measure (1900–
2014) by David Altman. Graph show Citizen initiated and Government initiated (or
“Top-Down”) direct democracy levels in Western European and North African
countries since 1900. An increase in the usage of both can be seen overtime.
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Similarly, in some of the cases examined in the last chapter such as Spain, the
UK, and Canada direct democracy could be seen in popular referendums held on issues
of minority rights or secession. The graph above, from David Altman’s The potential of
Direct Democracy: A global Measure (1900-2014), shows a clear trend in western
democracies towards a greeted usage of direct democracy mechanisms since 1900 except
for only a few of the countries studied (Altman 1222). In general, however, few Western
European countries with a parliamentary system have adopted direct democracy at the
national level through some sort of initiative and/or referendum measure (Schiller 13).
Instead, most direct democracy measures in Western Europe are mandated referendums
on constitutional issues. Nevertheless, some countries like Denmark, Ireland, Italy,
France, and Liechtenstein have implemented direct democratic instruments (Schiller 1316).
While direct democracy is most prominent inside of the state structure, it is not
limited in its use to only the state and the rationale for its creation is institutional in
nature. In 2009 the Lisbon Treaty created the European Citizens’ Initiative as a tool to
promote direct democracy in European Union politics and since 2009 numerous
referendums on accession to the EU or votes on treaty amendments have been conducted
through the instruments of direct democracy (Schiller 9). The specific reason, arguably,
why direct democracy has been implemented in any form on the national level in
European democracies in the late 20th to early 21st centuries is institutional. Direct
democracy at the national level, according to political scientist Schiller, could support the
adoption of corresponding local institutions that help to not only appease ethnic or racial
representation but to prevent calls for separation or fragmentation (Schiller 14-15). At the
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same time, however, the reverse is also possible. The creation of local direct democracy
institutions could help in the promotion of national direct democracy institutions that
promote cross-cutting cleavage, alleviate ethnic or racial calls for representation, and
prevent the fragmentation of the national political culture. Whereas European countries
such as Switzerland and Liechtenstein fit well into the first pattern outlined, Norway and
the Czech Republic could fit within the second pattern (Schiller 13). Although the
instruments of direct democracy may be seen in various forms and their development
occurs in different manners, they are always adopted as methods that allow for greater
democratic participation, a desire for an increased sense of representation, and a want to
promote popular sovereignty (Schiller 13-15).

Figure 1.2 Procedures of direct democracy: country profiles from Theo Schiller’s
Local Direct Democracy in Europe – a comparative overview. The figure shows the
type of direct democracy procedures in European countries and their level of
restrictiveness.
While the modern forms of direct democracy are adequate supplements to the
current systems of representative democracy, it is also possible to design Athenian forms
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of direct democracy to replace the need for representatives in some cases. On a local
level, as well as on a national level, Athenian-style direct democracy can come to fruition
in the form of citizens’ assemblies with built-in mechanisms to reduce prejudice and
societal power dynamics (Klein 20). In citizens’ assemblies, all of the people would be
able to directly affect real political outcomes, shape political discourse, define agenda
priorities, and deliberate about the contents of the agenda (Klein 14). According to
political scientist Hélène Landemore, deliberation amongst the many in society will help
to filter out the noise of non-conventional voices and to push policies/legislation that is
more representative of the desires of the people (Klein 14-16). One can only hope,
however, that this is true. For if it fails to hold, citizens prove to vote narrowly and
selfishly and stupidly, then direct democracy must be considered “falsified” or a fallacy
unable to be implemented. Who would desire direct democracy if it was such an
ineffectual system of representation? In Defense of Anarchism, the anarchist philosopher
Robert Paul Wolff advocates for direct democracy and argues that at first people may
make stupid decisions that benefit only themselves or their group (Wolff 20-25).
Overtime, however, Wolff asserts that once the consequences of selfish actions are
realized, all citizens will begin to get serious and will act socially conscious in their
participation (Wolff 24). In some respects, Woloff continues along the same ideological
linens as Rousseau in his exploration of direct democracy as a mechanism for change:
should citizens follow the will of all (selfishness) when they vote or the General Will
(national or common interests)? No matter what the outcome of implementing direct
democracy may be, the will of the selfish or the common good, the mechanisms and
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institutions within direct democracy can help to decrease the likelihood or overall
negative effects of a worst-case scenario of this regime.
If the inclusion of all of the people is impossible, rather as a result of logistics or
a mere lack of participation, a representative sample of the population that is randomly
selected could be convened in a citizens’ assembly to deliberate and make decisions; a
randomly selected group that is representative of the population along socio-economic
lines would minimize the loss of diversity/representation amongst the deliberators (Klein
16). The citizen’s assembly, in its essence, is a miniature portrait or encapsulation of the
people in any given society.
Similar to how citizen assemblies can be scaled down, they can also be scaled up.
Imagine if large swaths of representative samples of the population were randomly
selected to form a part of the legislative branch of government every couple of years? Or
if a representative sample of the population that was randomly selected was formed to
deliberate on a specific piece of legislation or policy proposal? The benefits of citizens’
assemblies are that they can avoid the homogenizing effect placed on
deliberators/representatives when they are elected. For when the people elect
representatives, the decision-makers tend to be relatively homogenous along some
dimension, whether it be psychological features, race, gender, or various other socioeconomic features (Klein 20). As a result, elected officials that have undergone a
homogenizing feature struggle to envision or place themselves into the lives of others
(Klein 20). Citizens’ assemblies, similar to the more common modern mechanisms of
direct democracy used, provide a means to create more representative deliberation and
policymaking in the democratic practice than what is currently available in some systems.
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Additionally, citizens’ assemblies help to break down some barriers to representation by
incentivizing discourse across cleavages and incorporating mechanisms that ensure
political subcultures are included in representative samples of the population that are
convened to deliberate.
If democratic institutions are formulated in a way that excludes perspectives or
fails to ensure representation for political subcultures, they will not only be unable to
solve problems the best way you could, but they may also fragment the political culture
as calls for such representation mount (Klein 21). Recent research by Scott Page and Lu
Hong has shown that group intelligence is more so a function of group diversity than of
the individual intelligence of its members. That means that, statistically, a group is better
off with one more unit of group diversity than it would be with one more unit of
individual competence or intelligence (Klein 24). Likely, diversity and adequate
representation play such a key role in group functionality and effectiveness because said
diversity brings about the possibility of having a larger breadth of experiences or
opinions. This notion of diversity as a driver of effectiveness, therefore, suggests that the
whole premise of the 18th-century democratic institutions needing to incorporate an
“elite” representative to filter or moderate the will of the people is unfounded (Klein 21).
It turns out, despite the inklings of early political theorists like Aristotle, that democracy
would have been better off with “a mini portrait of the people” governing over society
rather than merely the “best and the brightest” drawn from the elites (Klein 19-21).
What’s more, the notion of diversity in a group—such as a legislative body—not
fragmenting the political culture calls into question if guaranteed representation or
systems of representation in the Semi-Autonomous and Consociational models cause a
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lack of effectiveness in governance as some claim or if some other cause is to blame for
said lack of effectiveness (Klein 19-21).
Throughout this discussion of direct democracy, one may ask, is direct democracy
even fully possible and would it be effective? The usage of direct democracy, in the
modern-day, is increasingly possible with the developments we have experienced in
communication technology over past decades (Schiller 16). Modern technology allows us
to conduct direct democracy practices, such as holding large-scale referendums, not only
in person but also via the digital realm. As a result, the people have access to a broad
breadth of ways that they can engage with politics and voice their opinions through votes
that were previously impossible in the previous generations. In particular, the digital
realm allows direct democracy to be transparent through mechanisms such as ballot
tracking or live tallying of votes (Schiller 13). Just because direct democracy could be
implemented, however, does not mean that we should implement it; for although it has
many positives, direct democracy also could have significant drawbacks for political
subcultures (Schiller 16).
Direct democracy, aside from being conducive to greater levels of democratic
participation and an increased feeling of representation, may not work in every type of
society nor may it protect minority rights.33 In societies that are highly fragmented or
divided, direct democracy may be used as a means to oppose other groups or to strip said
groups of their rights through referendums (Schiller 35). The question must be asked,
therefore, does direct democracy endanger minority rights rather than protect them?

33

Direct democracy may have the greatest equalizing effect in Anglo-American Majoritarian systems,
rather than a Consociational or Semi-Autonomous system, because there are often no protections put in
place nor assurances for ethnic or racial political subcultures, as seen in the case of the USA.
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Although he ignored certain aspects of embedding minority rights into democracy, when
creating the US constitution James Madison advocated against “pure democracy” because
of its ability to erode individual liberties. In particular, Madison argued that a united
majority could easily manipulate a system without representatives and that a system with
direct democracy cannot “cope with the ills of factions because there is no check on the
power of the majority to rule at the expense of others” (Lewis 365). Opponents of direct
democracy, like Madison, argue that mass participation exposes minority groups to
negative policy outcomes favored by possibly only by a majority of the voters.
Furthermore, they argue that without a representative, who supposedly encourages
deliberation and minority representation, minority rights are at an increased risk of being
eroded under mechanisms of direct democracy (Lewis 364). With mixed opinions on the
effectiveness of direct democracy and its ability to protect minority rights, which point of
view holds?
There has not been substantial data that can point in favor of direct democracy nor
against direct democracy; Anglo-American Majoritarian representative democracies,
however, have been shown to erode the rights of minority political subcultures within
them (Lewis 365). Nevertheless, it seems apparent that even if there is no substantial
evidence against direct democracies protecting minority rights that precautions should be
taken when implementing such systems to ensure that minority rights are protected.
Direct democracy, as it has been in modern history, should only be implemented as a
supplement to the representative democracy system and it should not be allencompassing. For example, when thinking about direct democracy, specific subjects
may be excluded from initiative or referendum (such as topics relating to ending or
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stripping rights, privileges...etc. related to a particular group) to ensure ethnic or racial
political subcultures do not have their rights taken away (Schiller 13-15).
Additionally, referendums begun by citizens’ initiatives need to be regulated,
outlining a designated number of signatures required for an initiative to be voted upon
and other criteria allowed for collecting signatures (Schiller 18). Outlining how
signatures can be obtained, who can sign, and setting a minimum number of signatures
required will allow mechanisms of direct democracy to overcome some “minority”
opinions or segments of the voting base that may seek to erode racial or ethnic rights
(Lewis 365). Another important factor to consider, to ensure ethnic or racial political
subcultures, is the criteria to determine the validity of the vote such as requirements for a
majority of eligible votes to be cast in order to create a quorum. In Germany, for
example, a majority of votes cast must also include about 15% to 25% of all registered
voters to establish a quorum and be valid (Schiller 18-19). Furthermore, precaution can
be taken to ensure that results are not valid if a certain percentage of each other's major
political subcultures has participated in the vote. Similar to having a minimum number of
signatures, having a minimum percentage of the total voting population present can help
to mitigate possible obstacles where minority political opinions could affect everyone.
The last factor that needs to be considered is if referendums/ballot votes should
take on a binding or an advisory (consultative) role (Schiller 17-19). If referendums are
binding, then they will have the effect of overriding or superseding the decisions of the
representative elected in office. Contrarily, if referendums are merely advisory, they will
serve to inform the elected representative of the will of the people on a certain topic but
will not, in and of themselves, override a representative's desired course of action
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(Schiller 18-19). There are many ways to limit direct democracy, should it be
implemented in a given state, and develop institutions that would protect ethnic or racial
political subcultures. The effectiveness of direct democracy in ensuring the
representation of ethnic or racial political subcultures is highly debatable and it may even
be advised that in Consociational or Semi-Autonomous systems that direct democracy be
viewed negatively; since the Consociational and Semi-Autonomous systems guarantees
representation for political subcultures, while direct democracy may be unable to.
Despite its possible shortcomings, nevertheless, local direct democracy allows
communities to return to a more purist envisioning of democracy, in which the people are
able to affect real political outcomes, shape political discourse, and define/deliberate the
agenda, rather than just elect representatives under the auspice of the elite-mass
compromise (Klein 14).

Reforming Institutions: “Radical” Change and Reform?
Each of the three systems examined throughout this work has its own strengths
and weaknesses in terms of effectiveness, but the Semi-Autonomous and Consociational
systems guarantee representation to racial or ethnic political subcultures. As such, let’s
turn towards the Anglo-American Majoritarian system as that which needs the most
guidance on reforming political institutions of the three systems examined.
The most exclusionary aspect of many Anglo-American Majoritarian systems is
the prominence of electoral systems, such as the first-past-the-post system, that allow the
majority ethnic group to dominate politics and isolate ethnic or racial political
subcultures. The options on reforming majoritarian electoral systems, like the first-past-
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the-post system, are to either replace them entirely with new electoral institutions such as
PR systems or to reform them to be more representative of the will of the people (Cho
1650-1651). Replacing majoritarian systems in favor of PR systems has been a common
call to action for many political scientists for good reason. In “Citizens’ Perceptions of
Government Responsiveness in Africa: Do Electoral Systems and Ethnic Diversity
Matter?” political scientist Wonbin Cho found that election systems affect perceptions of
government responsiveness to constituents. The relationship between election systems
and government responsiveness, however, is highly contingent on the degree of ethnic
diversity in society (Cho 1650-1655). Using data collected from 15 democratic countries
in Africa, Cho found that at lower levels of ethnic diversity, majoritarian electoral
systems (such as first-past-the-post) are much better at boosting citizens’ existing
external efficacy. Put simply, majoritarian electoral systems work well in relatively
homogenous countries and in said countries, they bolster individuals' feeling of
government responsiveness (Cho 1650-1655). Although, at higher levels of ethnic
diversity, Cho found that PR systems are more likely to elevate efficacy and promote a
sense of being represented (Cho 1650-1655). Cho’s findings, although not perfectly
aligning with this work's focus on Western democracies, have important implications for
constitutional design and understanding about the role that electoral systems have on the
actual or perceived representation of ethnic and racial political subcultures.
In Anglo-American Majoritarian systems, the replacement of the first-past-thepost electoral systems has a wider effect than one might assume at first glance, for the PR
system tends to undermine the left-right dichotomy that allows two parties to dominate
national politics in favor of a more fragmented political landscape (Edsall 1).
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Additionally, the PR system tends to promote, or rather allow the creation of parties
along descriptive minority identities and allows for anti-democratic or populist
sentiments to be relegated to the margins of politics (Edsall 1-2). For most AngloAmerican Majoritarian systems, a PR system would be a dramatic shift to the political
landscape of parties but for the USA it would be a seismic transition from their two-party
system. Traditionally, the American two-party system has allowed the segmentation of
different political views and beliefs under the umbrella of one of the two major parties,
the Democrats and the Republicans, along a left-right dimension (Edsall 1). In recent
times, the two-party system has come into conflict with itself, as anti-democratic and
populist segments of the far-right have become prominent in the Republican party.
According to political scientist Daniel Ziblatt:
The American Republican Party looks like a European far-right party...But
the big difference between the U.S. and a lot of these European countries is
that the U.S. only has two parties and one of them is like a European farright party. If the G.O.P. only controlled 20 percent of the legislature, like
you see in a lot of European countries, this would be far less problematic—
but they basically control half of it (Edsall 1).
Proportional representation would not only let the Republican party fragment by allowing
far-right segments to form a separate party but would allow both moderate and far-right
politicians/constituencies to have greater levels of representation (Edsall 2-3). Similar to
the possible fragmentation of the Republican party along ideological lines, a PR system
would allow racial or ethnic political subcultures to form parties instead of merely being
a fraction within a larger party; the creation of new parties that can focus on the needs of
particular political subculture and an increased presence in the political realm can
position racial or ethnic political subcultures as prominent political forces (Edsall 2-3).
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PR systems can also help to decrease the fragmentation of the political culture and
mitigate, in some cases, the prominence of secessionist movements by a country’s
political subcultures. In an essay titled “Ethnopolitical Parties and Democratic
Consolidation in Post-Communist Eastern Europe,” John Ishiyama investigated the
relationship between institutions and the extent to which ethnic groups make political
demands for separatism (Ishiyama 50). It tests several institutional remedies, like
consociationalism and Horwatiz’s strengthened executive approach, in light of the
evidence from 21 'minorities at risk' in post-communist Eastern Europe from 1990-98
(Ishiyama 50-52). The article finds that that proportional representation of ethnic groups
and the existence of relatively powerful presidencies are associated with less mass ethnic
protests. Additionally, the avoidance of destructive demands appears to be best promoted
by electoral systems which emphasize 'individualism' and less decentralization of
political authority (Ishiyama 51). A drawback to the PR system, however, is that it would
allow the most extreme anti-democratic forces now present in U.S. politics or other
Anglo-American Majoritarian systems to possibly be institutionalized unless precautions
are taken with minimum voter capture percentages to prevent fringe groups from gaining
elected seats (Edsall 4). The replacement of majoritarian electoral systems is one way of
shifting institutions towards greater representation for ethnic or racial political
subcultures.
Aside from replacement, it is also possible to reform existing majoritarian
electoral systems to be more representative by adopting mechanisms to push away radical
candidates. A top-two or top-four primary system (such as that in the state of Oregon and
the state of Washington) allows representatives to be more accountable to their
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constituents than to their party. One can vote for the desired candidate that they want
most of the most desirable one within their party (Egan 1-3). If no one candidate gets
51% of the vote, then a runoff election is held amongst the top two vote-getters. In this
case, if one’s most preferred candidate fails to make it to the top two, they can reevaluate
the best option for themselves and vote accordingly. Allows for voters to reach across
party lines or political subcultures to choose more moderate candidates and isolate radical
segments of a given party from being elected with a majority of voters’ support (Egan 3).
Additionally, a top-two system causes politicians to reach outside of their vote base to
gain a broader breadth of support for different segments of the constituency (Egan 3-4).
A problem with a top-two system is that they make it very hard for minor-party
candidates to advance and if one party is too fragmented then one of their candidates may
not make it to the top two. As such, a top-4 system may be more favorable for having a
more inclusive ticket to vote on (Egan 4). Aside from a top-4 system, the use of large
multimember districts (Rather than winner take all single-member districts) coupled with
ranked-choice voting and the expansion of the size of the legislative branch could aid in
greater representation for racial or ethnic political subcultures (Edsall 4). Reforming
existing Anglo-American Majoritarian systems or simply replacing them all together is
essential for not only promoting ethnic or racial representation of political subcultures
but in protecting them. Populism or the tyranny of the ethnic majority in Anglo-American
Majoritarian systems can be, quite literally, fatal for ethnic or racial political subcultures
(Egan 2-3).
The various methods discussed in this section can aid in increasing representation
in politics for ethnic or racial political subcultures, but they cannot ensure said
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representation. The only mechanisms that can ensure representation are institutional
guarantees such as those laid out in the Semi-Autonomous and Consociational
democratic systems. As such, institutions need to be created at least on a national level to
guarantee that the major political subcultures of a state are represented in the national
legislator. Many of the cases studied in the previous chapter took different approaches, if
any, to ensure that political subcultures were represented.
The Semi-Autonomous system of Spain, in particular, grabs one's attention
because it can provide allocation systems for seats in the national legislature based on
region. Similarly, the Consociational System of Belgium guaranteed representation to its
major political subcultures by guaranteeing not only regional but ethno-linguistic
representation in their national legislature through a dual system. Belgium is a rather
extreme case of division. However, aspects of the approaches used by Spain and Belgium
are both very effective in different contexts. The Spanish system would only function
properly if it was in a country where the political subcultures are concentrated in
different regions and, thus, can benefit from the relative autonomy gained or the
guaranteed seats in the national legislature for each autonomous community. In contrast,
the Belgian system of guarantees relies on regional concentration to some extent but also
on specific ethno-linguistic representation for the country’s political subcultures. The
Belgian dual approach is the better of the two systems because it allows for greater
representation of specific groups and also more generally of territorial regions.
Ideally, the guarantees given to the racial or ethnic political subcultures should be
substantial enough to make sure that their rights are not eroded, and they have adequate
representation but not so intrusive that they cause resentment or ineffectiveness of
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governance. To those ends, the “dualist” Belgian system of representation for the national
legislation appears to be the best system of representation examined in this body of work.
That is not to say, however, that the overly complex system of governance that Belgians
employ on every level of governance, and their highly decentralized government should
be adopted. Instead, the basic format of having a minimum number of seats reserved for
each territorial region and each of the major ethnic or racial political subcultures should
be employed on a national level. The representatives could be selected by requiring
parties to have a minimum number of each of the major ethnic or racial political
subcultures or simply by holding elections within the said political subcultures to choose
a representative. These reforms could stand on their own as a means of ensuring political
representation for political subcultures but could also work in collaboration with the
other reforms outlined in this essay such as the adoption of local direct democracy,
proportional representation, or the reform of majoritarian electoral systems. The
combination of these mechanisms or institutions, nevertheless, will help to prevent the
continued fragmentation of political cultures, stymie the ability of fringe segments of the
political realm to erode minority rights, and promote greater minority participation in the
democratic practice. These institutions, however, must be able to change with the shifting
of political subcultures relevance and the overall needs of a given society.
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CONCLUSION: What Does it All Mean?
This thesis sought to answer and explore one simple question: can a democracy
truly be representative if there is a need for “equal footing” amongst citizens, that is as of
yet unmet, in the political realm and elected officials are not representative of the
populace? For all intents and purposes this question has been explored in great detail
throughout the duration of this thesis in hopes of shedding light on the importance of
representation for ethnic or racial political subcultures in a world of rapidly changing
demographic compositions. The simple answer to the question, I posed, as seen through
the case study is a resounding no; a representative government that fails to be
representative, both descriptively and substantively, of the people within a society is in
fact not a representative government and arguably fails short of even being a democracy.
Increased levels of descriptive representation for ethnic or racial political
subcultures can lead to greater participation by minority groups, a feeling of political
inclusion/representation amongst said groups and overall improved efficiency of
democracy. The absence of said representation, however, often leads to large-scale
discontent amongst political subcultures, heightened fragmentation of the political
cultures and various other symptoms of democratic decline. Recent trends in the decline
of democracy can be partially attributed to a lack of democratic legitimacy that has been
caused by a failure to intentionally account for demographic diversity in the elites-masses
compromise that underpins representative democracies and a continued failure of many
regimes to reform institutions to intentionally incorporate ethnic or racial political
subcultures. In particular, of the types of representative democracies studied in this
thesis, the Anglo-American Majoritarian system has the least mechanisms in place to
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ensure representation for political subcultures and tends to lead to the lowest rates of
racial or ethnic representation (Dahrendorf 19). The eternity of the people, put simply, are
not represented adequately and the root of the problem is the inequality inherent to the
elite-mass compromise that underpins representation. The inequalities developed in
societies, prior to the elite-mass compromise were stratified through the social
differentiation of elites’ positions and the social stratification of elites’ place in society as
“representatives” of the people's will (Dahrendorf 19).
Since the time of ancient Athens, notions of governance by the dēmos through
popular assemblies have been a cornerstone of democratic theory. Athenian democracy,
itself, was the purest form democracy for it allowed the governing of the state by the
people through the use of popular assemblies and other direct democracy institutions
(Schwartzberg 312-313). For Athenians like Aristotle, however, not all human beings
were political in nature or able to meaningfully participate in democracy because of their
natural capabilities; namely women, slaves, children, and foreigners were unfit for
political rule (Aristotle Book I). Aristotle was concerned with inequality as a form of
social stratification that could work in favor of a larger society; only by excluding some
from the dēmos, Aristotle asserted, could a regime function effectively (Dahrendorf 20).
Similar to Aristotle, Plato viewed a strict aristocratic society with a strong meritocratic
component centered around justice and not democratic freedom was an ideal way to rule
(Plato Book IV). While Plato created exclusion within a society based on human “nature”
or ability, Aristotle created exclusions based on citizenship or “freedom.” Plato and
Aristotle both embraced inequality in society and their conceptualizations of inequality in
participation as a necessity for regime, paving the way for generations of political
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theorists to segment societal structures so that the favored few within a society could
represent the will of the people (Plato Book IV). Inherent in their work as well is the
understanding that the people should include only certain aspects of society or favor
certain groups in terms of representation and power (Plato Book IV).
Exclusion of the people can come from structural understandings of who should
rule, who should be excluded, or from an understanding of the people as ethnos or dēmos.
An ethnos understanding can limit those included within the collective of the state along
ethnic lines but also through the forced removal of included groups from the state as seen
in the case of the homogenizing cultural agenda of the Franco government in Spain over
political subcultures in their nation (Taylor 100). There are many ways to exclude
segments of one's population from having representation; many of which have lasting
effects on the political apparatus of a society, for those initially chosen to be the people
will hold an institutionally powerful position in society (Agamben 3-5). The creation of
differentiations between the people and the exclusion of some from being defined as the
people results in “bio fracture” society; the “bio fracture” of the people initiates a
fragmentation of the political culture of nations by political subcultures, who are often
not entirely included or represented in notions of the people, vying to partake and gain
power (Agamben 3).
The inequalities codified into society by conceptualizations of who was/is
included and the acceptance of a privileged group of people being able to represent the
people is the foundation of a mixed democratic regime; mixed regimes, in their essence,
sought to incorporate the people or segments of the people into national governance but
to moderate their power through institutions. Conceptualized by Aristotle as “the Polity,”
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a mixed democratic regime was ruled by a select segment of citizens that are “neither rich
nor poor” and who rule in the favor of the people (Aristotle Book III). The idea of a
mixed democratic regime was later adopted by the Roman Republic through its use of
public assemblies, senatorial officials, and various councils to rule over its domain
(Machiavelli 193). During the English Civil War and the various eighteenth-century
democratic revolutions, however, the aristocratic or monarchist institutions of ancient
Rome were replaced with new mixed systems designed to moderate the people through
representation (Pitkin 338). In the modern day, the tool of representation has continued to
be used as the basis for mixed democratic regimes such as representative democracies
because it allows for the continued moderation of the people, the partial participation of
the people in the practice of governance, and compromise across various segments of
society. Representative democracy is underpinned, like all mixed regimes, by an elitemass compromise; in the elite-mass compromise, elections give the masses a right to
choose representatives to express their ideas but prevents them from actually intervening
directly in governance (Näsström 2).
The tool of representation used in representative democracies, therefore, arouses
the question of what is representation and who is being represented? There are numerous
schools of political theory that explore what is representation, who is a representative,
how to classify representation, and who has power in a representative-constituent
relationship. For the purpose of this thesis, however, we focused on how the
representative as an individual person represents or fails to represent constituents
descriptively in terms of race and ethnicity. Racial or ethnic representation was the
cornerstone of this analysis because, as seen in the case studies section, it tended to be the
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factor that fragmented the political culture of a representative democracy the most, as
political subcultures sought greater political power. With representation established as
the key mechanism of moderating the people—reinforced by institutional mechanisms
like national senates, majoritarian electoral systems, and the limiting or elimination of
direct democracy tools like referendums—and dictating who is present in political
discourse, a greater analysis of some of the different types of representative democracy
was needed.
This thesis built upon the ground breaking work of political scientists Gabriel
Almond and Arend Lijphart to outline three different types of representative
democracies: (1) the Anglo-American Majoritarian systems (embodied by the UK and
USA), (2) the Semi-Autonomous system (embodied by Spain and Canada), and (3) the
Consociational system (embodied by Belgium and Bosnia) (Almond 397-398). Each of
the three types of representative democracies explored had defining institutional
mechanisms that either promoted, ignored, or discouraged the representation of the
country’s political subcultures in the political system.
The Consociational system granted the greatest number of institutions to ensure
minority representation and security in the legislative/executive process, granting large
degrees of regional autonomy and often occurring in only the most divided of nations
(Lijphart 208). Consociational systems ensure seats in the national legislature for relevant
political subcultures, a mutual veto, PR electoral mechanisms, and various other
institutions; these institutional mechanisms often coincided with a thick political culture
that allowed for crossethnic communication collaboration or communication and
minimized the fragmentation of the political culture (Lijphart 218-220). Consociational
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systems, however, were observed to be ineffective in maintaining a ruling coalition, had
strong or growing secessionist movements, and are possibly culpable of enshrining
differences within a society to create “virtual apartheid” systems.
Similar to the Consociational system, in many regards, the Semi-Autonomous
system ensures the representation of relevant racial or ethnic political subcultures
through the delegation of autonomy (especially cultural, religious, or linguistic
autonomy) to different regions, PR electoral systems, and legislative mechanisms that
delegate a minimum number of seats to political subcultures (Almond 391). The key
differences between the two systems is the level of autonomy given, the number of
institution assurances for political subcultures, and the power invested in the central
government (Shabad 112-114). Semi-Autonomous systems appeared to be more effective
at maintaining a government coalition than the Consociational system but suffered from
similar concerns about political fragmentation, the reinforcement of existing societal
divisions through representative mechanisms, and prominent secessionist movements
(Shabad 113).
The last system explored was the Anglo-American Majoritarian system,
underpinned by majoritarian electoral systems, the ignoring of political subcultures, and
the absorption of political issues along a left-right dimension (Almond 391). The AngloAmerican Majoritarian system has no guarantees or reassurances in place for the relevant
ethnnic or racial political subcultures that may dwell within a country. As a result, the
Anglo-American Majoritarian system has the lowest levels of representation for political
subcultures (often opting merely to “overlook” them). In contrast, however, AngloAmerican Majoritarian systems were relatively stable, and they had high levels of
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government efficiency (Almond 391). From the analysis of six different countries with
the three aforementioned types of representative democracy, clear defining features could
be seen in each system and the health of the national (Lijphart 220).
Each of the three systems analyzed, and the six countries explored, used various
institutional systems of moderation and defined—whether intentionally or
unintentionally—who the people were that should have political power or representation
were (Agamben 3-5). In the case of the Anglo-American Majoritarian the people were
defined as the simple majority of the country’s population, which tended to coincide with
the majority ethnnic or racial group within a country (Agamben 4). Nevertheless, there
are examples of Anglo-American Majoritarian systems where political subcultures
engage in secessionist movements similar to and government ineffectiveness in terms of
political partisanship can be seen. In the Semi-Autonomous and Consociational systems,
the people were characterized as all of the relevant ethnic or racial political subcultures
within the country and, if applicable, the majority ethnic or racial group. As a result, the
Semi-Autonomous and Consociational systems created institutional systems and tools to
ensure that the people were adequately represented within government (Agamben 3-5).
The more inclusive the defining of the people, the greater number of representative
mechanisms were adopted, and the lower the “biofracture” within a given society and
thus the fragmentation of the political culture by political subcultures.
The question remains, upon a complete analysis of the six different cases, if
greater levels of ethnic or racial representation for political subcultures was a positive or
a negative thing? Although ineffectiveness in maintaining a ruling party and complicated
institutional systems seem to grow as a greater number of mechanisms are introduced to
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ensure racial or ethnic representation of political subcultures, data drawn from various
studies have shown that descriptive representation is positively associated with increased
levels of minority participation, governmental effectiveness, and the feeling of
representation in minority communities (Cho 1650-1655). Additionally, greater
representation can help to offset the recent prominence of populist or nationalist
movements caused by the fragmentation of the political culture. Perhaps, therefore, the
issue that causes lower levels of government effectiveness is not the level of guaranteed
representation for racial or ethnic political subcultures but rather the complexity of the
systems in place, the level of autonomy given to different regions or some factor not
explored by this work. No matter the cause of differing levels of government
effectiveness, the fact remains that descriptive representation of relevant political
subcultures stands at the center of cultural fragmentation to some extent in all three types
of representative democracies studied.
To address the issue of representation for ethnic or racial political subcultures,
institutions need to be created or reformed so that they can ensure descriptive
representation on some level locally and nationally. This thesis outlines four methods to
accomplish greater descriptive representation, focusing on the Anglo-American model in
particular:
(1) The adoption of Semi-Autonomous of Consociational guarantees/mechanisms
in national legislators when political subcultures are relatively concentrated and
the majority in a geographic region.
(2) The use of modern direct democracy mechanisms like referendums of
representative recalls to supplement representative democracies and grant greater
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direct input from the People (Schiller 13-14). Modern direct democracy
mechanisms can function well not only on a local level but also on a national
level but they need to be regulated.
(3) The replacement of representative institutions with “citizens assemblies” that
resemble, in some regards, the popular assemblies of Ancient Athens and can
actively debate on policy. The assemblies could be large in size, encompassing all
citizens, or smaller and composed of a representative sample of randomly selected
citizens. Citizens assemblies could function locally or nationally and be scaled as
necessary, especially with current technological advancements, but they need to
be regulated (Klein 20).
(4) The reform or replacement of existing electoral systems in Anglo-American
systems. In particular the replacement of the first-past-the-post electoral system
with a PR system and the use of a top-two system or ranked choice voting system
(Edsall 1).

Of the ways to increase representation for ethnic or racial political subcultures, the
adoption of direct democracy is the greatest departure from current practices in
representative democracies. There has not been substantial data that can point in favor of
direct democracy nor against it; however, it could be a valuable tool in returning power to
the people and allowing for greater participation in the political realm (Schiller 18). All
of the various methods of increasing descriptive representation, nevertheless, are viable
routes for representative democracies to take.
The lack of descriptive representation for relevant racial or ethnic political
subcultures in some types of democratic regimes, namely the Anglo-American system,
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has allowed for the fragmentation of national political cultures and a loss of government
democratic legitimacy as the elite-mass compromise that underpins representative
democracy is called into question by elites of political subcultures excluded from the
process and populist sentiments of the majority ethnic culture. As a result, a dual
legitimacy has been formed (embodied by the prominence of secessionist movements in
many western democracies) in which elites of political subcultures vie for power with the
majority ethnicity and fragment the political culture in the process. What is left is a lack
of trust in government institutions, the rise of the radical-right or secessionist parties, and
societal resentment across ethno-linguistic cleavages. To stymie the current degradation
of democratic practices systems, need to be put in place in order to ensure representation
of relevant political subcultures and strengthen political cultures by reinvesting power in
the hands of the people. What is needed, put simple, is a rethinking or reform of the elitemass compromise that modern democracies stand on to place the people at the center of
governance.
With mechanisms of ensured representation, every ethnic or racial group within a
society can improve the quality of representation and overcome the mentality of politics
as a zero-sum game of warfare. There is an intense societal concern, as has been explored
throughout this thesis, about exclusion or inclusion and the loss of political power by
granting greater levels of inclusion. The reality of the matter, however, is that developing
mechanisms of representation is a return to fundamental principles that democracy was
founded on and not some impending extinction for the ethnic or racial majority in power
within a society. In a world where demographics are rapidly changing, the demographic
majority of today can be the demographic minority of the future so it is paramount that
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institutions are developed to provide adequate and proportional representation to all
people within a society; in this way, representation, in fact, enhances the standing of the
majority and the minority by ensuring that neither will ever be without adequate
representation in relation to their size in the population.
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